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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation I analyze the economics of racial segregation. Each chapter provides the-
oretical models and empirical methods to analyze the separation of racial groups in several
contexts.
Chapter 2 propose a method for measuring residential segregation using techniques from
the spatial statistics literature. The available indices of segregation depend on a partition
of the city in neighborhoods: given the spatial distribution of racial groups, different par-
titions translate in different levels of measured segregation. I propose a location-specific
index, that maps individual coordinates to local level of segregation. The segregation of the
metropolitan area is measure as the average individual segregation. Therefore, the level of
segregation measured according to my approach is independent from arbitrary partitions. I
show that this method provides a different ranking of cities’ segregation than the traditional
neighborhood-based measures. The method estimates the entire distribution of segregation
across individuals and I provide evidence that high levels of aggregate segregation are the
consequence of very few highly segregated neighborhoods. Using the spatial indices, I show
evidence of the negative effect of segregation on individual outcomes of minorities.
Chapter 3 and 4 analyze segregation in social networks. In Chapter 3, I develop and es-
timate a structural model of strategic network formation with heterogeneous agents. Struc-
tural estimation of strategic models of network formation is challenging, since these models
usually have multiple equilibria. I present a dynamic model where the network is formed
sequentially: each period an individual has the opportunity to update his linking strategy.
This generates a sequence of networks that converges to a unique stationary equilibrium.
I characterize the equilibrium as providing the likelihood of observing a specific network
structure in the long run. However the estimation is complicated, since the likelihood is
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proportional to a normalizing constant that cannot be evaluated or approximated with pre-
cision. To overcome this problem, I propose a Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo method
that allows estimation of the posterior without evaluating the likelihood. I study segrega-
tion in social networks using data from Add Health, a survey of US high schools, containing
detailed information on school friendship networks. I find that students prefer interactions
with individuals of the same race. The simulation of several busing programs shows that
perfect integration across schools may not be optimal. An equalization of racial shares across
schools may increase segregation and decrease welfare.
In Chapter 4, I focus on an alternative estimation method. I propose an approximate
Maximum likelihood estimation strategy. Assuming the utilities are linear in parameters, it
can be shown that the Maximum likelihood maximization problem has the same solution of a
system of nonlinear equations, which I solve using a stochastic approximation algorithm. To
perform the stochastic approximation, I develop an algorithm to generate samples from the
stationary equilibrium of the model. The algorithm is a variant of the Simulated tempering
and allows fast convergence to the equilibrium distribution, decreasing the computational
costs of estimation. Using Add Health data, I confirm the results of Chapter 3.
iii
To my Dad:
I will never stop studying.
iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I have been blessed with an incredible academic environment at UIUC. I am greatly in-
debted with Roger Koenker for his continuous support, advice and encouragement. He’s
been a great advisor and an outstanding role model. I appreciate the creative-destructive
approach of Ron Laschever, whose invaluable suggestions and comments made me re-think
and re-write the papers several times. I am grateful to Dan Bernhardt: his encouragement
pushed me to reach more than I thought possible for this project. George Deltas pointed
out several limitations of the work and possible extensions that improved the quality of each
essay. Thanks to Darren Lubotsky, for his patient comments on previous versions of these
projects; and to Daniel McMillen for his suggestions on the first essay.
I am grateful to my brother Antonio. He has read many versions of each essay, suggesting
several changes in their structure and presentation. His ”referee reports” on my papers are
always very harsh, but each of them generates increasing returns in my productivity. Thanks
to Eliana La Ferrara, my favorite coauthor. She introduced me to this topic 10 years ago,
and since then she taught me more than I could thank her for. Thanks to Gianluca Violante,
for giving me a second chance.
During my 6 years at UIUC, I had the opportunity to meet many great friends, to learn
with them and from them. Micah has been a great flatmate, a stimulating colleague and
enthusiastic coauthor. I shared with Harry many hours of work, several fun trips and above
all, an infinite amount of meals. I also thank Hilal, Sahan, Vidisha, Tom, Sergey, Mona,
Xiang for making my days in Champaign less boring.
Thanks to my mom Elena: she taught me to be persistent in life, a quality that helps a
lot when dealing with Fortran 90. And thanks to Shweta, for her management of my panic
attacks during this period. She can keep her cool even in the worst situation, and I am glad
v
she is part of my life.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
CHAPTER 2 POISSON INDICES OF SEGREGATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.1 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Motivation and Practical Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 Theoretical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3.1 Notation, Basic Properties and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3.2 Measuring Segregation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4 Spatial Indices of Segregation and Diversity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.4.1 Spatial Dissimilarity Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.4.2 Spatial Exposure Indices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.4.3 Spatial Fractionalization Indices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.4.4 Spatial Entropy Indices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.5 Empirical Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.5.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.5.2 Estimation Strategy with Exact Location Data . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.5.3 Estimation Strategy with Block Level Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.6 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.6.1 Global Segregation In US Cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.6.2 Individual Segregation Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.6.3 The Impact of Segregation on Socioeconomic Outcomes . . . . . . . . 43
2.7 Extensions to Continuous and Multiple Marks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.8 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
CHAPTER 3 A STRUCTURAL MODEL OF SEGREGATION IN SOCIAL NET-
WORKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.2 A Model of Network Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.2.1 Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.2.2 Equilibrium Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
vii
3.3 Estimation Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.3.1 Computational Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.3.2 Estimation Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.3.3 Connections to Exponential Random Graphs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.3.4 Identification and Practical Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.3.5 The Add Health Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.4 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.4.1 Policy Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
CHAPTER 4 SEGREGATION IN SOCIAL NETWORKS: MONTE CARLO
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.2 A Model of Network Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.3 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.3.1 General Idea and Computational Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.3.2 Likelihood Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.3.3 Estimation Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.4 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.4.1 Artificial Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.4.2 Add Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
APPENDIX A TECHNICAL APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
A.1 Background Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
A.1.1 Notation, Basic Properties and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
A.1.2 First and Second Order Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
A.1.3 Poisson Processes and Marked Poisson Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
A.2 Point Processes Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
A.2.1 Independent Scattering Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
A.2.2 Probability Law of a Poisson Point Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
A.2.3 The process under A1,A2 and A3 is Poisson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
A.2.4 The case of Multitype Point Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
A.3 Proofs of the Main Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
A.4 Artificial Cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
APPENDIX B TECHNICAL APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
B.1 Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
B.2 Computational Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
B.2.1 Network Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
B.2.2 Posterior Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
B.2.3 Convergence Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
B.2.4 Parallel estimation with multiple networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
B.2.5 Freeman Segregation Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
B.3 Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
viii
APPENDIX C TECHNICAL APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
C.1 Derivation of the Pseudo-Likelihood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
C.2 Maximum Likelihood estimation problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
C.3 Simulation Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
C.3.1 The Main Building Blocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
C.3.2 Slow Mixing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
C.3.3 Large Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
C.3.4 Tempering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
C.3.5 Accelerating the Simulated Tempering Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . 177
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
ix
LIST OF TABLES
2.1 Spatial Dissimilarity vs Traditional Dissimilarity (African Americans) . . . . 41
2.2 Spatial Dissimilarity vs Traditional Dissimilarity (Multigroup) . . . . . . . . 42
2.3 Correlations with traditional indices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.4 Individual Distribution of Spatial Dissimilarity, Quartiles (African Americans) 45
2.5 Individual Distribution of Spatial Dissimilarity, Quartiles (Multigroup) . . . 46
2.6 Individuals 20-24 years old, OLS results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.7 Individuals 20-24 years old, IV results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.8 Individuals 25-30 years old, OLS results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.9 Individuals 25-30 years old, IV results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.1 Descriptive Statistics for the schools in the Saturated Sample . . . 89
3.2 Posterior Distribution, Structural Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.3 Posterior Distribution, Direct Utility only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.1 Estimation, Artificial Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.2 Estimation Results, Add Health School 28 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
A.1 Traditional vs Spatial Dissimilarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
B.1 Convergence Experiments, n = 50 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
B.2 Convergence Experiments, n = 100 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
x
LIST OF FIGURES
2.1 Different partitions imply different segregation levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2 Spatial Distribution of Racial Groups in New York PMSA, 2000 . . . . . . . 31
2.3 Estimated Conditional Probability of African American, New York PMSA 2000 36
2.4 Blacks Spatial Dissimilarity vs Traditional Dissimilarity (Blocks) . . . . . . . 37
2.5 Blacks Spatial Dissimilarity vs Traditional Dissimilarity (Tracts) . . . . . . . 38
2.6 Multigroup Spatial Dissimilarity vs Traditional Dissimilarity (Blocks) . . . . 39
2.7 Multigroup Spatial Dissimilarity vs Traditional Dissimilarity (Tracts) . . . . 40
2.8 Individual Black Segregation Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.1 Components of the utility function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.2 The Exchange Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.3 A School Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.4 Posterior Distribution, Full Structural Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.5 Posterior Distribution, Full Structural Model (continued) . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.6 Policy Experiments for School 88 (Structural Model) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.7 Policy Experiments for School 88 (only direct links) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.8 Policy Experiments for School 106 (Structural Model) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.9 Policy Experiments for School 106 (only direct links) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.1 Components of the utility function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
A.1 Artificial Cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
B.1 Convergence to the high density posterior region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
B.2 Convergence, autocorrelation functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
B.3 Convergence of the simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
C.1 A. Bimodal Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
C.2 B. Simulated Tempering Intuition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
xi
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Racial segregation indicates the separation of racial groups in social contexts. It is a perva-
sive phenomenon that has been studied by sociologists, political scientists and economists
and observed in several. This thesis analyzes the economics of racial segregation, using a
mix of economic theory, econometrics and simulation methods.
The first part of the thesis focuses on residential segregation in US metropolitan areas.
Chapter 2 propose a method to measure residential segregation using techniques from the
spatial statistics literature. Most available indices of segregation depend on a partition of
the city in neighborhoods: given the spatial distribution of racial groups, different partitions
translate in different levels of measured segregation. I propose a location-specific index, that
maps individual coordinates to local level of segregation. The segregation of the metropoli-
tan area is measure as the average individual segregation. The resulting index is therefore
independent from arbitrary partitions in neighborhoods. I show that this method provides
a different ranking of cities’ segregation than the traditional neighborhood-based measures.
The methodology allow the researcher to analyze the entire distribution of segregation across
individuals, showing that that high levels of aggregate segregation are the result of very few
neighborhoods with high segregation. Using the spatial indices, I find evidence of the nega-
tive effect of segregation on individual outcomes of minorities, as in previous literature. In
cities with higher segregation, individual socioeconomic performance is lower, as measured
by high school and college graduation, earnings and idleness.
The second part of the thesis, studies segregation in social networks. In Chapter 3, I
develop a dynamic model of strategic network formation with heterogeneous agents that al-
lows structural estimation. There are two main challenges in estimating structural models of
strategic network formation. First, these models have multiple equilibria, making estimation
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and identification very challenging. Second, the number of possible network configurations
increases exponentially with the number of players. As a consequence, the model may re-
quire an infeasible number of computations to find all equilibria.
The model developed in this work has a unique stationary equilibrium, which character-
izes the likelihood of observing a specific network configuration in the long run. This proves
crucial for estimation: I can estimate the structural parameters using only one observation
of the network at a single point in time. However, the estimation is complicated, since the
likelihood is proportional to a normalizing constant that cannot be computed or approxi-
mated with precision.
There are two alternative strategies to perform inference. In Chapter 3, I propose a
Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo approach to perform estimation of the posterior distri-
bution without evaluating the normalizing constant. The proposed algorithm decreases the
computational burden and allows estimation of high-dimensional models in reasonable time.
Using data from Add Health, I estimate preference for interracial interaction, showing that
students prefer to interact with individuals of the same racial group. Several simulations of
desegregation plans show that equalization of the racial groups shares among schools may
decrease welfare and increase segregation within schools, through the effect on interracial
friendships. These findings show that desegregation programs should be carefully designed
to avoid unexpected consequences.
In Chapter 4, I propose an approximate maximum likelihood estimation method for the
same model. Estimation through direct maximization of the likelihood is not possible, since
the likelihood contains the normalizing constant. Therefore the maximization methods that
require evaluation of the objective function cannot be used. The same is true for methods
that require derivatives, since the derivative of the likelihood also include the normalizing
constant.
The method I propose avoids evaluation of the constant. Assuming that the utilities are
linear in parameters, it can be shown that the likelihood maximization problem is equivalent
to solving a system of nonlinear moment equations. I use a stochastic approximation algo-
rithm to solve the system of equations. This requires a method to generate samples from the
stationary equilibrium of the model. To this end, I develop a Simulated Tempering algorithm
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that guarantees fast convergence to the stationary equilibrium and allows fast exploration
of the enormous state space of the model. One of the crucial aspects of the algorithm is the
determination of a good initial value for the simulations. I propose to use the posterior mean
estimated in Chapter 3 as opposed to the suggestion in the literature, i.e. the Maximum
Pseudo-Likelihood Estimator (MPLE). Estimates with artificial data show that the MPLE
is a very poor choice as initial value. I estimate preference for interracial interaction using
Add Health, confirming the results of Chapter 3.
The methods presented in this thesis could be used in several alternative applications.
The spatial methods used in Chapter 2 can be used in the study of economic agglomeration.
The methods of estimation presented in Chapter 3 and 4 can be used in models of social
interactions and in spatial econometrics models.
The remaining of the work proceed as follows. In Chapter 2, I present the methodology
to study residential segregation. Chapter 3 and 4 contain the model of network formation
and the Bayesian and Approximate MLE methods of estimation, respectively. All the proofs
and computational details are contained in Appendices A, B and C.
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CHAPTER 2
POISSON INDICES OF SEGREGATION
2.1 Introduction
The spatial separation of racial groups in US metropolitan areas is well documented by a large
body of research in sociology and economics.1 Most of the studies find a negative correlation
between residential segregation and socioeconomic outcomes of minorities. The empirical
strategy in this literature consists of regressing a measure of socioeconomic performance on
several controls and an index that proxies for the level of segregation in the metropolitan
area.
However, all the existing indices of segregation are based on a partition of the city in
neighborhoods, that makes the index directly dependent on the specific partition adopted.
In particular, given a spatial distribution of racial groups, the index measures different
segregation levels for alternative neighborhood definitions.2 This mismeasurement problem
raises concerns about the robustness of the estimated relationship between segregation and
outcomes.
To overcome these issues, I propose a method mapping individual locations to the level of
aggregate segregation in a city and show how this affects the estimated correlation between
racial segregation and socioeconomic outcomes. Assuming that the spatial distribution of
socioeconomics characteristics is the realization of a spatial stochastic process generating
(exogenous) clustering by race, I define an individual location-specific index of segregation.
1See for example Massey and Denton (1988), Massey and Denton (1993), Cutler and Glaeser (1997),
Cutler et al. (1999),Ananat (2011), Echenique and Fryer (2007), Frankel and Volij (2011), Card and Rothstein
(2007), Collins and Margo (2000), Ferrara and Mele (2011),Ananat and Washington (2009).
2The Spectral Segregation Index of Echenique and Fryer (2007) is an exception. Their index uses indi-
vidual locations as primitive of the index and therefore does not depend on an arbitrary partition of the city
in neighborhoods.
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The primitives of my index are the individuals’ coordinates and their segregation levels. The
metropolitan area segregation is measured as average of the individual indices.
The intuition behind this formulation is simple. Suppose to select a random coordinate in
the metropolitan area and draw a circle of 1km radius around the point. Compute the share
of blacks living in the circle: this is the probability of black location in that small area. Now
let’s shrink the radius until the area around the point becomes infinitesimal. The limit of
the black share is the probability that the individual at that location is African American.
Now suppose to repeat this procedure for all the points in the metropolitan area: the result
will be a continuous spatial density, that describes the probability of blacks location in the
city. If there is no segregation the spatial distribution of blacks does not vary over the
metropolitan area, it is flat. Therefore the metropolitan area segregation will be higher the
greater the difference between the actual spatial distribution of racial groups and the flat
spatial density.
This method has several advantages with respect to the traditional neighborhood-based
approach. First, the estimated index does not depend on arbitrary partitions of the city
in neighborhoods. I obtain the probability of location for each racial group for all possible
locations in the metropolitan area, without relying on arbitrary neighborhood definitions. If
the neighborhood definition changes over time my measure of segregation is unaffected.3
Second, this method provides the entire distribution of segregation among individuals and
over space, allowing the researcher to identify which individuals or spatial regions are driving
the spatial separation of groups. Indeed in the empirical section I argue that in many cases
the synthetic index alone may be misleading: the estimated distributions are very skewed
and very few extremely segregated individuals drive the average segregation, while most of
the population experiences moderate levels of spatial separation.
Third, the estimation method relies on simple nonparametric techniques, available in
standard statistical software.4 Therefore the computational burden is minimal and the time
3Most researcher define a neighborhood as a Census Tract. The US Census Bureau periodically revises the
definitions of census tracts. Therefore the neighborhood partitions change over time, making comparability
of the indices even more problematic.
4I use the packages splancs, spatstat and spatialkernel for the free statistical software R. I also
developed fast C codes to accelerate the estimation for big datasets.
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needed for estimation is reasonable.5 In this paper the spatial distribution and the index
are estimated using kernel estimation methods. In principle, as long as the researcher has
access to a spatial random sample of individuals/locations for the metropolitan area, it is still
possible to estimate the average segregation. This could possibly reduce the computational
burden even further.
Finally, this formulation is very flexible and it provides a unified framework for the sta-
tistical analysis of several spatial indices. Using alternative distance functions to measure
the difference between spatial densities, I build several indices of diversity and segregation
based on the spatial approach. The diversity indices are the Spatial Fractionalization In-
dex and the Spatial Entropy Index, that measure the average population heterogeneity in
the metropolitan area, taking into account the location of individuals and their local di-
versity. Several measures of segregation are also derived: a Spatial Dissimilarity, a Spatial
Relative Fractionalization, a Spatial Relative Entropy, a Spatial Exposure and a Spatial
Normalized Exposure. All these indices measure the segregation of the average individual in
the metropolitan area, but differ in the specific distance function used as primitive. Other
traditional indices of segregation can be reformulated in this framework.
The spatial approach can be considered as a complement to the social network approach
of Echenique and Fryer (2007): they develop a segregation index based on individuals’ social
networks, satisfying three axioms. The Spectral Segregation Index (SSI) measures segrega-
tion based on social interactions with same race neighbors and it allows disaggregation at
the individual level. In this sense the SSI shares most of the advantages of the spatial ap-
proach, since it is independent of neighborhood partitions. The Spectral Segregation Index
is more apt to measure segregation in non-spatial contexts (school segregation, employment
segregation), where ”neighborhoods” have non-spatial informational content. On the other
hand, the spatial approach has a comparative advantage in dealing with segregation in ge-
ographical contexts, since it is specifically developed for the analysis of spatial data. In
such contexts the SSI uses geographical distance only as an approximation for social inter-
5The only available individual level measure of segregation, the Spectral Segregation Index, is computa-
tionally very challenging for big cities. This is because the index is based on the network of each individual,
requiring the computation of eigenvalues of an association matrix. This computation itself may require
several hours for cities like New York. My index for New York can be computed in less than a minute.
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actions. In this sense we can distinguish the two approaches: the social network approach
is individual-specific while the spatial approach is location-specific.
The paper describes several distributional properties of the spatial approach. After deriv-
ing the theoretical moments for any possible index of segregation, I restrict my attention to
the family of additive indices, where each individual location contributes additively to the
aggregate index. For each individual I define a location-specific index of segregation and
measure the aggregate level of spatial separation as the average individual segregation. I
characterize the expectation and variance for this family of indices.
The methodology is applied to the study of racial segregation in US metropolitan areas
using Census 1990 and 2000 data. The estimate of the spatial distribution is obtained using
standard nonparametric kernel estimation techniques for spatial point processes.6 A crucial
step in the estimation of segregation is the choice of the bandwidth for the kernel estimator.
One could say that the spatial approach replaces the problem of neighborhood partition
with the problem of bandwidth selection, since the estimated index would depend on the
bandwidth chosen. On the other hand, the bandwidth is chosen using Mean Squared error
minimization criteria as it is standard procedure in nonparametric statistics, with known
statistical properties and with a ridiculous computational burden.7 Another advantage is
that different cities will have different optimal kernel bandwidths, according to their geo-
graphical properties and racial composition. This is an issue that could not be considered
when segregation is measured using indices based on the neighborhood approach. In partic-
ular, one could interpret the optimal bandwidth as a measure of the optimal neighborhood
radius.
I estimate actual segregation levels for all the metropolitan areas in the US using the
average individual segregation. I compare the segregation levels measured by the spatial
dissimilarity and the traditional dissimilarity. The levels of segregation and ranking of cities
are very different when using my approach. For example, Muncie (IN) is the metropolitan
area with highest segregation for African Americans according to the spatial dissimilarity,
6See Diggle (2003), Diggle et al. (2005) and Cressie (1993) for details.
7The procedure is implemented in standard statistical software and the time needed for computation of
the optimal kernel bandwidth is in the order of fraction of seconds.
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while according to the traditional dissimilarity is 141st. Correlations between the spatial
dissimilarity index and the traditional indices are between 0.65 and 0.75. An analysis of
individual segregation suggests that in several cities the high levels of spatial separation are
driven by very few locations with extremely segregated individuals.
The differences between the two alternative approaches have significant economic implica-
tions. Using data from the 1% PUMS 1990 and Summary Tape File 1B of the 1990 Census, I
replicate part of Cutler and Glaeser’s (1997) study. They find that racial segregation under-
mines the socioeconomic performance of blacks in education, unemployment and earnings.
Furthermore, segregation does not affect all the individuals, but mostly African Americans.
I compare results obtained using the Traditional Dissimilarity Index and the Spatial Dis-
similarity Index,8 using the same sample and variable definitions of the original work. My
results confirm that racial segregation of African Americans is negatively related to blacks’
individual socioeconomic outcomes.
However, I find that in the least squares estimates, segregation is negatively correlated with
the outcomes of all individuals, not only blacks. By instrumenting racial segregation with
the number of local governments in 1962 and the transfer of federal revenues in 1962 as in
the original paper, I find that the magnitude of the coefficients is amplified, implying an even
stronger negative impact of segregation on socioeconomic outcomes.
These empirical findings suggest that the conclusions of previous studies may not be ro-
bust: when segregation is measured in a more precise way, i.e. taking into account the spatial
location of each individual, the estimated correlation between segregation and outcomes may
be different.
Finally, I show simple extensions of the methodology that can be used to measure segre-
gation of continuous variables (e.g. income) or vectors. The definition of segregation slightly
changes but the main theorems still hold. Furthermore, this approach is not confined to
measuring residential segregation, but it can be applied in other fields of economics as well.
For example, the spatial approach can be used to measure clustering of economic activities
or spatial concentration of industries.9
8Echenique and Fryer (2007) replicate the ordinary least squares results of Cutler and Glaeser (1997)
using the Spectral Segregation Index, confirming the original results.
9Several recent works follow the spatial approach. Arbia et al. (2008) present methods similar to those
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2.1.1 Related Literature
The paper is related to several strands of literature. The literature on segregation indices
is certainly heavily influenced by the work of Massey and Denton (1988). They review the
indices of segregation and group them in five categories: evenness, exposure, concentration,
centralization and clustering. They show that the dissimilarity index can explain almost
the entire variability of segregation in US cities. Reardon and O’Sullivan (2004) extend the
traditional theory of segregation indices to spatial measures. They adapt the properties often
required to neighborhood-based indices to a framework based on the location of individuals
on a city map. They extend the existing indices in this new framework and check if they
satisfy the properties required. Segregation is measured as a function of the agents’ local
environment, where the latter is defined by a proximity function. There are two main
differences between their framework and mine: 1) the local environment in this paper is
infinitesimal, since I consider a continuous spatial density; 2) I assume that locations are the
realization of a stochastic process, while in their paper individual coordinates are assumed
as given.
Most of the contributions in economics are based on axiomatic approaches, but consider
the neighborhood partitions as given (See Frankel and Volij (2011) and Hutchens (2004) for
examples). I do not rely on an axiomatization, but I impose assumptions on the stochastic
process that generates locations and marks. In this sense, part of this paper’s contribution
is to operationalize the estimation of the spatial density using a simple spatial process.
The spatial approach can be considered as a complement to the spectral approach of
Echenique and Fryer (2007): they develop a segregation index based on individuals’ social
networks, satisfying three axioms. The Spectral Segregation Index (SSI) measures segrega-
tion based on social interactions with same race neighbors and it can disaggregate at the
individual level. In this sense the SSI shares most of the advantages of the spatial approach,
since it is indipendent of neighborhood partitions. The Spectral Segregation Index is more
apt to measure segregation in non-spatial contexts (school segregation, employment segre-
used here for the analysis of spatial concentration of economic activity. Quah and Simpson (2003) build
a model of spatial location of economic activity whose implication are empirically tested using techniques
from spatial statistics.
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gation) where the spatial approach cannot be implemented. On the other hand, the spatial
approach has a comparative advantage in dealing with segregation in geographical contexts,
where the SSI uses geographical distance only as an approximation for social interactions. In
this sense we can distinguish the two approaches: the spectral approach is individual-specific
while the spatial approach is location-specific.
Another important difference between the Spectral Segregation Index and the Spatial
Approach is that the former considers an isolated individual as perfectly integrated, while
the latter does not. An isolated individual has no interactions with other individuals of same
race and therefore his SSI is zero. In the spatial approach an isolated individual implies that
the probability of location in that point is positive: since there are no other individuals
located around that point, the probability of location for that particular racial group is very
close to one, therefore the individual will be segregated. Furthermore, the spatial approach
is easily extended to continuous variables while the Spectral Segregation Index is designed
for categorical variables only.
I borrow several concepts and results from the literature on point processes.10,11 In par-
ticular, this paper is related to Diggle et al. (2005), which study the clustering of bovine
tuberculosis in Cornwall. They assume that the cases of different types of tuberculosis fol-
low a multivariate inhomogeneous poisson process and compute conditional probabilities of
a specific type of disease at a specific location. Their definition of segregation is similar to
the one contained in this paper, but the conditional probabilities are computed taking into
account the control cases, i.e. bovines which did not developed any form of tuberculosis.12,13
The use of spatial techniques in economics is very recent. Arbia et al. (2008) apply
10See Diggle (2003), Moller and Waagepetersen (2004),Stoyan et al. (1987) and Stoyan and Stoyan (1994)
for excellent introductions to the theory and some applications.
11Statistical models of point patterns are used in spatial epidemiology (Diggle et al. (2005), Kelsall and
Diggle (1998)), Neuroscience (Diggle et al. (2006)), Astrophysics, Ecology, Geology (Zhuang et al. (n.d.))
and Image Recognition.
12In their model there are four types of tubercolosis and there is also a control group, i.e. locations in
which there is an animal not infected by the disease. We don‘t have to model the control group in our
application.
13They provide a test for detection of segregation based on Monte Carlo simulation. However, their test
is not particulary useful in the present context. indeed, in a segregation study the researcher is interested
in comparing segregation levels among cities, therefore testing if, say, New York is more segregated than
Chicago.
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techniques from spatial statistics to the analysis of firms’ location. Quah and Simpson
(2003) empirically test an economic model of location of economic activity using spatial
processes that exhibit clustering. While the statistical techniques used in these papers are
similar to the ones I propose, they do not rely on synthetic indices to analyze the clustering
of the spatial process.
2.2 Motivation and Practical Implementation
Residential separation by race (or other socioeconomic variables) is a common feature ob-
served in US metropolitan areas. The spatial separation has important economic implica-
tions: several influential studies show that racial segregation undermines the socioeconomic
performance of African Americans in education, unemployment, earnings and single moth-
erhood, while the remaining racial groups are not affected significantly (Massey and Denton
(1993); Cutler and Glaeser (1997)). These results still hold when the endogeneity of segre-
gation is corrected using better instrumental variables (Ananat (2011)), when segregation
is measured using the Spectral Segregation Index (Echenique and Fryer (2007)), and when
performance is measured as the black-white test score gap (Card and Rothstein (2007)).14,15
In all these studies, the level of segregation of (say) blacks is measured with a synthetic
index. The traditional approach consists of the following steps:
1. Partition the city in K neighborhoods
2. For each neighborhood k, compute the share of blacks Bk/Pk, where Pk is the number
of individuals and Bk the number of blacks in neighborhood k.
3. Choose a distance function to measure the difference among the actual spatial distri-
bution (B1/P1, ..., BK/PK) and the distribution arising when there is no segregation
(B/P, ..., B/P ). To be concrete, consider the dissimilarity index, which is the most
14Collins and Margo (2000) suggest that the negative impact of residential segregation on African Amer-
icans outcomes is relatively recent, starting from 1980.
15Recently Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011) constructed measures of segregation at the country level. Their
results show that countries with high ethnic and linguistic segregation have a lower quality of government.
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used measure of segregation in empirical studies. The distance function associated
with dissimilarity is the absolute deviation, |Bk/Pk −B/P |.
4. Compute the neighborhood-level segregation, using an appropriate normalization that
insures the aggregate index assumes values between 0 and 1. For the dissimilarity
index each neighborhood has segregation
φk =
|Bk/Pk −B/P |
2 (B/P ) (1−B/P )
5. Compute the average segregation of the city
D =
1
P
K∑
k=1
Pkφk (2.1)
The index measures the proportion of blacks that should change neighborhood in order to
achieve a perfectly integrated city. We can also interpret the index as mean deviation from
evenness, where each neighborhood’s segregation is weighted according to the population
proportions Pk/P .
While this approach is suitable for the measurement of segregation in other contexts (em-
ployment segregation, school segregation), it has some drawbacks when applied to residential
segregation, where the spatial element should be considered explicitly. First, the index is
based on an arbitrary partition of the metropolitan area in neighborhoods (as argued by
Echenique and Fryer (2007)), usually census tracts or blocks, making the measurement di-
rectly dependent on the specific partition adopted. Figure 2.1 presents four stylized cities
with the same spatial distribution of racial groups but a different partition in neighborhoods.
If segregation is measured using the standard dissimilarity then city A and C are perfectly
segregated, city B is perfectly integrated and city C has an intermediate level of segregation.
However, the spatial distribution of the racial groups is the same in the four cities: the
difference in the measured segregation is just the outcome of different partitions.
Second, if we compute the index of segregation using different levels of aggregation of
the data (tracts, block groups or blocks) we will observe different values and (even worse)
12
Figure 2.1: Different partitions imply different segregation levels
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Four stylized cities. Black dots represent the locations of blacks, white dots the locations of whites. The four
cities have the same spatial distribution of racial groups. However, when segregation is measured using the
neighborhood-based approach, the different partitions in neighborhoods deliver different segregation levels
as measured by the dissimilarity index. City A has a dissimilarity DA = 1, while City B has no segregation
DB = 0, since each neighborhood contains the same proportion of blacks and whites. Segregation is complete
in City C, DC = 1, and intermediate in City D, DD = .2291.
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different ranking of the cities, a problem known in spatial analysis as Modifiable Area Unit
Problem (MAUP). In Figure 2.1, the neighborhood partition in city A is obtained by parti-
tioning each of the neighborhoods in city B in four sub-areas of same size. This results in a
dissimilarity of 1 in city A, while in B segregation is 0.
Third, the majority of the indices does not take into account the spatial location of the
individuals over the urban area, thus completely ignoring the within neighborhood spatial
distribution. The dissimilarity index assigns the same segregation level φk to all individuals
living in the same neighborhood. However, the black individual located at (4,5) is surrounded
by 8 blacks, while the black individual in (3,3) has 5 white neighbors and 3 black neighbors:
an index of segregation should consider the former more segregated than the latter.
If segregation is defined as a function of individual locations, without relying on an arbi-
trary partition in neighborhoods, all these critiques do not apply. This is the main motivation
of the present work.
To make the argument clear, let’s assign to each individual i, i = 1, .., n, an individual
index of segregation φi =
|Bi/Pi−B/P |
2(B/P )(1−B/P ) , where Bi/Pi is the fraction of blacks in a small
area around individual i.16 The aggregate level of segregation is the average of individual
segregation
Dind =
1
P
K∑
k=1
Pk∑
i=1
φi (2.2)
By comparing (2.1) and (2.2) we notice that the traditional dissimilarity imposes a restriction
on the individual level segregation, i.e.
φi = φk for all i living in neighborhood k
In other words the traditional dissimilarity assumes no intra-neighborhood variation of
spatial segregation. The approach presented here does not impose such a restriction and
explicitly considers the spatial distribution of racial groups within neighborhoods.
To measure segregation according to the spatial approach we can proceed as follows:
16I will be more precise about the definition of small area around the individual in the theoretical section.
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1. Compute the optimal bandwidth h for the kernel estimator as the minimizer of the
Mean Squared Error in formula (2.36) and a kernel estimator function Kh (·). In this
paper, I use a multiplicative quartic kernel.
2. For each individual location xi, compute the intensity of the location pattern for blacks
λb (xi) and for the population as a whole λ0 (xi), using the formulas (see the theoretical
section for a definition of intensity)
λ̂b (xi) =
n∑
j=1
Kh (xi − xj) I{m(xi)=b}∫
S Kh (ξ − xi) dξ
(2.3)
λ̂0 (xi) =
n∑
j=1
Kh (xi − xj)∫
S Kh (ξ − xi) dξ
(2.4)
where I{m(xi)=b} is an indicator variable which assumes value 1 if the individual at
location xi is black.
3. Compute the probability of black location at xi as
ρ̂b (xi) =
λ̂b (xi)
λ̂0 (xi)
(2.5)
and the probability of black location when there is no segregation, as the proportion
of blacks in the population ρb = B/P
4. Choose a distance function to measure the difference among the actual spatial dis-
tribution ρ̂b (·) and the distribution arising when there is no segregation ρb. The
distance function associated with the spatial dissimilarity is the absolute deviation,
|ρ̂b (xi)− ρb|.
5. Compute the estimated segregation index φ̂ (xi) for each observed location xi. For the
spatial dissimilarity we use formula (2.18)
φ̂ (xi) =
|ρ̂b (xi)− ρb|
2ρb (1− ρb) (2.6)
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6. Compute the estimated global index T̂D (X) as the average individual index. The
global spatial dissimilarity is
T̂D (X) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
φ̂ (xi)
where n is the number of individuals in the city.
The computational burden is minimal, since the kernel estimation procedure is fully auto-
mated in standard statistical software for point pattern analysis.17 I analyze all the statistical
properties of this index in the theoretical section. Notice that in Step 5 we obtain the entire
distribution of segregation among individuals. The methodology explained above can be
easily extended to measure segregation for multiple racial groups, continuous variables and
vector of variables.
2.3 Theoretical Results
2.3.1 Notation, Basic Properties and Definitions
A spatial point process X is a stochastic process that maps points over a set S ⊆ R2.
Alternatively it can be defined as a random counting measure over bounded sets A ⊆ S.18,19
I denote the random set asX = {x1, ..., xn}, where xi denotes the generic point of the process.
The random variable N (A) indicates the number of points in a bounded set A ⊆ S. I denote
the realizations of X as x and the realizations of N as n. I write ξ or η to indicate a generic
point (coordinate) in S and xi for the generic realized point of the process. The area of
region A is |A| and dξ refers to the infinitesimal region containing ξ.
I consider only finite spatial processes, with realizations x in the set N1f = {x ⊆ S :
n (x ∩ A) < ∞}, for any bounded A ⊆ S. A point process is stationary if all the proba-
17I use the packages splancs, spatstat and spatialkernel for the statistical software R. The kernel
estimation is performed through fast C and Fortran 90 codes that decrease the computational burden even
further.
18See Conley (1999) for a more technical explanation of point processes in the context of spatial GMM.
19Diggle (2003), Stoyan et al. (1987), Stoyan and Stoyan (1994), Moller and Waagepetersen (2004) are
the basic references.
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bility statements about the process in any bounded set A of the plane are invariant under
arbitrary translations. This implies that all the statistics are invariant under translation,
e.g. EN (A) = ENp (A), where Np (A) is the process X translated by the vector p. A point
process is isotropic if the invariance holds under arbitrary rotations. The process is simple
(or orderly) if there are no coincident points. In this paper I consider simple nonstationary
and anisotropic processes.
Let X be a spatial point process defined over S ⊆ R2. The intensity function of the
process is a locally integrable function20 λ : S → [0,∞), defined as the limit of the expected
number of points per infinitesimal area
λ (ξ) = lim
|dξ|→0
{
E [N (dξ)]
|dξ|
}
(2.7)
A stationary process has constant intensity λ (ξ) = λ for all ξ. The intensity measure of
a point process X is defined for A ⊆ S as
Λ (A) = EN (A) =
∫
A
λ (ξ) dξ (2.8)
and measures the expected number of points of the process in the set A.
2.3.2 Measuring Segregation
Consider a spatial pattern X = {xi,m (xi)}ni=1 characterized by the locations xi’s in the city
S and marks m (xi). The mark attached to a location is a random variable describing the
characteristics of an individual living at xi. Examples of marks are racial groups, income
groups, income levels, education levels, or a mix of them.
I assume that the locations of individuals X0 are the realization of an Inhomogeneous
Poisson Point Process over the metropolitan area S ⊆ R2 with intensity function λ0 (ξ)
ASSUMPTION 1 The individuals locations X0 follow an Inhomogeneous Poisson Process
with intensity λ0 (ξ) over S
X0 ∼ Poi (S, λ0 (ξ))
20A function is locally integrable if
∫
A
λ (ξ) dξ <∞ for all bounded A ⊆ S
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therefore
1. for any bounded region A ⊆ S
P [N0 (A) = n] = [Λ0 (A)]n
exp [−Λ0 (A)]
n!
, n = 0, 1, 2, ....
2. for any bounded region A ⊆ S , conditional on N0 (A) = n the locations are i.i.d. with
density
f (ξ) =
λ0 (ξ)∫
A
λ0 (ξ) dξ
This assumption provides a simple but flexible model for the spatial distribution of house-
holds in the urban area, which exhibits clustering. Notice that the clustering of locations in
a certain region is exogenous and depends on the intensity only. In other words, this assump-
tion imposes no behavioral or equilibrium restriction on how people choose their residential
locations. In this context, I am not interested in studying the determinants of residential
segregation: the important point is being able to estimate the spatial distribution of racial
groups. The assumption of spatial Poisson locations allows this estimation in a simple way
(as shown in the estimation section), while allowing the process to exhibit complex clustering
properties of individual locations.
The second assumption concerns the interaction among marks: I assume that conditional
on the realized locations, the marks are independent.
ASSUMPTION 2 Conditional on X0, the marks are mutually independent
This implies that the presence of a specific attribute at a specific location does not influence
the attributes at other locations. On the other hand, the assumption does not rule out
clustering of marks.
Let ρ (ξ,m,X0ξ) ≡ P (m (ξ) = m|X0) be the probability that an individual located in ξ
has mark m, conditional on the realization of the locations X0. The third assumption states
that the probability distribution of a mark is location-specific and does not depend on the
entire realization x of the process. I assume that this conditional probability depends on the
location ξ, but it does not depend on the locations of the other points of the process X0 \ ξ.
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ASSUMPTION 3 For all ξ ∈ X0, for all m ∈M
ρ (ξ,m,X0 \ ξ) = ρ (ξ,m)
Assumptions 2 and 3 imply that the probability that an household has a certain char-
acteristic is not affected by the location or attributes of any other household. Marks are
independent conditioning on the realized locations, but they are not identically distributed
at each point. Each location faces a different mark distribution and clustering can occur
exogenously according to the functional form of the intensity function and the mark distri-
bution.
The assumption of conditional independence allows the process to display complex clus-
tering properties of the marks without specifying explicitly the interactions among them.
This is relatively convenient for estimation and to characterize the distributional properties,
since it imposes a simple structure on the data.
On the other hand, it may be desirable to relax this assumption imposing an explicit
structure on the way nearby locations depend on each other’s marks. This would be especially
valuable when the researcher has access to more detailed individual data, containing not only
the location and racial groups, but also other controls. The present work is developed under
the implicit assumption that the researcher has only data on location and racial group, but
this may not be the case in the future with further development of geocoded datasets. The
methodology of this paper can be extended to alternative spatial processes with more general
dependence structures among marks and locations and it is the topic of ongoing research.21
The present work should be considered as a first step in the development of these methods
for general classes of spatial point processes.
Under these three assumptions it is possible to derive several distributional results, which
I prove in Lemmas 1 and 2 in Appendix B. Lemma 1 characterizes the probability law of
21The class of Pairwise Interactions Processes is a general class of spatial point processes with markovian
dependence over space. Using these processes it is possible to model the attraction and repulsion of locations
and/or marks.
It is possible to use fully parametric models when more detailed data are available. Unfortunately the
estimation becomes more challenging in such a framework and requires the use of simulation methods.
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the process under the three assumptions. For a bounded region A ⊆ S and a configuration
of points F it is possible to show that the probability law of the process is
P [(X ∩ A) ∈ F ] (2.9)
=
∞∑
n=0
exp [−Λ0 (A)]
n!
∫
A×M
· ·
∫
A×M
1[{(x1,m1),...,(xn,mn)}∈F ]
n∏
i=1
[λ (xi,mi)] dx1 · ·dxndm1 · ·dmn
To make exposition more concise I will focus on the case of discrete marks, which is the
appropriate framework for racial segregation. In the last section of the paper I show how the
definitions and theorems can be extended if marks are continuous or multivariate. Notice
that both the main theorems are general and do not depend on the mark space being discrete.
Lemma 2 analyzes the stochastic process when the mark space is discrete: in this setting I
use notation ρm (ξ) to indicate the probability of markm occurring at location ξ. The Lemma
proves that the spatial process is equivalent to a multivariate Inhomogeneous Poisson process
X =
M⋃
m=1
Xm with intensities λm (ξ) = λ0 (ξ) ρm (ξ), m = 1, 2, ...,M respectively, where the
Xm’s are stochastically independent.
The definition of segregated spatial distribution is operationalized using the conditional
mark distributions. Intuitively, there is no segregation when the conditional probability of
each attribute/mark does not vary over S: ρm (ξ) = ρm for all ξ. Such a process is said
to exhibit random labelling. Therefore the marked poisson process is defined as completely
unsegregated if there is random labelling of the events. The maximum level of segregation is
reached when the conditional mark distribution is degenerate: for each point of the process
there is a mark occurring with probability one at that location, while the remaining marks
occur with probability zero at the same location.22
DEFINITION 1 Assume that the process X satisfies Assumptions 1-3. Then:
1. The marked point process X is completely unsegregated if and only if the conditional
mark distribution follows random labelling, i.e. ρm (ξ) = ρm for all individuals ξ ∈ X0,
for all racial groups m ∈M.
22See Diggle et al. (2005) for a similar definition. The same idea is proposed in Arbia et al. (2008).
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2. The marked point process X is completely segregated if and only if for each indi-
vidual location ξ ∈ X0, there is a racial group m∗ ∈ M such that ρm∗ (ξ) = 1 and
ρm (ξ) = 0 for any other racial group m 6= m∗.
An index of segregation measures the level of spatial clustering of the point process. I focus
on indices measuring the difference between the actual spatial distribution of racial groups
and the distribution arising under no segregation. In order to have comparability across
cities the index is normalized to assume values between 0 and 1, where zero corresponds to
the case of no segregation and one to the maximum level of segregation. The index increases
with the difference between the distributions ρm (ξ) and ρm: different notions of distances
between distribution will result in different indices.
Define N1m to be the set of all the possible realizations of the marked point process.
DEFINITION 2 A segregation index is a function T : N1m → [0, 1] such that
1. T (X) = 1 iff X is completely segregated
2. T (X) = 0 iff X is completely unsegregated (integrated)
3. T (X) is increasing in the difference between the conditional distributions ρm (ξ) and
ρm.
If the process X satisfies Assumptions 1-3 it is possible to derive the moments of any index
T (X). The following theorem applies to any possible index based on the above definition:
it is therefore a very general result.
THEOREM 1 If X is a point process satisfying Assumptions 1-3, then the expected value
of any index T (X) is
E [T (X)] =
∞∑
n=0
exp [−Λ (S ×M)]
n!
∫
S×M
··
∫
S×M
T ({xi,mi}ni=1)
n∏
i=1
λ (xi,mi) dx1··dxndm1··dmn
(2.10)
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More generally the r-th raw moment of T (X) is
E [T r (X)] =
∞∑
n=0
exp [−Λ (S ×M)]
n!
∫
S×M
··
∫
S×M
T r ({xi,mi}ni=1)
n∏
i=1
λ (xi,mi) dx1··dxndm1··dmn
(2.11)
Proof. If the process satisfies Assumptions 1-3, then it is Poisson over S ×M by Lemma
1. Therefore the probability law of X is given by (2.9). Notice that T (X) is a nonnegative
function. Since any nonnegative function can be expressed as a weighted sum of indicator
functions, the result follows. The same argument delivers the results for all the moments.
I specialize the framework and impose another restriction often requested in the literature.
I focus on indices that satisfy additivity : the segregation level of the city is the sum of
individual level segregation. Additivity is very common in the literature on segregation,
since it allows the researcher to determine which components provide higher contributions
to the global level of segregation. Many of the traditional indices are indeed additive at the
neighborhood level.
I define an individual or location-dependent segregation function φ (ξ), summarizing the
difference between ρm (ξ) and ρm at ξ, and a global segregation index that aggregates the
individual-level indices at the city level. I assume that the global index is computed as
average of the normalized individual-level segregation indices.
ASSUMPTION 4 Assume the global index T (X) is the average of the individual indices
φ (ξ)
T (X) = 1
N (S)
∑
ξ∈X0
φ (ξ) (A4)
where φ : S → R+ is a location-specific segregation index.
The function φ maps the location into the segregation level of the individual. I provide
examples of possible functional forms for φ below. The general distributional results are
summarized in the following theorem.
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THEOREM 2 Assume X follows a point process satisfying Assumptions 1-4. Then
E [T (X)] = E [φ (ξ)] =
∫
S
φ (ξ)
λ0 (ξ)
Λ (S)dξ (2.12)
V [T (X)] = E
[
1
N (S)
]
V [φ (ξ)] (2.13)
Proof. In appendix C
The results in Theorem 2 show that there is no difference between the expectation of
global or individual level segregation. This follows from the independence assumption in
the Poisson process. The variance of the global index is proportional to the variance of the
individual level segregation. Moreover, this variance should be smaller for cities with higher
population, or in terms of the poisson process, in cities with higher intensity measure.23
If we condition on the realized N (S) = n, we obtain the following corollary
COROLLARY 1 Under the assumptions of Theorem 2,
E [T (X)|N (S) = n] = E [φ (ξ)] (2.14)
and
V [T (X)|N (S) = n] = 1
n
V [φ (ξ)] (2.15)
The work of Diggle et al. (2005) is based on the conditional specification of the spatial
process.
I now provide several examples of indices of segregation. It is worth noting that most
of the existing indices can be adapted to this approach by redefining the neighborhoods as
individuals.
23To the extent that intensity measures for metropolitan areas are of the order of 100 thousands, we have
that E
[
1
N(S)
]
≈ 1EN(S) and therefore bigger cities will have smaller variances.
23
2.4 Spatial Indices of Segregation and Diversity
2.4.1 Spatial Dissimilarity Index
The spatial dissimilarity is constructed by using the absolute deviation as distance function
between distributions
d (ξ) =
∑
m∈M
|ρm (ξ)− ρm| (2.16)
In order to derive the distributional results, it is necessary to know the value of (2.16)
under complete segregation. The following result applies to any index using a discrete set
of marks. Let ξs be a generic point of a perfectly segregated process.
PROPOSITION 1 If the mark space is discrete the value of (2.16) under complete seg-
regation is
d (ξs) = 2
∑
m∈M
ρm (1− ρm) (2.17)
Proof. In Appendix C
Incidentally notice that d (ξs) is equivalent to twice the fractionalization of the city as
defined below in (2.28). The individual-level segregation index is then measured by the
function
φD (ξ) =
∑
m∈M |ρm (ξ)− ρm|
2
∑
m∈M ρm (1− ρm)
(2.18)
and the global Spatial Dissimilarity Index is
TD (X) = 1
N (S)
∑
ξ∈X0
φD (ξ) (2.19)
The main difference is that in the traditional dissimilarity the conditional probability
ρm (ξ) is assumed to be the same for all locations in the same neighborhood, while the
spatial dissimilarity does not impose such within-neighborhood restriction on the spatial
segregation.
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Using the results in Theorem 2, one can derive the theoretical expected value of the index.
E [TD (X)] =
[
2Λ0 (S)
∑
m∈M
ρm (1− ρm)
]−1 ∫
S
[∑
m∈M
|ρm (ξ)− ρm|
]
λ0 (ξ) dξ (2.20)
In most of the literature, the dissimilarity index is used to measure the segregation of a
minority group from the rest of the population: this is the dichotomous version, in which
the racial groups are assumed to be two, the minority and the rest of the population. In
its dichotomous version, the spatial dissimilarity can be simplified, by using the fact that
ρnb = 1− ρb (where b=blacks and nb=nonblacks), with φDic (ξ) = |ρb(ξ)−ρb|2ρb(1−ρb)
TDic (X) = 1
N (S)
∑
ξ∈X0
φDic (ξ)
2.4.2 Spatial Exposure Indices
The spatial exposure indices are derived using the squared deviation as distance function
between spatial densities
d (ξ) =
∑
m∈M
[ρm (ξ)− ρm]2 (2.21)
The value of the index under perfect segregation is derived in the following proposition
PROPOSITION 2 If the mark space is discrete the value of (2.21) under complete seg-
regation is
d (ξs) =
∑
m∈M
ρm (1− ρm) (2.22)
Proof. In Appendix C
The individual Spatial Exposure Index is defined as the location-specific squared deviation
from perfect integration, normalized using (2.22).
φExp (ξ) =
∑
m∈M [ρm (ξ)− ρm]2∑
m∈M ρm (1− ρm)
(2.23)
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and the global Spatial Exposure Index is defined as
TExp (X) =
1
N (S)
∑
ξ∈X0
φExp (ξ) (2.24)
An alternative approach to construct an exposure index is suggested in Reardon and
Firerbaugh (2002). One can consider the dichotomous version of the index (2.23) for each
group m, that is
φV,m (ξ) =
[ρm (ξ)− ρm]2
ρm (1− ρm) (2.25)
giving the dichotomous version of (2.24)
TV,m (X) =
1
N (S)
∑
ξ∈X0
φV,m (ξ) (2.26)
This index corresponds to a spatial version of Eta2 (see White (1986) for a description)
and it is a measure of how isolated a racial group is from the rest of the population. This is an
index varying between 0 and 1, therefore a normalized index is constructed as the weighted
sum of (2.26), where the weights are the ρm’s. The Spatial Normalized Exposure Index
is derived as
TP (X) =
∑
m∈M
ρmTV,m (X) (2.27)
=
1
N (S)
∑
ξ∈X0
∑
m∈M
[ρm (ξ)− ρm]2
(1− ρm)
Notice that this is not equivalent to index (2.24).
26
2.4.3 Spatial Fractionalization Indices
Many studies relate ethnic and racial heterogeneity to economic outcomes.24 The level of
heterogeneity in these studies is usually measured with the Fractionalization Index. The
latter measures the probability that two randomly drawn individuals belong to different
racial groups. The index is derived from the Herfindhal index of homogeneity and it is equal
to
I = 1−
∑
m∈M
ρ2m =
∑
m∈M
ρm (1− ρm) (2.28)
In the sociological literature the index is also known as the Simpson Interaction index.
An index of zero indicates perfect homogeneity, in which only one racial group is present.
Increasing values of the index imply increasing heterogeneity.
In a recent contribution, Bossert et al. (2011) develop a more general version of the index
in which the primitives are assumed to be individuals and their similarity. I follow a similar
idea and develop a spatial version of the fractionalization index, in which the primitives of
the aggregate index are the individual location-specific heterogeneity indices. The location-
specific index is the level of fractionalization in location ξ
I (ξ) =
∑
m∈M
ρm (ξ) (1− ρm (ξ))
and therefore the aggregate Spatial Fractionalization Index is
TI (X) = 1
N (S)
∑
ξ∈X0
I (ξ) (2.29)
This index measures the racial heterogeneity in the city incorporating the spatial location
of individuals. Moreover the index can be disaggregated at the individual level, to examine
the distribution of heterogeneity in the population. It can also be disaggregated over space
24Alesina et al. (1999) show that more fractionalization is correlated with lower provision of local public
goods. Easterly and Levine (1997) argue that more racially heterogenous societies show slower economic
growth. Alesina and Ferrara (2000) show that participation in social activities is lower in more unequal and
in more racially or ethnically heterogeneous localities. Mauro (1995) associates racial heterogeneity to more
corruption.
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showing which regions of the metropolitan area are more diverse.
An index of segregation can be derived from the spatial fractionalization using the distance
d (ξ) = |I (ξ)− I|
It is straightforward to show that under complete segregation d (ξs) = I: in each location
there is maximum homogeneity therefore I (ξ) = 0 for any ξ. Define
φF (ξ) =
|I (ξ)− I|
I
to be the individual spatial relative fractionalization, which measures the absolute devi-
ation from spatial homogeneity. The global Spatial Relative Fractionalization Index
is
TF (X) =
1
N (S)
∑
ξ∈X0
φF (ξ) (2.30)
2.4.4 Spatial Entropy Indices
An alternative to the fractionalization indices is the Theil Entropy (or Information) Index
(see Theil (1972) and Theil and Finezza (1971)). The entropy index for the metropolitan
area is
E =
∑
m∈M
ρm ln
(
1
ρm
)
(2.31)
and it can be thought of as a measure of heterogeneity of the city since it is equal to
zero if there is only one group and it reaches its maximum when all the groups have equal
probability. I define a location-specific entropy index as
E (ξ) =
∑
m∈M
ρm (ξ) ln
(
1
ρm (ξ)
)
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The Spatial Entropy Index is
TE (X) =
1
N (S)
∑
ξ∈X0
E (ξ) (2.32)
This index measures the average racial heterogeneity in the city but incorporates the
spatial location of each individual as a primitive. As for the fractionalization index it can
be disaggregated at the individual and spatial level.
A simple index of segregation based on the spatial entropy can be constructed by defining
a distance function
d (ξ) = |E (ξ)− E|
It is straightforward to show that under complete segregation d (ξs) = E: in fact complete
segregation implies E (ξ) = 0 for all ξ. Define the individual location-specific spatial relative
entropy as
φH (ξ) =
|E (ξ)− E|
E
This is the value of the absolute deviation from spatial homogeneity as measured by the
entropy of the metropolitan area. The Spatial Relative Entropy Index formula is
TH (X) =
1
N (S)
∑
ξ∈X0
φH (ξ) (2.33)
and measures the average absolute deviation from spatial homogeneity.
2.5 Empirical Methodology
All the data analysis was performed with R25 by using some available packages for the analysis
of spatial point patterns and by custom functions written by the author in R and C.26
25http://www.r-project.org/
26In particular I used the packages Splancs and SpatStat. I also used a modified version of the package
spatialkernel developed by Diggle et al. (2005). I created some additional C routines in order to compute
the indices using the kernel regression approach explained below.
Codes will be available on the web at: http://netfiles.uiuc.edu/amele2/www/pps
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2.5.1 Data
I apply this approach to census data from the 1990 and 2000 US Census of Population and
Housing. The ideal dataset would consist of individual or household level data on location,
racial group and socioeconomic characteristics. Unfortunately such data are not publicly
available for confidentiality reasons.27 A possible alternative is the 1% PUMS 1930 Census,
where each household’s address is reported. However, there are concerns about the spatial
randomness of this sample and the geocoding of historical addresses, therefore I prefer to
not use these data.
As a necessary compromise between estimation precision and reliability of data, I use the
most disaggregated data publicly available: census block data containing the location of the
block centroid and the racial composition. In Appendix D I illustrate the methodology using
exact locations from artificial datasets.
I have data for all the 331 MSA’s (Metropolitan Statistical Areas) and PMSA’s (Primary
Metropolitan Statistical Areas) for years 1990 and 2000. In order to maintain comparability
across census years, I adopt the racial categories in Census 1990: Whites/Caucasians, African
Americans, Asian/Pacific Islanders, Native American, Other.
Figure 2.2(a) plots all blocks centroids locations in the New York PMSA for the 2000: the
black dots represent blocks in which the majority is black while red dots are blocks in which
the majority is nonblack. The pattern of geographic separation is clear: African Americans
are concentrated in Harlem, Bronx and Bedford-Stuyvesant. Figure 2.2(b) plots all racial
groups: black points are African Americans, red points are Whites, green are Asians and
light blue correspond to Other racial groups (including Hispanics).28
2.5.2 Estimation Strategy with Exact Location Data
The estimation strategy consists of estimating the intensity function using nonparametric
techniques. When individual location data are available there are standard methods used in
spatial statistics to estimate the intensity of the process.29
27I have an application pending at the Census Bureau in order to gain access to such data.
28Other metropolitan areas are available from the author.
29See Diggle (2003), Diggle et al. (2005).
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Figure 2.2: Spatial Distribution of Racial Groups in New York PMSA, 2000
Each point represents the centroid of a census block. A black dot represent a census block in which the
majority is African American. Red represents Whites/Caucasians blocks, Green dots are Asians, Light
Blue are Other racial groups. Distances are measured in Kilometers and the axis are rescaled so that the
southwest corner is the origin.
Source: Summary File 1, Census of Population and Housing 2000, Us Bureau of Census.
Lemma 2 in Appendix B states that a multitype point process can be reformulated as
a multivariate Poisson process with independent univariate processes, therefore one can
estimate the intensities of each univariate process separately. This observation leads to a
convenient estimate of ρ̂m (ξ)
ρ̂m (ξ) =
λ̂m (ξ)
λ̂0 (ξ)
(2.34)
where λ̂m (ξ) is the estimate of the intensity function for the univariate process Xm,
corresponding to the spatial pattern of group m. Diggle (1985) and Berman and Diggle
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(1989) suggested a nonparametric estimator based on the definition of intensity function,
λ̂ (ξ) = N (ξ, h) /pih2, where N (ξ, h) is the number of points within distance h from ξ. The
estimator counts the points within the disc of radius h and centered in ξ, dividing by the
area of the disc pih2.30 More generally one can weight the points using a Kernel function,
which leads to estimators of the form (see Diggle (2003), p.148 or Moller and Waagepetersen
(2004))31
λ̂ (ξ) =
n∑
i=1
Kh (ξ − xi)∫
S Kh (ξ − xi) dξ
(2.35)
where Kh (u) = 1h2K (u/h). In my computations I will use a multiplicative quartic kernel
in order to speed up the estimation procedure.32
It is known in the spatial statistics literature that the choice of the bandwidth is more
important than the choice of the kernel function. The optimal h should be different for each
city, since it should take into account the specific geographic density. The bandwidth can
be interpreted as defining the relevant neighborhood for the individual (the local environ-
ment, in the words of Reardon and O’Sullivan (2004)), which is possibly different for each
metropolitan area.
I choose h using the Mean Squared Error (MSE) minimization procedure suggested in
Diggle (1985) and Berman and Diggle (1989). The formula for the MSE (h) is33,34
30This can be intepreted as a kernel estimator in which the kernel is
k (u) =
{
1
piu2 if 0 ≤ u ≤ 1
0 otherwise
31There are alternative ways to estimate the conditional mark probability. For example, Diggle et al. (2005)
exploit the fact that conditioning on the realized n, the mark distribution is a multinomial distribution and
can be estimated through kernel regression.
Alternative smoothing techniques can be used. For example, the method of total variation regularization
proposed in Koenker and Mizera (2004).
32I have tried with a gaussian kernel, but the computational time is increased without differences in the
estimated probabilities.
33A Cox Process is a point process such that:
1)
{
Λ (ξ) : ξ ∈ R2} is a non-negative-valued stochastic process
2) Conditional on the realization
{
Λ (ξ) = λ (ξ) : ξ ∈ R2}, the point process follows an Inhomogeneous
Poisson Point process with intensity λ (ξ).
We can see an Inhomogeneous Poisson Point process as a particular Cox process in which the distribution
of Λ (ξ) is degenerate at λ (ξ).
34This is a simple method of computing the optimal bandwidth. The literature on Point Processes usually
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MSE (h) = µ (0) + Λ (A)
1− 2K (h)
pih2
+
(
pih2
)−2 ∫ ∫
µ (‖ξ − η‖) dηdξ (2.36)
where µ (‖ξ − η‖) is the second-order intensity function defined as
µ (ξ, η) = lim
|dξ|,|dη|−→0
{
E [N (dη)N (dξ)]
|dη| |dξ|
}
(2.37)
which is a measure of the spatial association of the process. Notice that E [N (dη)N (dξ)] ≈
P [N (dη) = N (dξ) = 1], for ξ and η close. If we assume stationarity and isotropy then
µ (ξ, η) = µ (‖ξ − η‖), i.e it is a function of the euclidean distance among the two points.
The quantity K (h) is
K (h) = λ−1E [No (h)] = 2piλ−2
∫ h
0
µ (ξ) ξdξ (2.38)
and it is defined as the expected number of further points in the circle of radius h and
center ξ. I estimate K (h) with the Ripley’s estimator: define w (ξ, u) as the proportion
of the circumference of the circle with center ξ and radius u, which lies in S, and wij =
w (xi, uij), where uij = ‖xi − xj‖ .
K̂ (h) =
1
n (n− 1) |S|
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
w−1ij Ih (uij) (2.39)
where Ih (uij) = I (uij ≤ h) is an indicator function. This gives edge-corrected estimates
of the K(h) function. For the remaining part of (2.36), µ (0) does not depend on h, while
for the integral we use the weighted integral suggested by Berman and Diggle (1989). By
plugging these estimates in (2.36) we obtain an estimated M̂SE (h).
As a practical matter, when estimating the conditional probability, I use the same band-
width for λ̂m (ξ) and λ̂0 (ξ), to avoid probabilities greater than one or conditional probabilities
not summing up to one. In Appendix D I show how the technique works using artificial data.
relies on ad hoc criteria. Diggle et al. (2005) use cross-validated likelihood methods.
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2.5.3 Estimation Strategy with Block Level Data
In many cases the exact location data are not available, thus I develop an approximated
estimation technique to deal with data at the block level. I assume the researcher has the
number of individuals of each racial group for each block and the location of the block
centroid, as it is the case in my empirical application.
The metropolitan area S is partitioned in K disjoint blocks, S =
K⋃
k=1
Sk and Sk ∩ Sl = ∅,
for k 6= l. By the independent scattering property of the inhomogeneous poisson process the
counting variables N0 (Sk) and N0 (Sl) over disjoint regions Sk and Sl are independent (see
Appendix B.1 for a proof). The definition of intensity measure implies that EN0 (Sk) =∫
Sk λ0 (ξ) dξ, for any k. One can model the number of points as
N0 (Sk) =
∫
Sk
λ0 (ξ) dξ + uk
where uk is an error with mean zero, and independent across blocks. For any block k there
exists a ξk ∈ Sk such that
∫
Sk λ0 (ξ) dξ = λ0
(
ξk
) |Sk| and thus
N0 (Sk) = λ0
(
ξk
) |Sk|+ uk (2.40)
Notice that ξk is not necessarily the centroid of the block. An approximation of (2.40) for
any ξ ∈ Sk is N0 (Sk) ≈ λ0 (ξ) |Sk|+ uk.
The expected number of points in Sk is then approximated as
E [N0 (Sk)| ξ] ≈ λ0 (ξ) |Sk|
and thus the function λ0 (ξ) |Sk| can be estimated through kernel regression as
λ̂0 (ξ) |Sk| =
K∑
k=1
Kh (ξ − xk)∑K
j=1Kh (ξ − xj)
n0k (2.41)
where xk’s are the centroids of the census blocks and n0k the number of individuals ob-
served in each block. Applying this procedure to each racial group process we can then
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estimate λ̂m (ξ) |Sk| for each m.
Taking the ratio λ̂m(ξ)|Sk|
λ̂0(ξ)|Sk|
we get the estimator for ρ̂m (ξ)
ρ̂m (ξ) =
λ̂m (ξ)
λ̂0 (ξ)
=
∑K
k=1Kh (ξ − xk)nmk∑K
k=1Kh (ξ − xk)n0k
(2.42)
where n0k is the number of people living in block k and nmk is the number of people
belonging to race m and living in block k; I use the estimated conditional probabilities
evaluated at the block centroid to compute the index.
2.6 Empirical Results
2.6.1 Global Segregation In US Cities
I have estimated the Spatial Dissimilarity Index for all the racial groups and all the US
metropolitan areas in 1990 and 2000. In this section I present results based on the 2000
data while in next section I use the indices for 1990 to estimate the impact of segregation
on individual outcomes. In the tables I show only several metropolitan areas for ease of
exposition.35
In Figure 2.3 I show the estimated conditional probability of African Americans in the
New York PMSA. The bandwidth for the Kernel estimator obtained using the Berman and
Diggle (1989) procedure is 0.348 km.
The three main black areas in Bronx, Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant shown in Figure
2.2 above, correspond to the whiter areas in Figure 2.3, where the conditional probability
is close or equal to 1.36 The spatial dissimilarity of African Americans for New York is
estimated to be 0.69.
In Figure 2.4 I plot the spatial dissimilarity and the neighborhood-based dissimilarity
(computed using blocks) for African Americans. Figure 2.4 shows the same plot but the tra-
35The complete tables in Excel files are available from the author.
36The reader should be aware that Figure 2.3 is realized with a grid 1000× 1000. In the computation of
the index I estimate the conditional probability only at the observed locations. This is more precise and
computationally faster than imposing the grid.
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Figure 2.3: Estimated Conditional Probability of African American, New York PMSA 2000
Estimated conditional probability of African American location in New York PMSA in 2000. Distances are
measured in Kilometers and the axis are rescaled so that the southwest corner is the origin. The areas with
higher probabilities correspond to the neighborhods of Harlem, a part of the Bronx, Bedford Stuyvesant and
Jamaica. Source: Authors calculations based on Summary File 1, Census of Population and Housing 2000,
Us Bureau of Census.
ditional dissimilarity is computed using census tract data. Each point represents a metropoli-
tan area, indicated with the MSA FIPS code.
Spatial dissimilarity is positively associated with the traditional dissimilarity, as expected.
However the measured levels of segregation in many metropolitan areas are strikingly differ-
ent when we compare the two methodologies. For example, the metropolitan area of Muncie
(IN), with MSA FIPS code 5280 in the figure, has a dissimilarity of 0.7022 while the spatial
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Figure 2.4: Blacks Spatial Dissimilarity vs Traditional Dissimilarity (Blocks)
 
Each point represents a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). The marker of the points is the MSA FIPS
code. The vertical axis measures the level of spatial dissimilarity for African Americans and the horizontal
axis the level of traditional dissimilarity. The latter is computed using Blocks as subunits.
dissimilarity is 0.8785. Furthermore, the spatial dissimilarity implies a different ranking of
cities in terms of racial segregation: Muncie (IN) is indeed the most segregated metropolitan
area according to the spatial approach, while using the traditional approach it was 141st.
The segregation levels are shown in Table 2.1 for several cities. I compare the segrega-
tion levels obtained with the spatial dissimilarity and those obtained with the traditional
approach, using blocks and census tracts, in column 3, 5 and 7. I also present the different
ranking of the cities in columns 4, 6 and 8. Panel A and B are the ten most and least
segregated MSAs respectively. Panel C shows the results for the most populated MSAs.
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Figure 2.5: Blacks Spatial Dissimilarity vs Traditional Dissimilarity (Tracts)
 
Each point represents a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). The marker of the points is the MSA FIPS
code. The vertical axis measures the level of spatial dissimilarity for African Americans and the horizontal
axis the level of traditional dissimilarity. The latter is computed using Blocks as subunits.
Not all the metropolitan areas show strikingly different levels of segregation when using
the two approaches. For example, Detroit (MI) and Flint (MI) have comparable levels of
segregation according to spatial and traditional dissimilarity. Muncie (IN) and Beaumont
(TX) instead have dramatic differences in both level and rank. The least segregated city for
African Americans is San Jose (CA). In Panel C of Table 2.1, I show the estimates for the
most populated MSAs. The pattern seems confirmed: both levels and ranks are different.
Figure 2.6 and 2.7 plot the multigroup Spatial Dissimilarity index against the traditional
Dissimilarity. A similar pattern is present and not surprisingly the most segregated cities
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Figure 2.6: Multigroup Spatial Dissimilarity vs Traditional Dissimilarity (Blocks)
 
Each point represents a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). The marker of the points is the MSA FIPS
code. The vertical axis measures the level of spatial dissimilarity for African Americans and the horizontal
axis the level of traditional dissimilarity. The latter is computed using Blocks as subunits.
for African Americans are also the most segregated when considering all racial groups. This
suggests that multigroup segregation levels are mainly driven by blacks’ segregation.
This is confirmed in Table 2.2, where the multigroup spatial dissimilarity is compared to
its neighborhood-based version. The most segregated MSA in US is Flagstaff (AZ-UT), with
a level of 0.866741 while the lease segregated is Laredo (TX), with a spatial dissimilarity of
0.27716. The most populated cities display the same behavior of the previous table.
I computed the correlation among the spatial dissimilarity and several neighborhood-based
indices in Table 2.3. I present correlations with the standard dissimilarity, the isolation index,
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Figure 2.7: Multigroup Spatial Dissimilarity vs Traditional Dissimilarity (Tracts)
 
Each point represents a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). The marker of the points is the MSA FIPS
code. The vertical axis measures the level of spatial dissimilarity for African Americans and the horizontal
axis the level of traditional dissimilarity. The latter is computed using Blocks as subunits.
the information index and the Gini index (see Massey and Denton (1988) or Reardon and
Firebaugh (2002) for a detailed description). For blacks I also show the correlation with the
Spectral Segregation Index of Echenique and Fryer (2007), which is the only index based on
individuals locations available in the literature.
For the dichotomous version of the index (blacks) in Panel A, the correlation with the
standard dissimilarity is 0.6675. Similarly the correlation with the Gini is 0.6749. Notice that
Gini and Dissimilarity are almost perfectly correlated. The correlation with the Information
and Isolation indices is slightly higher but still far from one.
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Table 2.1: Spatial Dissimilarity vs Traditional Dissimilarity (African Americans)
MSA Metropolitan Area Spatial Dissimilarity Dissimilarity
FIPS Dissimilarity (Blocks) (Tracts)
Levels Rank Levels Rank Levels Rank
A. Most segregated MSA in US
5280 Muncie, IN MSA 0.8785051 1 0.7022 141 0.5282 150
2960 Gary, IN PMSA 0.8747661 2 0.8602 4 0.8093 2
2160 Detroit, MI PMSA 0.8701484 3 0.8655 3 0.8405 1
8080 Steubenville–Weirton, OH–WV MSA 0.848863 4 0.7648 58 0.6256 60
6960 Saginaw–Bay City–Midland, MI MSA 0.8471904 5 0.8123 19 0.7334 12
1320 Canton–Massillon, OH MSA 0.8457054 6 0.738 89 0.5774 99
2640 Flint, MI PMSA 0.8411021 7 0.8268 11 0.7646 6
1000 Birmingham, AL MSA 0.8389853 8 0.8157 17 0.6989 20
840 Beaumont–Port Arthur, TX MSA 0.8273058 9 0.7513 74 0.6481 47
5200 Monroe, LA MSA 0.8263328 10 0.8082 22 0.69 27
B. Least segregated MSAs in US
6560 Pueblo, CO MSA 0.4168497 322 0.6532 217 0.4069 261
7160 Salt Lake City–Ogden, UT MSA 0.415838 323 0.6598 209 0.4249 243
8735 Ventura, CA PMSA 0.4148834 324 0.5457 305 0.3695 286
1125 Boulder–Longmont, CO PMSA 0.4105108 325 0.6155 261 0.3239 311
7480 Santa Barbara–Santa Maria–Lompoc, CA MSA 0.4095207 326 0.5629 295 0.3894 271
5170 Modesto, CA MSA 0.394449 327 0.572 291 0.3212 313
200 Albuquerque, NM MSA 0.3794953 328 0.5505 303 0.312 319
380 Anchorage, AK MSA 0.3729775 329 0.4489 328 0.3336 308
5945 Orange County, CA PMSA 0.3686204 330 0.5072 318 0.3391 305
7400 San Jose, CA PMSA 0.3256682 331 0.4817 323 0.2939 325
C. Most populated MSAs in US
4480 Los Angeles–Long Beach, CA PMSA 0.6148579 177 0.6266 252 0.5765 102
5600 New York, NY PMSA 0.6903519 97 0.7013 142 0.6714 38
1600 Chicago, IL PMSA 0.7632357 35 0.8215 15 0.7789 4
6160 Philadelphia, PA–NJ PMSA 0.7276239 63 0.7565 69 0.6897 28
8840 Washington, DC–MD–VA–WV PMSA 0.651122 144 0.6449 227 0.5958 80
2160 Detroit, MI PMSA 0.8701484 3 0.8655 3 0.8405 1
3360 Houston, TX PMSA 0.7056391 81 0.6578 210 0.5716 106
520 Atlanta, GA MSA 0.6759976 115 0.6949 157 0.6148 66
1920 Dallas, TX PMSA 0.6365489 156 0.628 250 0.5396 133
1120 Boston, MA–NH PMSA 0.6009404 191 0.7084 132 0.6364 54
Spatial Dissimilarity is the average of the individual spatial dissimilarity. The traditional dissimilarity is
computed using Census blocks and Census tracts data from the Summary File 1, Census 2000.
The correlation with the Spectral Segregation Index (SSI) is similar, 0.7044. As explained
in Echenique and Fryer (2007), the SSI is more correlated with the isolation index, since
it is a more precise measure of exposure to same race neighbors. The correlations for the
multigroup indices in Panel B are slightly higher but the pattern is similar. Rank correlations
not shown here confirm the same pattern.37
37Rank correlation results are available from the author.
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Table 2.2: Spatial Dissimilarity vs Traditional Dissimilarity (Multigroup)
MSA Metropolitan Area Spatial Dissimilarity Dissimilarity
FIPS Dissimilarity (Blocks) (Tracts)
Levels Rank Levels Rank Levels Rank
A. Most segregated MSA in US
2620 Flagstaff, AZ–UT MSA 0.8667412 1 0.7093 69 0.5808 38
2160 Detroit, MI PMSA 0.8286439 2 0.8198 2 0.7355 1
8080 Steubenville–Weirton, OH–WV MSA 0.8213511 3 0.7397 38 0.5177 86
1000 Birmingham, AL MSA 0.8187241 4 0.8029 5 0.6661 8
5200 Monroe, LA MSA 0.8163867 5 0.8033 4 0.669 7
5280 Muncie, IN MSA 0.8154988 6 0.6843 105 0.4757 120
1320 Canton–Massillon, OH MSA 0.8072924 7 0.7204 55 0.5089 96
2640 Flint, MI PMSA 0.7960778 8 0.799 6 0.6747 6
840 Beaumont–Port Arthur, TX MSA 0.7901801 9 0.738 41 0.6101 24
760 Baton Rouge, LA MSA 0.7901433 10 0.762 21 0.6113 22
B. Least segregated MSAs in US
1150 Bremerton, WA PMSA 0.3996123 322 0.437 322 0.2669 303
6560 Pueblo, CO MSA 0.3992773 323 0.4754 306 0.2864 293
4150 Lawrence, KS MSA 0.3982949 324 0.4753 307 0.264 306
1720 Colorado Springs, CO MSA 0.3969479 325 0.4575 313 0.3069 280
5170 Modesto, CA MSA 0.3946211 326 0.4457 317 0.2684 301
1880 Corpus Christi, TX MSA 0.3941522 327 0.4337 323 0.2515 311
7840 Spokane, WA MSA 0.3868918 328 0.5592 248 0.2777 298
380 Anchorage, AK MSA 0.354807 329 0.4051 328 0.2643 305
2320 El Paso, TX MSA 0.2795754 330 0.367 330 0.2017 327
4080 Laredo, TX MSA 0.2771601 331 0.3563 331 0.1072 331
C. Most populated MSAs in US
4480 Los Angeles–Long Beach, CA PMSA 0.4834004 270 0.4973 289 0.4091 183
5600 New York, NY PMSA 0.6053643 138 0.6286 183 0.5603 56
1600 Chicago, IL PMSA 0.6563473 90 0.7057 76 0.6141 21
6160 Philadelphia, PA–NJ PMSA 0.6965794 54 0.7306 45 0.6252 16
8840 Washington, DC–MD–VA–WV PMSA 0.5894296 149 0.5949 212 0.5028 100
2160 Detroit, MI PMSA 0.8286439 2 0.8198 2 0.7355 1
3360 Houston, TX PMSA 0.5698989 175 0.5689 237 0.4548 138
520 Atlanta, GA MSA 0.6376615 108 0.6702 126 0.5603 55
1920 Dallas, TX PMSA 0.5586969 188 0.5718 235 0.4478 144
1120 Boston, MA–NH PMSA 0.5336268 220 0.6435 166 0.5215 80
Spatial Dissimilarity is the average of the individual spatial dissimilarity. The traditional dissimilarity is
computed using Census blocks and Census tracts data from the Summary File 1, Census 2000.
2.6.2 Individual Segregation Distribution
One of the main advantages of using the spatial approach is that the researcher can examine
the entire distribution of segregation. Figure 2.8 shows the distribution of individual-level
segregation for African Americans, smoothed using a kernel estimate. The four distributions
show that using the average to measure the level of segregation of a metropolitan area can
be misleading. The red vertical line is the average segregation, which I use to measure
segregation for the entire city. The green vertical line is the median segregation, while the
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Table 2.3: Correlations with traditional indices
Spat. Dissim. SSI Dissim Isol Info
Panel A: Blacks
SSI 0.7044
Dissimilarity 0.6675 0.5740
Isolation 0.7371 0.9000 0.7810
Information 0.7290 0.7926 0.9210 0.9545
Gini 0.6749 0.5905 0.9897 0.7797 0.9180
Panel B: Multigroup
Dissimilarity 0.7484
Isolation 0.7241 0.8821
Information 0.7470 0.9530 0.9544
Gini 0.7430 0.9860 0.8442 0.9402
The Spatial Dissimilarity is the average individual spatial dissimilarity. The SSI is the Spectral Segregation
Index of Echenique and Fryer (2006). The Isolation, Information and Gini indices of segregation are described
in Massey and Denton (1988) and Reardon and Firebaugh (2002). The spatial dissimilarity and the SSI
are computed using block level data from the Summary File 1, Census 2000. The remaining indices are
computed using Census Tracts data from the Census 2000. Correlations with indices computed using blocks
are similar and available from the author.
blue lines are the 10th and 90th percentiles. Notice that in all four MSAs the average is above
the median. The distribution is very skewed and there are very few blocks with extremely
high levels of segregation that drive the average up.
I show the quartiles of the distributions for several MSAs in Table 2.4. For comparison
I report the average segregation levels as in Table 2.1. Muncie (IN), which is the most
segregated metropolitan area according to the average segregation, shows that this high
average is due to very few blocks that are highly segregated, while most of the individuals
are exposed to moderate levels of segregation. The same is valid for Detroit (MI), since most
of the blocks have moderate levels of segregation. The average segregation is 0.87 while the
3rd quartile is about 0.65.
I repeat the same exercise for the multigroup version of the index, in Table 2.5. The
distributional pattern is confirmed.
2.6.3 The Impact of Segregation on Socioeconomic Outcomes
The literature on the effect of segregation on socioeconomic outcomes usually shows a nega-
tive correlation of spatial separation and individual performance. In particular, Cutler and
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Figure 2.8: Individual Black Segregation Distribution
A. Chicago, IL B. New York, NY
C. Los Angeles, CA D. Houston, TX
The distribution is a kernel density estimate of the empirical individual spatial dissimilarity density. The
red vertical line is the average spatial dissimilarity, which is the level of spatial dissimilarity for the entire
city. The green line is the median, the blue lines are respectively the 10th and 90th percentiles. It is clear
that an analysis of the entire distribution is more informative than using only the index (which corresponds
to the average).
Glaeser (1997) is one of the most influential papers in economics. They regress measures of
individual socioeconomic performance on the (traditional) dissimilarity and the interaction
of dissimilarity and a dummy for African Americans, showing that racial segregation under-
mines the socioeconomic performance of African Americans in education, unemployment,
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Table 2.4: Individual Distribution of Spatial Dissimilarity, Quartiles (African Americans)
MSA FIPS Metropolitan Area Average 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile
A. Most Segregated MSAs in US
5280 Muncie, IN MSA 0.8785051 0.4210913 0.536438 0.536438
2960 Gary, IN PMSA 0.8747661 0.59432 0.624964 0.624964
2160 Detroit, MI PMSA 0.8701484 0.6527996 0.6527996 0.6527996
8080 Steubenville–Weirton, OH–WV MSA 0.848863 0.5131925 0.5205587 0.5205587
6960 Saginaw–Bay City–Midland, MI MSA 0.8471904 0.4719803 0.5582634 0.5582634
1320 Canton–Massillon, OH MSA 0.8457054 0.4002332 0.5365979 0.5365979
2640 Flint, MI PMSA 0.8411021 0.531328 0.6290947 0.6315051
1000 Birmingham, AL MSA 0.8389853 0.6466866 0.7176122 1.0913744
840 Beaumont–Port Arthur, TX MSA 0.8273058 0.5746312 0.6678815 1.0368019
5200 Monroe, LA MSA 0.8263328 0.6165972 0.755943 1.2140182
B. Least Segregated MSAs in US
6560 Pueblo, CO MSA 0.4168497 0.198187 0.3978968 0.5100178
7160 Salt Lake City–Ogden, UT MSA 0.415838 0.1909232 0.3650295 0.5057651
8735 Ventura, CA PMSA 0.4148834 0.2094268 0.3707898 0.5103415
1125 Boulder–Longmont, CO PMSA 0.4105108 0.1856612 0.363827 0.504531
7480 Santa Barbara–Santa Maria–Lompoc, CA MSA 0.4095207 0.2085673 0.3972317 0.5123268
5170 Modesto, CA MSA 0.394449 0.2065722 0.3786059 0.5140098
200 Albuquerque, NM MSA 0.3794953 0.1716114 0.3434244 0.5133553
380 Anchorage, AK MSA 0.3729775 0.2025856 0.358544 0.5210976
5945 Orange County, CA PMSA 0.3686204 0.1853323 0.3445561 0.4796011
7400 San Jose, CA PMSA 0.3256682 0.1519909 0.3096957 0.4531364
C. Most Populated MSAs in US
4480 Los Angeles–Long Beach, CA PMSA 0.6148579 0.343943 0.4747065 0.5480155
5600 New York, NY PMSA 0.6903519 0.5258307 0.6423153 0.6737719
1600 Chicago, IL PMSA 0.7632357 0.5528326 0.618727 0.6195102
6160 Philadelphia, PA–NJ PMSA 0.7276239 0.498949 0.6210654 0.6286433
8840 Washington, DC–MD–VA–WV PMSA 0.651122 0.4241205 0.6056744 0.6833271
2160 Detroit, MI PMSA 0.8701484 0.6527996 0.6527996 0.6527996
3360 Houston, TX PMSA 0.7056391 0.4178659 0.55851 0.6096372
520 Atlanta, GA MSA 0.6759976 0.4436585 0.6349907 0.7082935
1920 Dallas, TX PMSA 0.6365489 0.3680504 0.5148539 0.5912919
1120 Boston, MA–NH PMSA 0.6009404 0.3859964 0.504475 0.5383391
The average spatial dissimilarity corresponds to the index of segregation for the entire city. Notice that the
individual-level segregation can be greater than one, while the average is constrained to be between zero and
one for comparability across cities.
earnings and single motherhood. They also find that whites are not affected significantly by
segregation, even after controlling for the possible endogeneity of segregation. Ananat (2011)
provides similar results using an alternative instrumental variable strategy. In particular she
finds a mix of positive and negative effects on whites. Echenique and Fryer (2007) use the
Spectral Segregation Index to replicate the least squares regressions in Cutler and Glaeser
(1997), finding qualitatively the same results, with slightly different point estimates.
I use the 1% PUMS 1990 and the Summary Tape File 1B to replicate the Cutler and
Glaeser (1997) study. I analyze the same sample and the same specifications of the original
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Table 2.5: Individual Distribution of Spatial Dissimilarity, Quartiles (Multigroup)
MSA FIPS Metropolitan Area Average 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile
A. Most Segregated MSAs in US
2620 Flagstaff, AZ–UT MSA 0.8667412 0.53719981 0.67667898 1.44508612
2160 Detroit, MI PMSA 0.8286439 0.4994092 0.54727524 0.54727524
8080 Steubenville–Weirton, OH–WV MSA 0.8213511 0.09468782 0.10193237 0.10193237
1000 Birmingham, AL MSA 0.8187241 0.57186057 0.64343456 0.94592965
5200 Monroe, LA MSA 0.8163867 0.57393668 0.69740037 1.09410571
5280 Muncie, IN MSA 0.8154988 0.14197748 0.17546687 0.17546687
1320 Canton–Massillon, OH MSA 0.8072924 0.1274268 0.16439563 0.16460785
2640 Flint, MI PMSA 0.7960778 0.37310235 0.44017288 0.4636971
840 Beaumont–Port Arthur, TX MSA 0.7901801 0.53031412 0.61211039 0.95667631
760 Baton Rouge, LA MSA 0.7901433 0.54107325 0.67690541 1.0536933
B. Least Segregated MSAs in US
1150 Bremerton, WA PMSA 0.3996123 0.1176552 0.17211191 0.22281765
6560 Pueblo, CO MSA 0.3992773 0.14755533 0.2813778 0.43960199
4150 Lawrence, KS MSA 0.3982949 0.10488319 0.18351015 0.24649722
1720 Colorado Springs, CO MSA 0.3969479 0.15178639 0.22656594 0.31751936
5170 Modesto, CA MSA 0.3946211 0.19590742 0.31616467 0.47983551
1880 Corpus Christi, TX MSA 0.3941522 0.17305489 0.30298449 0.46049655
7720 Sioux City, IA–NE MSA 0.3868918 0.24153557 0.31525281 0.31525281
380 Anchorage, AK MSA 0.354807 0.15469473 0.26151132 0.36095664
2320 El Paso, TX MSA 0.2795754 0.10509243 0.18472356 0.316258
4080 Laredo, TX MSA 0.2771601 0.07141443 0.1421759 0.2571718
C. Most Populated MSAs in US
4480 Los Angeles–Long Beach, CA PMSA 0.4834004 0.3974564 0.56927795 0.73234758
5600 New York, NY PMSA 0.6053643 0.60649702 0.74460922 0.88614442
1600 Chicago, IL PMSA 0.6563473 0.4863418 0.58390268 0.65356618
6160 Philadelphia, PA–NJ PMSA 0.6965794 0.41789015 0.50060683 0.53834268
8840 Washington, DC–MD–VA–WV PMSA 0.5894296 0.4377141 0.59586204 0.7592566
2160 Detroit, MI PMSA 0.8286439 0.4994092 0.54727524 0.54727524
3360 Houston, TX PMSA 0.5698989 0.41500124 0.55513781 0.70744205
520 Atlanta, GA MSA 0.6376615 0.44326551 0.61122652 0.71895259
1920 Dallas, TX PMSA 0.5586969 0.36111587 0.50142262 0.62570005
1120 Boston, MA–NH PMSA 0.5336268 0.21691148 0.27838146 0.32705205
The average spatial dissimilarity corresponds to the index of segregation for the entire city. Notice that the
individual-level segregation can be greater than one, while the average is constrained to be between zero and
one for comparability across cities.
paper, while substituting the traditional dissimilarity with the spatial dissimilarity. The
samples contain all 20-24 years old and 25-30 years old individuals born in US. I consider
only the MSAs for which the fiscal variables instruments are available.
The estimated linear probability model has the following specification
yic = α + βSegc + γSegc × blacki + δXi + εic (2.43)
where i indicates an individual and c a MSA/PMSA, yic is a socioeconomic outcome,
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blacki is a dummy indicating if the individual is black, Segc is the segregation level of the
MSA, and the controls Xi’s are: fraction of blacks in MSA, dummies for race (black, asian,
hispanic and other nonwhite), dummy for female, age dummies, log of population in MSA,
log of median income in MSA, manufacturing share of MSA. The last three variables are
also included interacted with the black dummy.
The dependent variables are: the probability of high school graduation, the probability of
college graduation, the probability of being idle (not in school nor at work) and the log of
total earnings.
Table 2.6: Individuals 20-24 years old, OLS results
Cutler and Glaeser (1997)
hs grad coll grad idle ln(earnings)
Dissimilarity .0648∗∗ .1013 .0086 .1027
(.0317) (.0760) (.0278) (.1675)
Dissim * black −.2172∗∗∗ −.1320∗∗ .2832 −.5230
(.0757) (.0672) (.0624) (.2417)
N 139634 139634 139634 105526
R2 .0371 .0405 .0510 .0983
Mele (2008)
hs grad coll grad idle ln(earnings)
Spat. Dissimilarity .1061∗ .1642 .0147 .1697
(.0589) (.1259) (.0462) (.2857)
Spat. Dissim * black −.4435∗∗∗ −.2403∗∗ .5761∗∗∗ −.9032∗
(.1797) (.1193) (.1883) (.4992)
N 139634 139634 139634 105526
R2 .0353 .0379 .0490 .0973
Standard errors corrected for clustering at the MSA level. The sample contains all 20-24 years old individuals
born in US. I consider only the MSAs for which the scal variables instruments are available. Controls included
but not shown: fraction of blacks in MSA, dummies for race (black, asian, hispanic and other nonwhite),
dummy for female, age dummies, log of population in MSA, log of median income in MSA, manufacturing
share of MSA. The last three variables are also included interacted with the black dummy.
Table 2.6 compares the replication of Cutler and Glaeser’s least squares estimates (upper
panel) with the ones I obtained using the spatial dissimilarity (bottom panel), for the sample
of 20-24 years old individuals.
There are several differences. When using the spatial dissimilarity, the segregation is
harmful per se, decreasing the probability of high school graduation for all individuals and
not only for blacks. The coefficients for college graduation are not significant in my analysis,
implying that segregation is not correlated with this outcome. The results on idleness are
47
similar, but I find that the log of total earnings is negatively correlated with segregation and
strongly significant. These findings suggests that the conclusions of previous studies may be
driven by the mismeasurement of segregation and may not be very robust.
To check the robustness of my estimates, I ran all the regressions using the Spatial Dissim-
ilarity computed using a fixed bandwidth of .5 and 1 km. The point estimates are slightly
different but the qualitative implications of Table 2.6 are confirmed. I also use the specifica-
tion in Echenique and Fryer (2007), where variables are normalized, and the results do not
change.
In order to correct for the endogeneity of segregation I use the fiscal instruments of Cutler
and Glaeser. It is not clear if these are good instruments for the spatial dissimilarity and
I leave the search of a good instrument for the spatial dissimilarity to future research.
Nonetheless this exercise provides some insights.
The results of these regressions are reported in Table 2.7.
Table 2.7: Individuals 20-24 years old, IV results
Cutler and Glaeser (1997)
hs grad coll grad idle ln(earnings)
Dissimilarity .1330∗∗∗ .2144∗∗∗ −.0403 .0985
(.0445) (.0531) (.0255) (.1649)
Dissim * black −.4136∗∗∗ −.1991∗∗∗ .2093∗∗∗ −.8156∗∗∗
(.0836) (.0558) (.0888) (.2849)
N 97932 97932 97932 56390
R2 .0384 .0911 .0508 .0882
Mele (2008)
hs grad coll grad idle ln(earnings)
Spat. Dissimilarity .2193∗∗ .3535∗∗∗ −.0666 .1609
(.0932) (.1049) (.0439) (.2863)
Spat. Dissim * black −.8288∗∗∗ −.3269∗∗∗ .6378∗∗∗ −1.487∗∗∗
(.2764) (.1111) (.2099) (.5667)
N 97932 97932 97932 56390
R2 .0325 .0811 .0486 .0877
Standard errors corrected for clustering at the MSA level. The sample contains all 20-24 years old individuals
born in US. I consider only the MSAs for which the scal variables instruments are available. Controls included
but not shown: fraction of blacks in MSA, dummies for race (black, asian, hispanic and other nonwhite),
dummy for female, age dummies, log of population in MSA, log of median income in MSA, manufacturing
share of MSA. The last three variables are also included interacted with the black dummy.
The results confirm the qualitative conclusions of the original paper. On the other hand
the coefficients have higher magnitudes, implying a stronger negative impact of segregation
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on socioeconomic performance of blacks. Assuming that the instrumental variables are valid
for the spatial dissimilarity, this suggests that segregation’s negative impact may have been
underestimated in previous studies.
The same pattern is confirmed by the 25-30 years old sample. The least squares estimates
are in Table 2.8 and the instrumental variable estimates are in Table 2.9
Table 2.8: Individuals 25-30 years old, OLS results
Cutler and Glaeser (1997)
hs grad coll grad idle ln(earnings)
Dissimilarity .0165 −.0137 .0048 −.0926
(.0238) (.0671) (.0249) (.1151)
Dissim * black −.2513∗∗∗ −.0496 .2707∗∗∗ −.5563∗∗∗
(.0453) (.0512) (.0395) (.1416)
N 139634 139634 139634 105526
R2 .0374 .0412 .0510 .0988
Mele (2008)
hs grad coll grad idle ln(earnings)
Spat. Dissimilarity −.0681∗∗∗ −.1507∗∗ .0125 −.4736∗∗∗
(.0276) (.0699) (.0228) (.1202)
Spat. Dissim * black −.1823∗∗∗ .0248 .1915∗∗∗ −.5198∗∗∗
(.0541) (.0522) (.0527) (.1371)
N 139634 139634 139634 105526
R2 .0376 .0422 .0504 .1011
Standard errors corrected for clustering at the MSA level. The sample contains all 20-24 years old individuals
born in US. I consider only the MSAs for which the scal variables instruments are available. Controls included
but not shown: fraction of blacks in MSA, dummies for race (black, asian, hispanic and other nonwhite),
dummy for female, age dummies, log of population in MSA, log of median income in MSA, manufacturing
share of MSA. The last three variables are also included interacted with the black dummy.
Even if the causal interpretation of these results is unclear, the estimation exercise pro-
vides some evidence that when segregation is measured with more precision, i.e. taking
into account the intra-neighborhood distribution of racial groups, the estimated impact on
socioeconomic outcome is different.38
2.7 Extensions to Continuous and Multiple Marks
Throughout the paper I maintained the assumption that the marks were discrete, since I
focused on the measurement of racial segregation. Here I show how to extend the basic
38In results not shown I repeat the estimation using standardized variables as in Echenique and Fryer
(2007). The qualitative results are unchanged. These results are available from the author.
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Table 2.9: Individuals 25-30 years old, IV results
Cutler and Glaeser (1997)
hs grad coll grad idle ln(earnings)
Dissimilarity .0648∗∗ .1013 .0086 .1027
(.0317) (.0760) (.0278) (.1675)
Dissim * black −.2172∗∗∗ −.1320∗∗ .2832 −.5230
(.0757) (.0672) (.0624) (.2417)
N 139634 139634 139634 105526
R2 .0371 .0405 .0510 .0983
Mele (2008)
hs grad coll grad idle ln(earnings)
Spat. Dissimilarity .1061∗ .1642 .0147 .1697
(.0589) (.1259) (.0462) (.2857)
Spat. Dissim * black −.4435∗∗∗ −.2403∗∗ .5761∗∗∗ −.9032∗
(.1797) (.1193) (.1883) (.4992)
N 139634 139634 139634 105526
R2 .0353 .0379 .0490 .0973
Standard errors corrected for clustering at the MSA level. The sample contains all 20-24 years old individuals
born in US. I consider only the MSAs for which the scal variables instruments are available. Controls included
but not shown: fraction of blacks in MSA, dummies for race (black, asian, hispanic and other nonwhite),
dummy for female, age dummies, log of population in MSA, log of median income in MSA, manufacturing
share of MSA. The last three variables are also included interacted with the black dummy.
definitions and results to continuous and multivariate segregation. Assume the researcher is
interested in measuring income segregation.
The definition of extreme spatial separation slightly changes.
DEFINITION 3 The process X is completely unsegregated if and only if ρ (ξ,m) =
ρ (m) for all ξ ∈ X0, m ∈ M. The process X is completely segregated if and only if for
all ξ ∈ x0, there is an m∗ = m∗ (ξ) ∈M such that ρ (ξ,m) = δ (m−m∗), where δ (u) is the
Dirac-Delta function.
To measure the level of income segregation (or any nonnegative continuous variable) the
mark space is assumed to be M = [0,∞). The spatial dissimilarity index is derived analo-
gously to the racial segregation case. Consider the quantity
d (ξ) =
∫
M
|ρ (ξ,m)− ρ (m)| dm (2.44)
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PROPOSITION 3 If the mark space is M = [0,∞) then under Complete Segregation
d (ξs) = 2
Proof. In Appendix C
Therefore the individual Spatial Dissimilarity index for income segregation is defined as
φD Inc (ξ) =
1
2
∫
M
|ρ (ξ,m)− ρ (m)| dm
and the average index for the metropolitan area is
TD Inc (X) = 1
2N (S)
∑
ξ∈X0
∫
M
|ρ (ξ,m)− ρ (m)| dm (2.45)
As emphasized in the theoretical section, Theorem 1 and 2 are general and do not depend
on the mark space. The expectation computed using Theorem 2 is
E [TD Inc (X)] = 1
2Λ0 (S)
∫
S
∫
M
|ρ (ξ,m)− ρ (m)|λ0 (ξ) dmdξ (2.46)
Furthermore, the researcher may be interested in computing segregation levels for more
than one variable, for example residential segregation by race and income. This is easily
done in this framework: define the mark as a vector r = (m, y), where m is the racial group
and y is the income level, and compute the joint conditional spatial probability of the marks
ρ (ξ, r). All the previous results apply.
Moreover the researcher can allow for correlation among marks of different type. In the
case just mentioned, there is no restriction on the correlation between racial group and
income levels. In other words, the mark vectors r must be independent, but there is no
restriction about the joint distribution of m and y, i.e ρ (ξ,m, y) 6= ρm (ξ) ρ (ξ, y)
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2.8 Conclusions
In this work I propose an alternative method for measuring spatial segregation of socioeco-
nomic variables that considers individuals and their locations as primitives. Existing indices
of segregation are based on an arbitrary partition of the metropolitan area in neighbor-
hoods: given the same spatial distribution of racial groups, the index will measure different
segregation levels for different neighborhood definitions.
The proposed method assumes that the locations of racial groups are the realization of
a simple spatial process that generates a spatial density of racial groups characterized by
(exogenous) clustering. For each coordinate of the metropolitan area, one can measure the
probability that an individual living at that specific location belongs to a specific racial
group. If there is no segregation the spatial density does not vary over space, it is flat. The
segregation level of an individual is defined as difference between the actual spatial density
and the flat spatial density at her location. The level of segregation of the entire metropolitan
area is the segregation level of the average individual.
This method has several advantages with respect to the traditional neighborhood-based
approach. First, the index does not depend on arbitrary partitions of the city in neighbor-
hoods. Second, this method provides the entire distribution of segregation among individuals
and over space, and therefore it is more informative than a synthetic index. I show that for
most cities, the extremely high average level of segregation is driven by very few locations
with excessive segregation, while most of the location are exposed to moderate levels of
spatial separation. Third, the estimation method relies on simple nonparametric estimation
techniques, available in standard statistical software. Furthermore, I derive several distri-
butional properties of the indices derived under the spatial approach that could be used to
develop rigorous statistical tests for segregation.
The methodology is not confined to indices of racial segregation, but it can be extended
to measure segregation of continuous variables or vectors of variables as I show in the last
section of the paper. Other applications include the study of clustering of economic activities
or the spatial concentration of industries. These are topic of interest in the rapidly growing
literature of economic geography, but there are very few applications of spatial statistics
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techniques in this field.39
This method delivers different segregation levels than the ones measured by traditional
indices. Using 1990 and 2000 Census data I compute a spatial dissimilarity and compare it
with the traditional dissimilarity. The resulting levels of segregation and ranking of cities in
terms of spatial separation are significantly different.
These differences have important economic implications. I replicate Cutler and Glaeser
(1997) analysis of the impact of segregation on socioeconomic outcomes, showing that results
change when the traditional dissimilarity is replaced by the spatial dissimilarity. I conclude
that my empirical findings may potentially challenge the robustness of the estimated impact
of racial segregation on individual outcomes: when segregation is measured in a more precise
way, i.e. taking into account the spatial location of each individual, the conclusions of
previous studies may be different.
39An exception is Arbia et al. (2008).
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CHAPTER 3
A STRUCTURAL MODEL OF SEGREGATION IN
SOCIAL NETWORKS
3.1 Introduction
Social networks are important determinants of individuals’ socioeconomic performance. An
increasing amount of evidence shows that the number and composition of social ties affects
employment prospects, school performance, risky behavior, adoption of new technologies,
diffusion of information and health outcomes.1 The structure of social ties is endogenous:
individuals choose their peers and friends according to their socioeconomic characteristics
and their relationships. As a consequence, in socially generated networks the agents are
likely to interact with similar individuals (homophily), segregating along socioeconomic at-
tributes.2 This paper develops a structural model and estimation methods to study the
determinants of such segregated network structures.
The economics literature has relied on two complementary approaches to model the pro-
cess of network formation. Strategic models interpret the network as equilibrium outcome
of a strategic game, in which rational players choose their social ties by weighing the costs
and benefits of each link.3 Structural estimation of strategic models is challenging, be-
cause the process of link formation generates externalities: individuals benefit from indirect
links created by other players. As a result, these models have multiple equilibria, a feature
that greatly complicates the identification of structural parameters.4 Furthermore, strategic
1For example, see the contributions of Topa (2001); Laschever (2009); Cooley (2010); De Giorgi et al.
(2010); Nakajima (2007); Bandiera and Rasul (2006); Conley and Udry (forthcoming); Golub and Jackson
(2011); Acemoglu et al. (2011).
2See Currarini et al. (2009, 2010), De Marti and Zenou (2009),Echenique et al. (2006).
3Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), Bala and Goyal (2000), Galeotti (2006), Jackson (2008).
4Comola (2010) and Mayer and Puller (2008) are examples of structural models where multiple equilibria
may arise.
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models suffer a curse of dimensionality: the number of possible network structures increases
exponentially with the number of players. Therefore the computation of equilibria may re-
quire an infeasible number of calculations for networks with a large number of players. On
the other hand, in random network formation models, the network is the realization of a
stochastic process.5 Each link occurs with some probability and the model characterizes
the likelihood of observing a specific network configuration. While these models are able to
match several important characteristics of social network data (high clustering, homophily,
diameter) and their estimation is relatively standard, they lack the equilibrium microfoun-
dation of the strategic models, limiting their use for policy analysis.
This paper develops and estimates a strategic model of dynamic network formation with
heterogeneous agents. Preferences are defined over individual socioeconomic characteristics
and network structures. Each period a random player is selected from the population and
he meets another agent, according to a meeting technology. Upon meeting, the player has
the opportunity to revise his linking strategy: a link is created (or maintained, if already in
place) if and only if the utility of the additional link is positive.
I prove and characterize the existence of a unique stationary equilibrium, which provides
the likelihood of observing a specific network architecture in the long run. The absence of
multiple equilibria is crucial in estimation: assuming that the network observed in the data
is drawn from the stationary equilibrium of the model, the structural parameters can be
estimated using only one observation of the network at a single point in time.
I estimate the posterior distribution of the structural parameters, using a Bayesian ap-
proach. The main challenge is that the model’s likelihood is proportional to an intractable
normalizing constant, that cannot be evaluated or approximated with precision. To over-
come this problem, I propose a Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm that generates samples
from the posterior distribution without evaluating the likelihood. I prove that the algorithm
converges to the correct posterior distribution and therefore the sample averages of the algo-
rithm’s output can be used to approximate posterior expectations. Using several properties
of the model, I am able to decrease the computational burden even further, allowing infer-
ence in high dimensional models.
5Jackson (2008),Jackson and Rogers (2007), Snijders (2002), Wasserman and Pattison (1996)
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I present an application to the study of segregation in school friendship networks, using
data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health). This unique
database contains detailed information on friendship networks of students enrolled in a rep-
resentative sample of US schools. The final sample contains 14 schools with a total of 1139
students.6 I find that race, gender and grade are important determinants of network forma-
tion in schools. There is overwhelming evidence of homophily, i.e. students tend to interact
and form social ties with similar people, other things being equal. These estimates control
for the structure of the network. In addition, I find that homophily effects extend beyond
direct links: students prefer an homogeneous racial composition of friends of friends.
This model provides useful guidance to policymakers who care about promoting policies
that affect the structure of the network. I use the estimated model to predict how a change
in the composition of the student population affects the structure of the network and wel-
fare.7 As an example, I consider a busing program that affects two schools in the sample, one
with an enrolled population of 98% Whites and the other with 96% African Americans. I
simulate alternative re-assignments of students across schools and then measure the average
segregation and welfare in the new stationary equilibrium of the model.
I find that a desegregation program that equalizes the racial composition across schools is
not welfare maximizing and may promote higher segregation within schools. Furthermore,
a desegregation plan may have different effects on each school, increasing segregation in one
while decreasing it in the other. I also compare the results of these policy experiments with
results generated using a model with a simpler preference structure, where individuals care
only about their direct links. The predictions of such model are quite different from the full
structural model.
The paper provides both theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature on net-
work formation. From the theoretical side, the model incorporates ingredients from both
6I use only the schools from the saturated sample. The sampling scheme of Add Health involved in-
school interviews for all the students. A subsample of 20745 students was also interviewed at home, to
collect detailed individual information. The saturated sample contains schools for which both interviews
were administered to each student enrolled. Therefore this sample does not contain any missing information
about individual controls. This is not the case for most schools in Add Health.
7Alternatively, the model could be used as a guide for the design of randomized experiments that modify
students assignments.
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strategic and random network formation literature (Jackson, 2008). The link formation is
sequential: each period only one agent is active and he updates only one link. At the be-
ginning of the period, a random player is drawn from the population and he meets another
agent according to a random meeting technology. Upon meeting the player has the oppor-
tunity to update his social tie to the agent. The implicit assumption is that meetings occur
often and players have frequent opportunities to revise their strategies.
The agents’ preferences allow for a rich structure of indirect payoffs from link formation.
Individuals care about the socioeconomic composition of their friends, friends of friends and
feedback from those friends payoffs. Concretely, a player’s utility from linking to another
individual depends on the socioeconomic attributes of the pair; additionally, players value
the socioeconomic composition of friend of friends, and how befriending someone could affect
their popularity among the other players. Finally, a link provides additional utility when it
is reciprocated. When updating the link, the player receives a random shock to his prefer-
ences, which is unobserved by the econometrician. This shock captures unobservable factors
that could affect link formation: for example, a student may be in a bad mood when he
meets another individual, and this affects his linking strategy. The link is formed if and only
if the social relationship provides positive utility. To preserve tractability, I assume that
individuals do not take into account how their current linking strategy affects the shape
of future networks: they follow a stochastic best-response dynamics a` la Blume (1993).8
This assumption reduces the computational complexity and makes analysis of the network
dynamics feasible.9
The model has two desirable features. First, there are two sources of heterogeneity. Each
individual is endowed with a set of exogenous attributes. Furthermore, the dynamics of net-
work formation generates endogenous heterogeneity: each individual has a different set of
friends and different compositions of friends’ attributes. In equilibrium, two agents with the
same exogenous attributes may exhibit very different linking strategies, due to their differ-
8It is possible to relax the assumption of myopic agents, but the computational burden becomes much
more challenging. The simple characterization of equilibrium behavior, long run dynamics and the estimation
strategy depend on the best-response dynamics and may not extend to networks with forward-looking agents.
9Alternatively, it is possible to interpret this model as an equilibrium selection device, that selects one of
the possible networks as the result of an evolutionary game.
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ent endogenous positions in the network and the socioeconomic composition of their friends.
Most models of strategic network formation incorporate the first level of heterogeneity but
are unable to generate different equilibrium behavior, because the agents in these models
only care about their direct links.10
Second, the network formation game can be characterized as a potential game.11 All the
players’ incentives in any state of the network are completely summarized by an aggregate
function, the potential, mapping networks and socioeconomic characteristics into potential
levels. When an agent updates a link, the change in his utility is equal to the change in
the aggregate potential. This simple characterization is key to making analysis of a network
with many agents feasible because the potential summarizes the incentives of all players
with a single number: there is no need to keep track of the choices and utility levels of all
n players. The existence of a potential allows me to characterize the stationary equilibrium
in closed form. Assuming that preference shocks follow an extreme value distribution (i.i.d.
over time and across agents), and that any pair of agents can meet with positive probability,
I prove that the unique stationary equilibrium characterizes the probability of observing a
specific network structure as an exponential function of the potential. This result provides
the likelihood function underlying the estimation.
The second main contribution is the development of a flexible algorithm that reduces the
computational burden for estimation.12 The likelihood of this model is proportional to a nor-
malizing constant that cannot be evaluated or approximated with precision. A state-of-the-
art supercomputer would take several years to evaluate the likelihood at a single parameter
value. This feature prevents the use of traditional MCMC schemes, e.g. Metropolis-Hastings,
that evaluate the likelihood at each iteration. To circumvent this problem, I propose a
10An exception is the model of De Marti and Zenou (2009), where the cost of linking an individual also
depends on the composition of friends of friends. While the structure of the preference is similar to mine, they
present a static model and the link formation requires mutual agreement of the players. The consequence is
that their model has multiple equilibria.
11See Monderer and Shapley (1996) for a description of games with a potential. Gilles and Sarangi (2004)
investigates a model of network formation with a potential function. Their model only considers the utility
from direct links, while mine includes indirect links, mutual links and popularity.
12Christakis et al. (2010) propose an alternative model and estimation procedure. In their model myopic
agents meet over time and must mutually agree to form a link. The meeting is treated as a latent variable
and integrated out in estimation, using a MCMC algorithm that samples parameters from the posterior
while simulating meeting sequences.
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Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm that samples from the posterior distribution of the
parameters without evaluating the likelihood. The algorithm belongs to the class of ex-
change algorithms, first proposed by Murray et al. (2006) to generate samples from posterior
distributions with similar intractable likelihoods. I develop an approximate version of the
algorithm that reduces the computational burden even further, allowing inference in high
dimensional models.13
The idea behind the sampler is as follows. At each iteration we perform a double
Metropolis-Hastings step. First, we propose a new parameter vector as in the standard
Metropolis-Hastings scheme; second, we draw a new network from the stationary equilib-
rium of the model at the proposed parameter, using a second Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
If the network generated by the latter simulation is similar to the network observed in the
data, then the parameter is accepted with high probability; viceversa, if the simulated net-
work is very different from the data, the probability of acceptance is lower. The similarity
between networks is measured using likelihood ratios at the current and proposed parame-
ters.14 The intuition is that if the observed and simulated networks are similar, the proposed
parameter is very likely to generate the data as a draw from the stationary equilibrium.
I prove that the samples generated by my approximate algorithm converge to the correct
posterior distribution. Therefore, sample averages computed using the algorithm’s output
can be used to approximate posterior expectations and to make inference. In the empirical
application I use an extension of the algorithm which makes use of parallel computing tech-
niques and allows me to estimate the model using multiple network data. This is extremely
important if the model is used to perform counterfactual policy experiments: using multiple
networks allows to control for network fixed effects and additional network level character-
istics that could affect the outcome of the implemented policy.
In the appendix, I provide extensions of the model and estimation strategy to incorporate
unobserved heterogeneity in individual quality and preferences. The inclusion of unobserved
heterogeneity and random coefficients makes the model more realistic, at the price of a
13I use arguments similar to Liang (2010)
14While the evaluation of the likelihood is infeasible, it is always possible to evaluate likelihood ratios
computed at the same parameter value but at different network configurations.
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substantial increase in computational costs. Furthermore, the estimation strategy is easily
adapted to deal with missing links, through data augmentation techniques. This extension
also comes with a substantial additional computational cost.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I present the model’s details and show that
it belongs to the class of potential games. Then, I provide a full characterization of the
unique stationary equilibrium. Section 3 identifies the computational problem in estima-
tion and proposes an approximate exchange algorithm for the estimation of the posterior
distribution. I prove that the proposed algorithm converges to the correct posterior distri-
bution. The empirical application is presented in Section 4, where I estimate preferences
for interracial interaction in a sample of US high schools. I also study the impact of school
desegregation programs on the structure of the school friendship network. Section 5 con-
cludes. The proofs for the theoretical model results are in Appendix A, while the details
of the estimation algorithm are contained in Appendix B. Several extensions of the model
to incorporate unobserved heterogeneity in individual quality and preferences, and missing
links are shown in Appendix C.
3.2 A Model of Network Formation
3.2.1 Setup
Let I = {1, 2, ..., n} be the set of agents, each identified by a vector of A (exogenous)
attributes Xi = {Xi1, ..., XiA}, e.g. gender, wealth, age, location, etc. The attributes of the
population are contained in the matrix X = {X1, X2, ..., Xn} and X denotes the set of all
possible matrices X. Time is discrete.
The social network is represented as a n × n binary matrix G ∈ G, where G is the set of
all n× n binary matrices. The generic element of matrix G is
Gij =
 1 if individual i nominates individual j as a friend0 otherwise
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and I follow the convention in the literature, assuming Gii = 0, for any i.
The network represented by G is directed : the existence of a link from i to j does not
imply the existence of the link from j to i, i.e. Gij 6= Gji. This modeling choice reflects the
structure of the Add Health data, where friendship nominations are not necessarily mutual.
Some authors refer to this data as perceived networks.15
Let the realization of the network at time t be denoted as gt and the realization of the
link between i and j at time t be gtij. The network including all the current links but g
t
ij,
i.e. gt\gtij, is denoted as gt−ij; while gt−i denotes the network matrix excluding the i-th row
(i.e. all the links of player i).
Preferences are defined over network realizations and population characteristics. I assume
there is an utility function Ui : G × X → R for each i, mapping networks and individual
characteristics into utility levels.
Network Formation Process
The process of link formation follows a stochastic best-response dynamics, as in Blume (1993),
and generates a Markov chain of networks. The main ingredients of this process are random
meetings and utility maximization. The implicit assumption is that individuals meet very
frequently and have the opportunity to revise their links.
Meeting Technology. At the beginning of each period a player i is randomly selected from
the population, and he meets individual j, according to a matching technology. Formally, the
meeting process is a stochastic sequence m = {mt}∞t=1 with support I × I. The realizations
of the meeting process are ordered pairs mt = {i, j}, indicating which agent i should play
and which link gij can be updated at period t.
16
The probability that player i is randomly chosen from the population and meets agent j
is defined as
Pr
(
mt = ij|gt−1, X) = ρ (gt−1, Xi, Xj) (3.1)
15See Wasserman and Faust (1994) for references.
16Several models incorporate a matching technology in the network formation process. Jackson and Watts
(2002) assume individuals meet randomly according to a discrete uniform distribution. Currarini et al.
(2009) introduce a matching process that is biased towards individuals of the same type, similar to the one
modeled here.
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where
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 ρ (g,Xi, Xj) = 1 for any g ∈ G. The matching probability depends on the
current network (e.g. the existence of a common friend between i and j) and the character-
istics of the pair. This structure includes matching technologies with a bias for same-type
individuals as in Currarini et al. (2009). The simplest example of matching technology is
an i.i.d. discrete uniform process with ρ (gt−1, Xi, Xj) = 1n(n−1) . An example with bias for
same-type agents is ρ (gt−1, Xi, Xj) ∝ exp [−d (Xi, Xj)], where d (·, ·) is a distance function.
Utility Maximization. Conditional on the meeting mt = ij, player i updates the link gij
to maximize his current utility, taking the existing network gt−ij as given. I assume that the
agents do not take into account the effect of their linking strategy on the future evolution
of the network. The players have complete information, since they can observe the entire
network and the individual attributes of all agents. Before updating his link to j, individual
i receives an idiosyncratic shock ε ∼ F (ε) to his preferences that the econometrician cannot
observe. This shock models unobservables that could influence the utility of an additional
link, e.g. mood, gossips, fights, etc. Player i links agent j at time t if and only if it is a best
response to the current network configuration, i.e. gtij = 1 if and only if
Ui
(
gtij = 1, g
t−1
−ij , X
)
+ ε1t ≥ Ui
(
gtij = 0, g
t−1
−ij , X
)
+ ε0t. (3.2)
I assume that when the equality holds, the agent plays the status quo.17
The network formation process generates a sequence [g0, g1, ...., gt] of networks. In each
period only one element of the random matrix G is updated, conditioning on the existing
network. Therefore the sequence is a Markov chain, with transition probabilities determined
by the meeting process and agents’ linking choices.18
17This assumption does not affect the main result and is relevant only when the distribution of the
preference shocks is discrete.
18The derivation of the transition matrix is straightforward. The set of all possible states corresponds to
the set of all possible binary n × n matrices G; the probability of transition from a network gt = g to next
period network gt+1 =
(
g′ij , g−ij
)
is
ρ (g,Xi, Xj) Pr
[
Ui
(
g′ij , g−ij , X
)
+ ε
(
g′ij
) ≥ Ui (gij , g−ij , X) + ε (gij)] (3.3)
The transition probability is zero if the networks g and g′ differ by more than one element.
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Preferences
The preferences are defined over networks and individual characteristics. The utility of
player i from a network g and population attributes X = (X1, ..., Xn) is given by
Ui (g,X) =
n∑
j=1
gijuij︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct friends
+
n∑
j=1
gijgjimij︸ ︷︷ ︸
mutual friends
+
n∑
j=1
gij
n∑
k=1
k 6=i,j
gjkvik
︸ ︷︷ ︸
friends of friends
+
n∑
j=1
gij
n∑
k=1
k 6=i,j
gkiwkj
︸ ︷︷ ︸
popularity
(3.4)
where uij ≡ u (Xi, Xj), mij ≡ m (Xi, Xj), vij ≡ v (Xi, Xj) and wij ≡ w (Xi, Xj) are
(bounded) real-valued functions of the attributes. The utility of the network is the sum
of the net benefits received from each link. The total benefit from an additional link has
four components.
When a player creates a link to another individual, he receives a direct net benefit uij.
The direct utility includes both costs and benefits and it may possibly be negative: when
only homophily enters payoffs of direct links, the net utility uij is positive if i and j belong
to the same group, while it is negative when they are of different types. This is illustrated
in Panel A of Figure 4.1 with a simple network of 8 agents. Each agent can belong to either
the blue group or the yellow group. The link that agent 4 forms to individual 5 provides
different direct utility in the two networks, since the identity of 5 is different: blue for the
left network and yellow for the right one. In many models this component is parameterized
as uij = bij − cij, where bij indicates the (gross) benefit and cij the cost of forming the
additional link gij. I use the notation uij, since it does not require assumptions on the cost
function.
The players receive additional utility mij if the link is mutual; friendship is valued differ-
ently if the other agent reciprocates. An agent may perceive another individual as a friend,
but that person may not perceive the relationship in the same way. Panel B of Figure 4.1
isolates this component: a link from agent 4 to agent 5 has a different value if agent 5 re-
ciprocates (right network).
The players value the composition of friends of friends. When i is deciding whether to
befriend j, she observes j’s friends and their socioeconomic characteristics. Each of j’s friend
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Figure 3.1: Components of the utility function
A. Direct friends
B. Mutual friends
C. Friends of friends
D. Popularity
The network contains n = 8 agents, belonging to two groups: blue and yellow. All the panels show a
situation in which player 4 decides whether to form a link to individual 5 (the dashed arrow from 4 to 5).
Agent 4 receives different direct utility when he links a blue (Panel A, left) or a yellow (Panel A, right)
individual. Agent 4’s utility from an additional link is different if the link is unilateral (Panel B, left)
or reciprocated (Panel B, right). Furthermore, agent 4’s utility from friends of friends varies with their
socioeconomic composition: 3 blue individuals (Panel C, left) provide different utility than 2 blue and 1
yellow agents (Panel C, right). Finally, agent 4 values how his new link affects his popularity, since he
creates a new indirect friendship for those who already have a link to him (agents 1,2 and 3). The utility of
a link to agent 5 (which is yellow) when agents 1,2 and 3 are all blue (Panel D, left) is different than when
agent 2 is yellow and 1 and 2 are blue (Panel D, right).
provides additional utility v(Xi, Xk) to i. In this model, an agent who has the opportunity
to form an additional link, values a white student with three Hispanic friends as a different
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good than a white student with two white friends and one African American friend.19 In
other words, individuals value both exogenous heterogeneity and endogenous heterogeneity:
the former is determined by the socioeconomic characteristics of the agents, while the latter
arises endogenously with the process of network formation. I assume that only friends of
friends are valuable and they are perfect substitutes: individuals do not receive utility from
two-links-away friends. In Panel C of Figure 4.1, from the perspective of agent 4, agent 5 in
the left network is a different good than agent 5 in the right network, since the composition
of his friends is different.
The fourth component corresponds to a popularity effect. Consider Panel D in Figure 4.1.
When agent 4 forms a link to agent 5, he automatically creates an indirect link for agents
1, 2 and 3. Thus agent 4 generates an externality. For example, suppose there is homophily
in indirect links. Then in the left network the externality is negative for all three agents (1,
2 and 3); and in the right network it is negative for 1 and 3, but positive for 2. Therefore,
in the left network the popularity of 4 goes down, while in the right network the fall in
popularity is less pronounced.
3.2.2 Equilibrium Analysis
I impose an additional assumption on the functional forms of the utility functions. The
assumption is not too strong, but it provides important identification restrictions. I assume
that the utility mij obtained from mutual links is symmetric and that the utility of an
indirect link vij has the same functional form as the utility from the popularity effect wij.
ASSUMPTION 5 (Preferences) The preferences satisfy the following restrictions
m (Xi, Xj) = m (Xj, Xi) for all i, j ∈ I
w (Xk, Xj) = v (Xk, Xj) for all k, j ∈ I
19A similar assumption is used in De Marti and Zenou (2009) where the agents’ cost of linking depend
on the racial composition of friends of friends. Their model is an extension of the connection model of
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), and the links are formed with mutual consent. The corresponding network is
undirected.
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therefore the utility function is
Ui (g,X) =
n∑
j=1
gijuij +
n∑
j=1
gijgjimij +
n∑
j=1
gij
n∑
k=1
k 6=i,j
gjkvik +
n∑
j=1
gij
n∑
k=1
k 6=i,j
gkivkj (3.5)
The symmetry in mij does not imply that a mutual link between i and j gives both the same
utility. Indeed if i and j have a mutual link, they receive the same common utility compo-
nent (mij) but they may perceive that particular friendship in a different way, as long as the
utility from direct or indirect links are different for i and j. As a result, two individuals with
the same exogenous characteristics Xi = Xj (say two males, whites, enrolled in eleventh
grade) who form a mutual link receive the same uij and mij, but they may have different
utilities from that additional link because of the composition of their friends of friends and
their popularity. Therefore, this part of the assumption helps in identifying the utility from
indirect links and popularity.
The second restriction is more technical. When i forms a link to j, i creates an externality
for all k’s who have linked her: any such k now has an additional indirect friend, i.e. j,
who agent k values by an amount v (Xk, Xj). When w (Xk, Xj) = v (Xk, Xj), an individual
i values his popularity effect as much as k values the indirect link to j, i.e., i internalizes the
externality he creates.
Assumption 1 is the main ingredient that guarantees a closed form solution for the sta-
tionary equilibrium of the model. Without this assumption, the model would still have a
unique stationary equilibrium, however it would be impossible to characterize the likelihood
function in closed form.20 The first part of the assumption is a normalization of the utility
function that allows identification for the utility of indirect links and popularity. The second
part of the assumption is an identification restriction, that guarantees the model’s coherency
in the sense of Tamer (2003). In simple words, this part of the assumption guarantees that
the system of conditional linking probabilities implied by the model generates a proper joint
distribution of the network matrix.21
20Estimation of such a model could be performed using Approximate Bayesian Computations (see Marjo-
ram et al. (2003) for example), but the computational burden is even more challenging.
21Similar restrictions are also encountered in spatial econometrics models (Besag, 1974) and in the litera-
ture on qualitative response models (Heckman, 1978; Amemiya, 1981)
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The assumption delivers a very simple characterization of the stationary equilibrium. The
following proposition highlights a crucial result of this paper.
PROPOSITION 4 (Potential Function)
Under Assumption 1, the deterministic component of the incentives of any player in any
state of the network are summarized by a potential function, Q : G × X → R
Q (g,X) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
gijuij +
n∑
i=1
n∑
j>i
gijgjimij +
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
n∑
k=1
k 6=i,j
gijgjkvik, (3.6)
and the network formation game is a Potential Game.
Proof. See Appendix A
The intuition for the result is simple. Under the restrictions of Assumption 1, for any
player i and any link gij we have
Q (gij, g−ij, X)−Q (1− gij, g−ij, X) = Ui (gij, g−ij, X)− Ui (1− gij, g−ij, X)
Consider two networks, g = (gij, g−ij) and g′ = (1− gij, g−ij), that differ only with respect
to one link, gij, chosen by individual i: the difference in utility that agent i receives from
the two networks, Ui (g,X) − Ui (g′, X), is exactly equal to the difference of the potential
function evaluated at the two networks, Q (g,X) − Q (g′, X). That is, the potential is an
aggregate function that summarizes both the state of the network and the deterministic
incentives of the players in each state.
Characterizing the network formation as a potential game facilitates analysis. In order to
compute the equilibria of the model, there is no need to keep track of each player’s behavior:
the potential function contains all the relevant information. This property is key for the
analysis of networks with many players: the usual check for existence of profitable deviations
from the Nash equilibrium can be performed using the potential, instead of checking each
player’s possible deviation in sequence. The computation of all profitable deviations for each
player involves n(n − 1)2n(n−1) operations: each player has n − 1 possible deviations, there
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are n players and a total of 2n(n−1) possible network configurations. As it is shown below
(Proposition 2), when the game is a potential game, the computation of all Nash equilibria
is equivalent to finding the local maxima of the potential function. This corresponds to
evalutating the potential function for all the 2n(n−1) possible network structures. The latter
task involves fewer operations by a factor of n(n − 1), thus decreasing the computational
burden.
It should be emphasized that the potentialQ (g,X) is not equivalent to the welfare function
W (g,X), that describes the total utility of all agents in the network,
W (g,X) =
n∑
i=1
Ui (g,X)
= Q (g,X) +
n∑
i=1
n∑
j>i
gijgjimij +
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
n∑
k=1
k 6=i,j
gijgkivkj
To analyze the long run behavior of the model, I impose more structure on the meeting
technology.22
ASSUMPTION 6 (Meeting Process) Any meeting is possible, i.e., for any ij ∈ I × I
ρ(gt−1, Xi, Xj) > 0 (3.7)
The meeting process is such that any player can be chosen and any pair of agents can meet.
This assumption guarantees that any equilibrium network can be reached with positive
probability. For example, a discrete uniform distribution satisfies this assumption.
It is helpful to consider a special case of the model, in which there are no preference shocks:
the characterization of equilibria and long run behavior for such model provides intuition
about the dynamic properties of the full structural model.
22Christakis et al. (2010) assume that individuals can meet only once and their link remains in place forever.
This assumption is convenient when estimating a large network, but it does not allow the characterization
of the stationary equilibrium.
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Let N (g) be the set of networks that differ from g by only one element of the matrix, i.e.
N (g) ≡ {g′ : g′ = (g′ij, g−ij), for all g′ij 6= gij, for all i, j ∈ I}. (3.8)
A Nash network is defined as a network in which any player has no profitable deviations
from his current linking strategy, when randomly selected from the population. The following
results characterize the set of the pure-strategy Nash equilibria and the long run behavior
of the model with no shocks.
PROPOSITION 5 (Model without Shocks: Equilibria and Long Run)
Consider the model without idiosyncratic preference shocks. Under Assumptions 1 and 2:
1. There exists at least one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium network
2. The set NE(G, X, U) of all pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the network formation game
is completely characterized by the local maxima of the potential function.
NE(G, X, U) =
{
g∗ : g∗ = arg max
g∈N (g∗)
Q (g,X)
}
(3.9)
3. Any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is an absorbing state.
4. As t→∞, the network converges to one of the Nash networks with probability 1.
Proof. In Appendix A
Suppose that the current network is a Nash network. As a consequence, if a player deviates
from the current linking strategy, he receives less utility.23 Since the change in utility for any
agent is equivalent to the change in potential, any deviation from the Nash network must
decrease the potential. It follows that the Nash network must be a local maximizer of the
potential function over the set of networks that differ from the current network for at most
one link.
23When the utility from the equilibrium and the deviation is the the same, the agent plays the status quo,
i.e., the Nash strategy.
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Furthermore, the network must converge to one of the Nash Equilibria in the long run,
independently of the initial network. Suppose a player is drawn from the meeting process.
Such agent will play a best response to the current network configuration. Therefore, his
utility cannot decrease. This holds for any player and any period. It follows that the
potential is nondecreasing over time. Since there is a finite number of possible networks, in
the long run, the sequence of networks must reach a local maximum of the potential, i.e., a
Nash equilibrium.
With the intuition from the simpler model in mind, we can now analyze the full structural
model with preference shocks. In the full model there is a high probability of hitting a Nash
network. However, the preference shocks allow the chain to escape from such networks: this
makes the model ergodic and eliminates absorbing states.
I make the following parametric assumption on the shocks, that allows me to characterize
the stationary distribution and transition probabilities.
ASSUMPTION 7 (Idiosyncratic Shocks) The shock follows a Type I extreme value
distribution, i.i.d. among links and across time.
The probability of a link between i and j, given a meeting mt = ij and previous period
network configuration gt−1 is thus given by
Pr
(
gtij = 1
∣∣ gt−1−ij , X) = Pr [ε0t − ε1t ≤ Ui (1, gt−1−ij , X)− Ui (0, gt−1−ij , X)] (3.10)
=
exp
[
uij + g
t−1
ji mij +
∑
k 6=i,j
gt−1jk vik +
∑
k 6=i,j
gt−1ki vkj
]
1 + exp
[
uij + g
t−1
ji mij +
∑
k 6=i,j
gt−1jk vik +
∑
k 6=i,j
gt−1ki vkj
] (3.11)
Under Assumptions 1-3, the network evolves as a Markov chain with transition proba-
bilities given by the conditional choice probabilities (3.11) and the probability law of the
meeting process mt.
One can show that the sequence [g0, g1, ...., gt] is:
1. irreducible, i.e. every state of the network can be reached with positive probability in
a finite number of steps
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2. aperiodic, i.e. the chain does not get trapped in cycles, because the probability of
moving from a state to another is always positive under the extreme value assumption
Intuitively, since the meeting probability Pr (mt = ij) > 0 for all ij, there is always a positive
probability of reaching a new network in which the link gij can be updated. The logistic
shock assumption implies that there is always a positive probability of switching to another
state of the network, thus eliminating absorbing states.
THEOREM 3 (Uniqueness and Characterization of Stationary Equilibrium)
Consider the network formation game with idiosyncratic shocks, under Assumptions 1-3.
1. There exists a unique stationary distribution pi(g,X), i.e.,
lim
t→∞
P
(
Gt = g
∣∣G0 = g0, X) = pi (g,X) . (3.12)
2. If the meeting probability of i and j does not depend on the existence of a link between
them, i.e.,
ρ
(
gt−1, Xi, Xj
)
= ρ
(
gt−1−ij , Xi, Xj
)
. (3.13)
for any i, j ∈ I. Then the stationary distribution pi(g,X) is
pi (g,X) =
exp [Q (g,X)]∑
ω∈G
exp [Q (ω,X)]
, (3.14)
where Q (g,X) is the potential function (4.6).
Proof. In Appendix A
The first part of the proposition follows directly from the irreducibility and aperiodicity
of the Markov process generated by the network formation game. The uniqueness of the
stationary distribution is crucial in estimation, since one does not need to worry about
multiple equilibria. Furthermore, the stationary equilibrium characterizes the likelihood of
observing a specific network configuration in the data. As a consequence, I can estimate
the structural parameters from observations of only one network at a specific point in time,
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under the assumption that the observed network is drawn from the stationary equilibrium.
The second part of the proposition provides a closed-form solution for the stationary
distribution. The latter can be interpreted as the probability of observing a specific network
structure, when the network is observed in the long run. In the long run, the system of
interacting agents will visit more often those states/networks that have high potential, which
correspond to the Nash equilibria described in Proposition 2. Therefore a high proportion
of the possible networks generated by the network formation game, will correspond to Nash
networks.
The stationary distribution pi (g,X) includes a normalizing constant
c (G, X) ≡
∑
ω∈G
exp [Q (ω,X)] (3.15)
that guarantees that (4.7) is a proper probability distribution. Unfortunately, this nor-
malizing constant greatly complicates estimation, since it cannot be evaluated exactly or
approximated with precision. How this is circumvented is explained in the next section.
3.3 Estimation Strategy
3.3.1 Computational Problem
To estimate the model, I assume that the utility functions depend on a vector of parameters
θ = (θu, θm, θv):
uij (θu) = u (Xi, Xj, θu)
mij (θm) = m (Xi, Xj, θm)
vij (θv) = v (Xi, Xj, θv)
The goal is to recover the parameters’ posterior distribution, given the data, the model and
the prior. Let p (θ) be the prior distribution. Given the likelihood function pi (g,X, θ) of the
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observed data (g,X), the posterior distribution of θ can be written as
p (θ|g,X) = pi (g,X, θ) p (θ)∫
Θ
pi (g,X, θ) p (θ) dθ
. (3.16)
Intuitively, the posterior is the distribution of the parameters that are most likely to generate
the data g, given the model pi (g,X, θ) and the prior p (θ).
Estimation of the posterior faces two computational challenges. First, the posterior de-
pends on the normalizing integral
∫
Θ
pi (g,X, θ) p (θ) dθ. This problem is common to any
Bayesian analysis, and is often solved using a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm that avoids
direct computation of the integral. This algorithm generates a Markov chain of parameters
{θ0, θ1, θ2, ..} whose unique invariant distribution is the posterior (3.16). The empirical dis-
tribution of the chain is used as estimate of the posterior. A Weak Law of Large Numbers
guarantees that sample averages computed using the sequence generated by the chain, con-
verge to the expectation under the posterior distribution.
At each iteration s, with current parameter θs = θ, a new parameter vector θ
′ is proposed
from a distribution qθ (·|θ). At iteration t+ 1 the new parameter θs+1 is updated according
to
θs+1 =
 θ′ with prob. α (θ, θ′)θ with prob. 1− α (θ, θ′) , (3.17)
where α (θ, θ′) is computed as
α (θ, θ′) = min
{
1,
p (θ′|g,X) qθ (θ|θ′)
p (θ|g,X) qθ (θ′|θ)
}
(3.18)
The appealing feature of this scheme is that one does not need to evaluate the integral to
compute α (θ, θ′), because the ratio of the posteriors is p (θ′|g,X) /p (θ|g,X) = pi(g,X,θ′)p(θ′)
pi(g,X,θ)p(θ)
.
However, the naive version of the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm cannot be used for the
model formulated above. The likelihood function pi (g,X, θ) is known up to a normalizing
constant that cannot be computed in practice. The acceptance probability in (3.18) can be
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rewritten to make the likelihood contribution explicit
α (θ, θ′) = min
{
1,
exp[Q(g,X,θ′)]
c(G,X,θ′) p (θ
′) qθ (θ|θ′)
exp[Q(g,X,θ)]
c(G,X,θ) p (θ) qθ (θ
′|θ)
}
= min
{
1,
exp [Q (g,X, θ′)]
exp [Q (g,X, θ)]
c (G, X, θ)
c (G, X, θ′)
p (θ′)
p (θ)
qθ (θ|θ′)
qθ (θ′|θ)
}
.
The Metropolis-Hastings acceptance α (θ, θ′) depends on the ratio c (G, X, θ) /c (G, X, θ′),
whose exact evaluation is computationally infeasible even for very small networks. To
be concrete, consider a small network with n = 10 agents. From (3.15) we know that
c (G, X, θ) = ∑
ω∈G
exp [Q (ω,X, θ)]. To compute the constant at the current parameter θ we
would need to evaluate the potential function for all 290 w 1027 possible networks with 10
agents and compute their sum. This task would take a very long time even for a state-of-the
art supercomputer. In general with a network containing n players, we have to sum over
2n(n−1) possible network configurations.24
3.3.2 Estimation Algorithm
To solve the estimation problem, I develop a variation of the exchange algorithm, first de-
veloped by Murray et al. (2006). This algorithm uses a double Metropolis-Hastings step
to avoid the computation of the normalizing constant c (G, X, θ) in the likelihood. This
improvement comes with a cost: the algorithm may produce MCMC chains that have very
poor mixing properties (Caimo and Friel, 2010) and high autocorrelation. I partially correct
for this problem by carefully calibrating the proposal distribution.25
While several authors have proposed similar algorithms in the related literature on Ex-
ponential Random Graphs Models (ERGM),26 the models estimated with this methodology
24A supercomputer that can compute 1012 potential functions in 1 second would take almost 40 million
years to compute the constant once for a network with n = 10 players. The schools used in the empirical
section have between 20 and 159 enrolled students. This translates into a minimum of 2380 and a maximum
of 225122 possible network configurations.
25In this paper I use a random walk proposal. Alternatively one could update the parameters in blocks or
use recent random block techniques as in Chib and Ramamurthy (2009) to improve convergence and mixing.
26Caimo and Friel (2010) use the exchange algorithm to estimate ERGM. They improve the mixing of
the sampler using the snooker algorithm. Koskinen (2008) proposes the Linked Importance Sampler Aux-
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typically have very few parameters and use data from very small networks. To the best of
my knowledge, this is the first attempt to estimate a high-dimensional model using data
from multiple networks.
In this section I describe the algorithm for a single network, while in the appendix I pro-
vide the extension for multiple independent networks.27 This is especially important for
policy: schools may have unobserved differences that impact the network formation process
and using multiple networks may partially correct for that.
The idea of the algorithm is to sample from an augmented distribution using an auxiliary
variable. At each iteration, the algorithm proposes a new parameter vector θ′, drawn from a
suitable proposal distribution qθ(θ
′|θ); in the second step, it samples a network g′ (the aux-
iliary variable) from the likelihood pi (g′, X, θ′); finally, the proposed parameter is accepted
with a probability αex(θ, θ
′), such that the Markov chain of parameters generated by these
update rules, has the posterior (3.16) as unique invariant distribution.
I first describe the algorithm used to sample a network from the stationary distribution
of the model; then I provide the full algorithm for estimation of the posterior.
Network Simulations
To use the exchange algorithm, I need to draw random samples from the stationary distri-
bution of the network formation model. Direct simulation is not possible because the nor-
malizing constant c (G, X, θ) is computationally infeasible, for the reasons explained above.
Therefore I rely on Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation methods.
The algorithm used in this paper is similar to the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm proposed
in Snijders (2002).28 For a fixed parameter value θ, the algorithm simulates a Markov chain
iliary variable (LISA) algorithm, which uses importance sampling to provide an estimate of the acceptance
probability. Another variation of the algorithm is used in Liang (2010).
27When the data consist of several independent school networks, I use a parallel version of the algorithm
that stores each network in a different processor. Each processor runs the simulations independently and
the final results are summarized in the master processor, that updates the parameters for next iteration.
Details in Appendix.
28I also experimented with the Simulated Tempering algorithm proposed in Mele (2010a). The latter is
extremely useful when the stationary distribution of the network formation model has more than one mode.
It also improves the mixing of the chain. However, it does so by increasing the time needed to collect a
sample. In this context, a set of experiments with artificial data revealed virtually no difference between the
Simulated Tempering results and the simpler Metropolis-Hastings updates, so I use the latter in this paper.
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of networks whose unique invariant distribution is (4.7). As the number of iterations R
becomes large, the simulated networks are (approximate) samples from the stationary dis-
tribution of the model evaluated at parameter θ.
ALGORITHM 1 Fix a parameter value θ. At iteration r, with current network gr
1. Propose a network g′ from a proposal distribution
g′ ∼ qg (g′|gr) (3.19)
2. Update the network according to
gr+1 =
 g′ with prob. αmh(gr, g′)gr with prob. 1− αmh(gr, g′) (3.20)
where
αmh(gr, g
′) = min
{
1,
exp [Q(g′, X, θ)]
exp [Q(gr, X, θ)]
qg (gr|g′)
qg (g′|gr)
}
(3.21)
At each iteration a random network g′ is proposed, and the update is accepted with probabil-
ity αmh(gr, g
′). The main advantage of this simulation strategy is that the acceptance ratio
(3.21) does not contain the normalizing constant c (G, X, θ) of the stationary distribution.
Each quantity in the acceptance ratio can be computed exactly.
The Metropolis-Hastings structure of the algorithm guarantees that the sampled networks
are drawn from the stationary equilibrium of the model.
PROPOSITION 6 The updates in ALGORITHM 1 produce a Markov Chain of networks.
1. The unique invariant distribution of ALGORITHM 1 is the stationary equilibrium of
the model at parameter θ
lim
r→∞
Pr (Gr = g|G0 = g0, X, θ) = pi (g,X, θ) (3.22)
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2. The Markov Chain generated by ALGORITHM 1 is uniformly ergodic, i.e. there exist
constants B > 0 and κ ∈ (0, 1) such that
max
g0∈G
∥∥∥P(r)θ (·|g0)− pi (·, X, θ)∥∥∥
TV
≤ Bκr (3.23)
where P(r)θ (g|g0) is the r-th step transition probability of the algorithm, starting at
network g0 and using parameter θ; and ‖·‖TV is the total variation distance.
3. For any initial network g0, the rate of convergence can be bounded as
2 sup
g∈G
∣∣∣pi (g, θ)− P(r)θ (g|g0)∣∣∣ ≤
√
1− pi (g0, θ)
pi (g0, θ)
λ∗ (θ)
r (3.24)
where λ∗ (θ) = max {λ2 (θ) , |λ2n(n−1) (θ) |} is the second highest eigenvalue of ALGO-
RITHM 1’s transition matrix.
Proof. See Appendix B
The first part of the proposition confirms that the algorithm converges to the stationary
equilibrium of the model. Therefore, one can generate samples from the stationary equilib-
rium of the model using a sufficiently long chain generated by ALGORITHM 1. The second
part establishes uniform convergence to the stationary distribution and the last statement
of the proposition bounds the rate of convergence. Formula (3.24) is a classical result on
Markov chain convergence (see Diaconis and Stroock (1991) or Meyn and Tweedie (2009)).
For certain regions of the parameter space, the convergence would be fast, while for other
parameter regions the rate of convergence could be extremely slow. Recent work on similar
algorithms for the simulation of exponential random graphs, have shown that in several cases
the convergence rates are so slow that the simulation is infeasible. Diaconis and Chatterjee
(2011) and Bhamidi et al. (forthcoming) show that for the simplest Erdos-Renyi random
graph, the bound to the convergence rate scales up with m log(m), where m is the total
number of states. In our setting, m = 2n(n−1). However, the bounds in these papers are for
any parameter θ and for any initial network g0. This implies that the researcher can improve
convergence through a careful choice of the initial network and proposal distributions, as
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indicated in (3.24).
In the empirical implementation of the algorithm, I use several alternative proposals qg (·|·).
First, a move that updates only one link per iteration, proposing to swap the link value.
At each iteration a random pair of agents (i, j) is selected from a discrete uniform distri-
bution, and it is proposed to swap the value of the link gij to 1 − gij. Second, to improve
convergence, I allow the sampler to propose bigger moves: with a small probability pinv, the
sampler proposes a to invert the network matrix, i.e. g′ = 1 − g, and the proposal is ac-
cepted with probability αmh(g, g
′).29 These proposals directly modify the transition matrix
of ALGORITHM 1, decreasing the value of the second highest eigenvalue.
The choice of the initial network is quite trivial in this model, and it is given by the
observed network g. There are two reasons for this choice. First, in the high density region
of the posterior the observed network g must have high probability according to the model.
This decreases
√
1−pi(g0,θ)
pi(g0,θ)
. Second, the result in Lemma 1 in Appendix B shows that this
choice guarantees faster convergence of the approximate posterior simulation algorithm to
the correct posterior.
Posterior Simulation
I propose a modified version of the exchange algorithm developed by Murray et al. (2006) to
sample from distributions with intractable constants. In the original algorithm, one needs
to draw exact samples from the stationary equilibrium of the model. However, this would
require an enormous number of steps using the network simulation algorithm. My strategy
is instead to exploit the result in Lemma 1 (in Appendix B) to decrease the number of
simulations needed to collect an approximate sample from the stationary equilibrium. The
Lemma essentially implies that my approximate algorithm and the exact algorithm have the
same probability of accepting the proposed parameter.30
The samples from the posterior distribution are generated using the following steps
29This move is suggested in Geyer (1992) and Snijders (2002). Snijders (2002) argues that this is partic-
ularly useful in case of a bimodal distribution.
30The details require a careful use of the detailed balance condition for the network simulation model. See
Appendix B.
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ALGORITHM 2 (APPROXIMATE EXCHANGE ALGORITHM)
Fix the number of simulations R. At each iteration t, with current parameter θt = θ and
network data g:
1. Propose a new parameter θ′ from a distribution qθ(·|θ),
θ′ ∼ qθ(·|θ). (3.25)
2. Start ALGORITHM 1 at the observed network g, iterating for R steps using pa-
rameter θ′ and collect the last simulated network g′
g′ ∼ P(R)θ′ (g′|g). (3.26)
3. Update the parameter according to
θt+1 =
 θ′ with prob. αex (θ, θ′, g′, g)θ with prob. 1− αex (θ, θ′, g′, g)
where
αex(θ, θ
′, g′, g) = min
{
1,
exp [Q(g′, X, θ)]
exp [Q(g,X, θ)]
p (θ′)
p (θ)
qθ (θ|θ′)
qθ (θ′|θ)
exp [Q(g,X, θ′)]
exp [Q(g′, X, θ′)]
}
. (3.27)
The appeal of this algorithm is that all quantities in the acceptance ratio (3.27) can be eval-
uated: there are no integrals or normalizing constants to compute. I provide the algorithm
details, and the relative proofs of convergence to the posterior and some evidence on mixing
in Appendix B. The algorithm used to estimate the model using multiple school networks
on parallel processors is an extension of ALGORITHM 2. I also present it in Appendix B.
Here I explain intuitively why the sampler works, with the help of Figure 3.2.
For ease of exposition, suppose that the prior is relatively flat, so that p(θ)/p(θ′) ' 1.
Suppose we start the sampler from a parameter θ that has high posterior probability, given
the data g. That is, there is good agreement between the data and the parameter, so it
is likely that the data are generated from a model with parameter θ. This is displayed on
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Figure 3.2: The Exchange Algorithm
A. Posterior Distribution B. Two Stationary Equilibria
The graph on the left is the posterior distribution, given the data. The graph on the right represents two
stationary equilibria of the model, one at parameter θ (blue) and one at parameter θ′ (red). The iteration
t starts with parameter θ. It is proposed to update the parameter using proposal θ′. The algorithm start
sampling networks from the stationary distribution at parameter θ′ (red) and quickly moves from g to g′.
The probability of accepting the proposed parameter θ′ is proportional to the ratio pi(g
′,X,θ)
pi(g′,X,θ′)
pi(g,X,θ′)
pi(g,X,θ) , which
is small as indicated in the graph. In summary, a move from the high density region of the posterior (θ) to
a low density region (θ′) is likely to be rejected. For the same reasoning a move from θ′ to θ is very likely
to be accepted. Therefore the algorithm produces samples from the correct posterior distribution.
the left panel of Figure 3.2. Now, suppose we propose a parameter θ′ that belongs to a
low probability region of the posterior. This means that there is a low probability that the
observed network g is generated by parameter θ′. As a consequence the ratio
p(θ′|g,X)
p(θ|g,X) '
pi(g,X, θ′)
pi(g,X, θ)
would be very small, as indicated in the right panel of Figure 3.2. Let’s start the network
simulations using parameter θ′. The sequence of simulated networks will start approaching
the new stationary distribution pi(·, X, θ′), moving away from the stationary distribution
pi(·, X, θ). This is indicated in Figure 3.2 with a simulation of 2 steps: starting from g
we obtain two networks, g1 and g′. Network g′ is closer to a high probability region of
pi(·, X, θ′) than to a high probability region of pi(·, X, θ), as long as the algorithm was run
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for a sufficiently large number of steps R. It also follows that the ratio
pi(g′, X, θ)
pi(g′, X, θ′)
(3.28)
is small. Notice that
pi(g′, X, θ)
pi(g′, X, θ′)
pi(g,X, θ′)
pi(g,X, θ)
=
exp [Q(g′, X, θ)]
exp [Q(g,X, θ)]
exp [Q(g,X, θ′)]
exp [Q(g′, X, θ′)]
c(G, X, θ′)
c(G, X, θ)
c(G, X, θ)
c(G, X, θ′)
=
exp [Q(g′, X, θ)]
exp [Q(g,X, θ)]
exp [Q(g,X, θ′)]
exp [Q(g′, X, θ′)]
.
This ratio is contained in (3.27). As a consequence the acceptance ratio of the exchange
algorithm is low and the proposed parameter θ′ is very likely to be rejected. Let’s repeat
the reasoning while starting the sampler at θ′ and proposing an update θ: this proposal is
very likely to be accepted by the same intuitive argument.
In summary, the sampler is likely to accept proposals that move towards high density
regions of the posterior, but it is likely to reject proposals that move towards low density
regions of the posterior. Therefore, it produces samples of parameters that closely resemble
draws from the posterior distribution. The formal statement about ergodicity is contained
in the following theorem.
THEOREM 4 (Ergodicity of the Approximate Exchange Algorithm). The approximate
exchange algorithm is ergodic, and it converges to the correct posterior distribution.
1. (Convergence)) Let P˜
(s)
R (θ0, ·) be the s-th step transition of the approximate ex-
change algorithm, when the auxiliary network is sampled using R steps of the network
simulation algorithm and the initial parameter of the simulation is θ0. Let ‖·‖TV be
the total variation distance and p (·|g,X) the posterior distribution.
Then, for any  > 0 there exist R0 ∈ N and S0 ∈ N such that for any R > R0 and
s > S0 and any initial parameter vector θ0 ∈ Θ
∥∥∥P˜ (s)R (θ0, ·)− p (·|g,X)∥∥∥
TV
≤  (3.29)
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2. (WLLN) A Weak Law of Large Numbers holds: for any initial parameter vector θ0 ∈ Θ
and any bounded integrable function h(·)
1
S
S∑
s=1
h (θs)
P−→
∫
Θ
h (θ) p (θ|g,X) dθ (3.30)
Proof. In Appendix B.
The theorem states that the algorithm produces good samples as long as the number of steps
of the network simulation algorithm is big enough and the algorithm is run for a sufficient
number of iterations.
An important tuning parameter of the algorithm is R, the number of network simula-
tions to be performed in the second step. As R → ∞ the algorithm converges to the exact
exchange algorithm of Murray et al. (2006), producing exact samples from the posterior dis-
tribution. At the same time an higher value of R would increase the computational cost and
result in a higher rejection rate for the proposed parameters. I do not propose an optimal
way to choose R, but I provide some evidence with simulated data in Appendix B, showing
that there is not much difference in the estimates or convergence using different R’s. The
value of R has a stronger effect on the standard deviation than on the mean of the posterior,
as one would expect.
3.3.3 Connections to Exponential Random Graphs
Considerable attention has been paid to exponential random graph models (ERGM).31 The
latter are statistical models of random network formation, with complex dependence struc-
tures among links. Exponential random graphs have been successfully used to fit social
networks, providing a useful benchmark for alternative models. However, as any random
31Frank and Strauss (1986) developed the theory of Markov random graphs. These are models of random
network formation in which there is dependence among links: the probability that a links occur depends
on the existence of other links. Wasserman and Pattison (1996) generalized the Markov random graphs to
general dependence structures, developing the Exponential Random graph models. Snijders (2002) reviews
these models and the related estimation techniques.
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network formation model, they lack the equilibrium microfoundations of the strategic liter-
ature.
A remarkable feature of my model is that it contains the exponential random graph
models as a special case. Assume that the utility functions u, m and v depend linearly
on a vector of parameters. Define θu = (θu1, θu2, ..., θuP )
′, θm = (θm1, θm2, ..., θmL)
′ and
θv = (θv1, θv2, ..., θvS)
′. Define the function H : RA × RA → R.
ASSUMPTION 8 (Linearity of Utility) The utility functions are linear in parameters
uij = u (Xi, Xj, θu) =
P∑
p=1
θupHup (Xi, Xj) = θ
′
uHu (Xi, Xj)
mij = m (Xi, Xj, θm) =
L∑
l=1
θmlHml (Xi, Xj) = θ
′
mHm (Xi, Xj)
vij = v (Xi, Xj, θv) =
S∑
s=1
θvsHvs (Xi, Xj) = θ
′
vHv (Xi, Xj)
This assumption leaves room for many interesting specifications. In particular, the functions
H do not exclude interactions among different characteristics, for example interactions of
race and gender of both individuals. We can consider different specifications, including
different sets of variables for direct, mutual and indirect links. Interactions of individual and
network-level attributes are also possible.
The main consequence of the linearity assumption is that the stationary equilibrium of
the model belongs to the exponential family (Lehman (1983)).
PROPOSITION 7 (Exponential Family Likelihood)
Under Assumptions 1-4, the stationary distribution pi (g,X) belongs to the exponential
family, i.e., it can be written in the form
pi (g,X) =
exp [θ′t (g,X)]∑
ω∈G
exp [θ′t (ω,X)]
, (3.31)
where θ = (θu, θm, θv)
′ is a (column) vector of parameters and t (g,X) is a (column) vector
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of canonical statistics.
Proof. See Appendix A
The vector t (g,X) = (t1 (g,X) , ..., tK (g,X)) is a vector of sufficient statistics for the
network formation model. This vector can contain the number of links, the number of
whites-to-whites links, the number of male-to-female links and so on. Interactions between
different variables are possible, e.g. the number of black-males-to-white-females links, or
interactions of individual controls with school-level controls.
This likelihood is very similar to the one of exponential random graph models. My theo-
retical model can be interpreted as providing the microfoundations for exponential random
graphs. In this sense, we can interpret the ERGM as the stationary equilibrium of a strategic
game of network formation, where myopic agents follow a stochastic best response dynamics
and utilities are linear functions of the parameters.
3.3.4 Identification and Practical Implementation
The identification of parameters for the linear utility case follows from the theory of exponen-
tial families (Lehman, 1983). Identification is guaranteed as long as the sufficient statistics
t(g,X) are not linearly dependent. The nonlinear case is more complex and there are no
general conditions that guarantee identification.32 For this reason, I consider estimation of
the model only in the linear case.
The Bayesian framework can help to achieve identification of the parameters in the non-
linear case, by careful use of prior distributions. This is standard practive in the DSGE
estimation literature, where parameters are often ill-identified and prior distributions are
used to produce more precise estimates (Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2010)). This possibil-
ity is not explored here, and it is left to future research.
The linear case also allows for specifications of the utility function involving network-level
32Geyer (1992) provides some guidance in this matter. He provides conditions that guarantee convergence
of the Monte Carlo Maximum Likelihood estimate to the exact MLE. However, to the best of my knowledge,
there are no sufficient conditions that guarantee identification in this setting.
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controls, when estimation is performed using multiple networks. This can be achieved by a
specification of the parameters
θp = θp0 +
C∑
c=1
θpcZc (3.32)
where Zc is a network-level variable. This specification allow network fixed effects and inter-
actions of network controls with individual controls. The estimation methodology presented
above can be applied to this specification without any change. However, estimation of a
model with random coefficients would require significant additional computational effort
(see Appendix C).
As noted above, it is possible to modify the precision of the estimates when there is some
previous information that can be incorporated in the prior. I choose somewhat vague priors
for the parameters, in order to extract most of the information from the data. I assume
independent normal priors
p (θ) = N (0, 3IP ) , (3.33)
where P is the number of parameters.
The proposal distribution for the posterior simulation is
qθ(·|θ) = N (0, δΣ) , (3.34)
where δ is a scaling factor and Σ is a covariance matrix. I use an adaptive procedure to
determine a suitable Σ. I start the iterations with Σ = λIP , where λ is a vector of standard
deviations. I choose λ so that the sampler accepts at least 20%-25% of the proposed param-
eters, as is standard in the literature (Gelman et al., 2003; Robert and Casella, 2005). I run
the chain and monitor convergence using standard methods. Once the chains have reached
approximate convergence, I estimate the covariance matrix of the chains and use it as an
approximate Σ. The scaling factor is δ = 2.382/P as suggested in Gelman et al. (1996).
The network sampler uses a proposal qg (g|g′), that selects a link to be updated at each
period according to a discrete uniform distribution. The probability of network inversion is
pinv = 0.01.
The posterior distributions shown in the graphs are obtained with a simulation of 100000
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Figure 3.3: A School Network
white=Whites; blue = African Americans; yellow = Asians; green = Hispanics; red = Others
Note: The graphs represent the friendship network of a school extracted from AddHealth. Each
dot represents a student, each arrow is a friend nomination. The colors represent racial groups.
Metropolis-Hastings updates of the parameters. These simulations start from values found
after extensive experimentation with different starting values and burn-in periods, monitor-
ing convergence using standard methods. For each parameter update, I simulate the network
for 3000 iterations to collect a sample from the stationary distribution.
3.3.5 The Add Health Data
The National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health) is a dataset contain-
ing information on a nationally representative sample of US schools. The survey started
in 1994, when the 90118 participants were entering grades 7-12, and the project collected
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data in four successive waves.33 Each student responded to an in-school questionnaire, and
a subsample of 20745 was given an in-home interview to collect more detailed information
about behaviors, characteristics and health status. In this paper I use only data from the
saturated sample of Wave I, containing information on 16 schools. Each student in this
sample completed both the in-school and in-home questionnaires, and the researchers made
a significant effort to avoid any missing information on the students.34
I exclude the two largest schools, school 58 and 77, which have respectively 811 and 1664
students, while the third largest school has 159 students. This is for convenience: the esti-
mation routine is much faster when schools are of similar size, since the parallel version of
the exchange algorithm can propose a new parameter vector only after all the school level
simulations are done. Therefore the speed of the algorithm depends on the simulation speed
of the largest school. The simulation of a school with more than 800 or 1600 students would
significantly slow down the simulations and estimation routines. My final sample includes
1139 students enrolled in 14 schools.
The in-school questionnaire collects the social network of each participant. Each student
was given a school roster and was asked to identify up to five male and five female friends.35
I use the friendship nominations as proxy for the social network in a school. The resulting
network is directed : Paul may nominate Jim, but this does not necessarily imply that Jim
nominates Paul.36 The model developed in this paper takes this feature of the data into
account.
A sub-sample of 20745 students was also given an in-home questionnaire, that collected
most of the sensible data. I use data on racial group, grade and gender of individuals. A stu-
dent with a missing value in any of these variables is dropped from the sample. Each student
that declares to be of Hispanic origin is considered Hispanic. The remaining non-Hispanic
33More details about the sampling design and the representativeness are contained in Moody (2001) and
the Add Health website http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/addhealth/projects/addhealth
34While this sample contains no missing covariate information for the students, there are several missing
values for the parental variables.
35One can think that this limit could bias the friendship data, but only 3% of the students nominated
10 friends (Moody, 2001). Moreover, the estimation routine could be easily extended to deal with missing
links, as reported in Appendix.
36Some authors do not take into account this feature of the data and they recode the friendships as mutual:
if a student nominates another one, the opposite nomination is also assumed.
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students are assigned to the racial group they declared. Therefore the racial categories are:
White, Black, Asian, Hispanic and Other race. Other race contains Native Americans.
Additionally, I control for homophily in income. I construct the income of the family using
a question from the parent questionnaire.37 In the estimated models I control for income
difference between the students and income levels.
There may be some unobservable variables that affect network formation. For example
some students may be ”cool” and receive more friendship links than others. To partially
control for such effects, I use information from the interviewer remarks about the physical at-
tractiveness and personality of the student interviewed. I define a dummy variable ”beauty”,
which is equal to 1 if the interviewer told that the students was very attractive. Analogously,
the dummy ”personality” is equal to 1 if the interviewer responded that the personality of
the student was very attractive. Additionally, I control for school fixed effects using school
dummies. As an alternative to such approach, in Appendix I provide an extension of the
model and estimation method that allows for unobserved heterogeneity with a significant
additional computational cost.
Descriptive statistics are in Table 3.1. The smallest school has 20 enrolled students while
the largest used in estimation has 159 students. There is a certain amount of variation in
the number of links: some schools are more social and form many links per capita, while
other schools have very few friendship nominations. The ratio of boys to girls is balanced in
almost all schools, except school 369, where female students are large majority.
Panel A summarizes the racial composition. Many schools are almost racially homoge-
neous. School 1, 28, 126 and 175 are more diverse as reflected in the Racial Fragmentation
index. This is an index that measure the degree of heterogeneity of a population. It is
interpreted as the probability that two randomly chosen students in the school belong to
37There are several cases in which the family income is missing. For those observations, I imputed values
drawn from the unconditional income distribution of the community. An alternative but computationally
very costly alternative is to introduce an additional step in the simulation, in which the imputation of missing
incomes is done at each iteration.
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different racial groups.38 An index of 0 indicates that there is only one racial group and the
population is perfectly homogeneous. Higher values of the index represents increasing levels
of racial heterogeneity. Panel B summarizes the grade composition. Most schools offer all
grades from 7th to 12th, with homogeneous population across grades. Several schools only
have lower grades.
Panel C analyzes the racial and gender segregation of each school friendship network.
The level of segregation is measured with the Freeman (1972) segregation index. If there is
no segregation, the number of links among individuals of different groups does not depend
on the group identity. The index measures the difference between the expected and actual
number of links among individuals of different groups. An index of 0 means that the actual
network closely resembles one in which links are formed at random. Higher values indicate
more segregation. The index varies between 0 and 1, where the maximum corresponds to a
network in which there are no cross-group links.
Since most schools are racially homogeneous, the measured segregation is zero. Schools
with a racially diverse student population show high level of segregation for each racial group.
On the other hand gender segregation is quite low and homogeneous across schools.
3.4 Empirical Results
In Table 3.2, I show the estimation results for the full structural model, using the 14 schools
in the Add Health saturated sample. The table summarizes the marginal posterior distri-
butions of the estimated parameters with posterior mean, median, standard deviation, 5th
and 95th quantiles. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 display the marginal posterior distributions and in
red the posterior mean. The blue dotted line represents the prior distribution. In a web
appendix, I report results from alternative specifications and estimates using only one net-
work.
38If there are K racial groups and the share of each race is sk, the index is
FRAG = 1−
K∑
k=1
(sk)
2 (3.35)
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Table 3.2: Posterior Distribution, Structural Model
mean median std. dev. 5 pctile 95 pctile
A. Direct utility (uij)
CONSTANT -4.8615 -4.8325 0.3124 -5.4380 -4.4058
SAME GENDER 0.1340 0.1366 0.1091 -0.0517 0.3062
SAME GRADE 2.0287 2.0262 0.1298 1.8141 2.2460
WHITE-WHITE 0.4408 0.4383 0.1654 0.1714 0.7288
BLACK-BLACK 0.6802 0.6886 0.1312 0.4704 0.8727
HISP-HISP 0.1649 0.1742 0.0856 0.0143 0.2904
ATTRACTIVE i (Physical) -0.0091 -0.0100 0.1547 -0.2621 0.2546
ATTRACTIVE j (Physical) 0.1876 0.1727 0.1490 -0.0300 0.4442
ATTRACTIVE i (Personality) 0.0095 0.0093 0.1411 -0.2196 0.2426
ATTRACTIVE j (Personality) 0.2370 0.2337 0.1209 0.0401 0.4383
LOG OF (INCOME i/INCOME j) -0.0182 -0.0172 0.0266 -0.0630 0.0230
LOG OF (INCOME i × INCOME j) 0.0685 0.0685 0.0277 0.0237 0.1147
FRACTION WHITES -1.5015 -1.4433 0.4602 -2.3086 -0.8500
FRACTION BLACKS 1.9019 1.9234 0.1829 1.5583 2.1614
FRACTION HISP 0.2845 0.2547 0.5496 -0.5504 1.2862
WHITE-WHITE * % WHITES -0.5351 -0.5470 0.1752 -0.7980 -0.2179
BLACK-BLACK * % BLACKS -0.1780 -0.1227 0.3854 -0.8700 0.3626
HISP-HISP * % HISP 1.4607 1.5407 1.4443 -0.9003 3.5895
SCHOOL 1 -1.3334 -1.3416 0.4418 -2.0527 -0.6015
SCHOOL 2 1.6555 1.6527 0.2685 1.2191 2.1068
SCHOOL 3 0.3559 0.3461 0.3108 -0.1381 0.8907
SCHOOL 4 0.8271 0.8159 0.3129 0.3315 1.3665
SCHOOL 5 1.1032 1.1076 0.2803 0.6407 1.5603
SCHOOL 6 -0.7804 -0.7944 0.2720 -1.2053 -0.3189
SCHOOL 7 0.8817 0.8709 0.2863 0.4229 1.3574
SCHOOL 8 -0.7325 -0.7014 0.3790 -1.4188 -0.1569
SCHOOL 9 -0.0591 -0.1104 0.3794 -0.6177 0.6102
SCHOOL 10 2.5418 2.5386 0.3069 2.0397 3.0434
SCHOOL 11 -1.6844 -1.6501 0.3983 -2.3642 -1.0801
SCHOOL 12 1.8666 1.8578 0.2731 1.4308 2.3121
SCHOOL 13 -0.6248 -0.6084 0.3126 -1.1625 -0.1363
B. Mutual utility (mij)
CONSTANT 3.0074 3.0012 0.3501 2.4445 3.5969
SAME GENDER 1.2099 1.1865 0.1862 0.9457 1.5733
SAME GRADE -1.6620 -1.6505 0.2772 -2.1371 -1.2159
WHITE-WHITE 0.1821 0.1950 0.1450 -0.0651 0.4044
BLACK-BLACK -0.0707 -0.0591 0.2547 -0.4805 0.3512
HISP-HISP 0.7850 0.7719 0.1337 0.5703 1.0088
BOTH ATTRACTIVE (Physical) 0.1050 0.1037 0.3255 -0.4228 0.6380
BOTH NOT ATTRACTIVE (Physical) 0.0577 0.0693 0.2180 -0.3156 0.3920
BOTH ATTRACTIVE (Personality) -0.1538 -0.1370 0.2371 -0.5641 0.2074
BOTH NOT ATTRACTIVE (Personality) -0.1279 -0.1446 0.1762 -0.4055 0.1924
C. Indirect utility and Popularity (vij)
CONSTANT -0.1116 -0.1099 0.0523 -0.2002 -0.0233
SAME GENDER -0.0992 -0.0971 0.0414 -0.1698 -0.0352
SAME GRADE 0.0224 0.0214 0.0288 -0.0246 0.0706
WHITE-WHITE 0.1535 0.1514 0.0484 0.0765 0.2343
BLACK-BLACK 0.1657 0.1613 0.0545 0.0831 0.2638
HISP-HISP 0.1673 0.1678 0.1083 -0.0141 0.3435
Estimated posterior distribution for the full structural model. The estimates are obtained with a sample of
100000 parameter simulations, and 3000 network simulations for each parameter proposal.
Each estimate measures the marginal effect of the variable: for example, the parameter
associated with the direct utility of WHITE-WHITE measures the marginal utility of a white
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student when forming a link to another white student, other things being equal.
Panel A shows the estimates for the direct utility. There is evidence of homophily in pref-
erences: individuals prefer to form friendship links to students of the same gender, grade,
race, other things being equal. Racial homophily is not homogenous across groups: African
Americans show stronger preference for same race students, while the group of Hispanics
has the lowest magnitude. Grade homophily is also very high.
Furthermore, there is a clear difference in how the different racial groups respond to a
change in the fraction of their own group in the population. While Whites and African
Americans’ preference for same race students decreases with the fraction of their group in
the population, the opposite occurs for Hispanics. This result is important, because it im-
plies that different racial groups have different responses to the desegregation policies: some
group may engage more in interracial friendships, while some group may segregate even
more.
Physically attractive students have similar propensity to form friendships than the rest of
the population. The same holds for students with very attractive personalities. Nonetheless,
there is a propensity to form links to individuals that are physically attractive and have at-
tractive personalities. Income differences decrease the likelihood of friendship, while higher
income levels increase the number of friendships formed. The magnitude of the income ef-
fects is smaller than the effect of racial preferences. The total number of friends is higher in
schools with higher fraction of minorities. The estimates for the school dummies show that
there is substantial heterogeneity in the network formation process across schools, which is
not accounted for by the individual characteristics.
Panel B shows the estimated parameters of the mutual utility. An additional mutual link
provides positive additional utility. There is evidence of homophily in mutual links for gen-
der, Whites and Hispanics. A mutual link to a student of the same grade decreases utility.
The mutual link provides additional utility if the students have similar physical attractive-
ness and their personalities do not coincide.
Panel C contains estimates of the indirect and popularity effects. The negative value of
the constant can be interpreted as a congestion effect: linking to students with many friends
decreases utility. There is evidence of homophily in the indirect and popularity effects (ex-
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Figure 3.4: Posterior Distribution, Full Structural Model
Estimated posterior distribution for the full structural model. Each graph shows the histogram of the simu-
lation output. The red line indicates the posterior mean, while the blue dotted line is the prior distribution.
The estimates are obtained with a sample of 100000 parameter simulations and 3000 network simulations
for each proposed parameter.
cept for gender), which increases the incentives of the students to segregate.
As a benchmark to evaluate policy experiments, I also estimated a model without mutual,
indirect and popularity effects. The results are shown in Table 3.3. In this specification,
the homophily effects in the direct utility are stronger than in the richer model. This is
because in the full model part of the homophily effects are captured by indirect utility and
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Figure 3.5: Posterior Distribution, Full Structural Model (continued)
Estimated posterior distribution for the full structural model. Each graph shows the histogram of the simu-
lation output. The red line indicates the posterior mean, while the blue dotted line is the prior distribution.
The estimates are obtained with a sample of 100000 parameter simulations and 3000 network simulations
for each proposed parameter.
popularity. Whites have much higher marginal utility of forming a link to a person of the
same race than in the full model. Moreover, this specification would suggest that Whites
preferences for same race contacts are stronger than Blacks, which is the opposite result
found in the full model.
An increase in the fraction of same race individuals has asymmetric effects on the racial
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Table 3.3: Posterior Distribution, Direct Utility only
mean median std. dev. 5 pctile 95 pctile
CONSTANT -5.3194 -5.3041 0.9443 -6.8908 -3.7122
SAME GENDER 0.4041 0.4033 0.0882 0.2610 0.5523
SAME GRADE 2.2564 2.2567 0.1048 2.0874 2.4300
WHITE-WHITE 1.6410 1.6368 0.2626 1.2165 2.0803
BLACK-BLACK 0.7567 0.7627 0.3475 0.1711 1.3160
HISP-HISP 0.9513 0.9561 0.3247 0.4061 1.4712
ATTRACTIVE i (Physical) 0.0764 0.0770 0.1401 -0.1603 0.3046
ATTRACTIVE j (Physical) 0.1713 0.1699 0.1353 -0.0461 0.4014
ATTRACTIVE i (Personality) 0.0385 0.0405 0.1403 -0.1965 0.2647
ATTRACTIVE j (Personality) 0.2914 0.2900 0.1354 0.0652 0.5131
LOG OF INCOME i/INCOME j -0.0114 -0.0114 0.0248 -0.0521 0.0296
LOG OF INCOME i × INCOME j 0.0669 0.0663 0.0254 0.0274 0.1107
FRACTION WHITES -1.0100 -0.9778 1.0678 -2.8420 0.6912
FRACTION BLACKS 0.5905 0.6719 0.9179 -0.9582 2.0499
FRACTION HISP -2.6683 -2.6526 1.7131 -5.6238 0.1307
WHITE-WHITE * FRACTION WHITE -1.4795 -1.4737 0.3316 -2.0371 -0.9475
BLACK-BLACK * FRACTION BLACKS 0.8718 0.8553 0.6620 -0.2192 1.9868
HISP-HISP * FRACTION HISP -0.0297 0.0176 1.6081 -2.7317 2.5566
SCHOOL 1 -0.2844 -0.2649 0.6093 -1.2991 0.6866
SCHOOL 2 1.6957 1.6963 0.3413 1.1257 2.2615
SCHOOL 3 -0.1003 -0.0925 0.4302 -0.8377 0.5974
SCHOOL 4 0.5644 0.5647 0.4066 -0.1070 1.2481
SCHOOL 5 0.8732 0.8790 0.3962 0.1987 1.5249
SCHOOL 6 -0.2655 -0.2681 0.5927 -1.2511 0.7287
SCHOOL 7 0.6230 0.6206 0.3994 -0.0366 1.2829
SCHOOL 8 0.2385 0.2458 0.8298 -1.1460 1.6260
SCHOOL 9 -0.2277 -0.2259 0.5018 -1.0423 0.6200
SCHOOL 10 2.5708 2.5787 0.4515 1.8136 3.3045
SCHOOL 11 -0.6995 -0.7252 1.1728 -2.6429 1.2818
SCHOOL 12 1.4434 1.4477 0.3925 0.7884 2.0838
SCHOOL 13 -0.1609 -0.1605 0.4667 -0.9391 0.6283
Estimated posterior distribution for the model with utility from direct links only. The estimates are obtained
with a sample of 100000 parameter simulations, and 3000 network simulations for each parameter proposal.
groups: Whites and Hispanics decrease their links, while African Americans form more
friendships. This is different from the full model.
3.4.1 Policy Experiments
I use the estimated model to predict how alternative policies affect the network structure.
Policy makers may be interested in pursuing policies that promote racial integration, or
they may consider policies that create separate schools for boys and girls. Simulations of
the model in alternative scenarios can provide a valuable benchmark on the possible effects
of such policies.
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I consider the effectiveness of busing programs in promoting interracial integration. Us-
Figure 3.6: Policy Experiments for School 88 (Structural Model)
The policy experiment consists of swapping African American and White students among schools 88 and
106. The result is a change in the fraction of racial groups in the schools. The blue dots are the average
segregation or welfare obtained in the simulations for each policy experiment. The vertical dotted line
indicates the perfect integrated case. The red dotted line displays a cubic polynomial interpolation of the
simulation results. Each simulated result was obtained with a sample of 1000 draws from the posterior
distribution and a 10000 iterations of the network formation model for each posterior draw.
ing the posterior distribution estimated in Table 3.2, I simulate several busing programs
that redistribute students of different racial groups among schools 88 and 106 of my sample.
These are two schools with an homogeneous student population: 98.9% Whites and 96.3%
African Americans, respectively. The simulated policies randomly select several (white) stu-
dents from school 88 and enroll them in school 106; the same number of (black) students is
randomly selected from school 106 and enrolled in school 88. This allows me to modify the
ratio of Whites and African Americans in both schools and predict the levels of segregation
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and welfare implied by the policy.39
Using 1000 draws from the estimated posterior distribution, I run the network formation
Figure 3.7: Policy Experiments for School 88 (only direct links)
The policy experiment consists of swapping African American and White students among schools 88 and
106. The result is a change in the fraction of racial groups in the schools. The blue dots are the average
segregation or welfare obtained in the simulations for each policy experiment. The vertical dotted line
indicates the perfect integrated case. The red dotted line displays a cubic polynomial interpolation of the
simulation results. Each simulated result was obtained with a sample of 1000 draws from the posterior
distribution and a 10000 iterations of the network formation model for each posterior draw.
model for 10000 iterations after the policy change (using ALGORITHM 1) and compute
segregation and welfare of the realized networks. I use Freeman’s segregation index (see
Freeman (1972) and Appendix B) to measure segregation for the relevant groups: Whites,
African-Americans and gender. The welfare measure is the total utility of the school, i.e. the
sum of all students’ utilities. I simulate the model using both the full structural specification
39There are several alternative ways to implement this desegregation policy. For example, one could select
students based on their race, while keeping a balance for gender and income distribution. My implementation
is simple. I order students of different racial groups based on their numerical ID in the data (from lowest to
highest). If I need to implement a policy that re-assigns 10 students, I select the first 10 students in the list.
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and the specification with direct utility only, to compare the policy implications. The results
of the simulations are shown in Figures 3.6, 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9. The figures report the average
segregation and welfare as a function of the fraction of Whites and African Americans in the
school. The blue dots are the average welfare and segregation obtained from each simulation.
The vertical dotted line indicates the situation of perfect integration among schools, i.e. a
policy where the students of each racial group are equally split among the schools. The red
dotted line is a cubic polynomial interpolation of the simulation results.40
The simulations provide several results. First, a policy that implements perfect integra-
Figure 3.8: Policy Experiments for School 106 (Structural Model)
The policy experiment consists of swapping African American and White students among schools 88 and
106. The result is a change in the fraction of racial groups in the schools. The blue dots are the average
segregation or welfare obtained in the simulations for each policy experiment. The vertical dotted line
indicates the perfect integrated case. The red dotted line displays a cubic polynomial interpolation of the
simulation results. Each simulated result was obtained with a sample of 1000 draws from the posterior
distribution and a 10000 iterations of the network formation model for each posterior draw.
tion among the two schools is not optimal, both in terms of welfare and segregation. Perfect
40The curve is fitted using least squares and all the coefficients are statistically significant.
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racial integration among the schools does not minimize expected segregation in the network
of friendships and does not maximize welfare. A certain degree of segregation among schools
is necessary to increase interracial contact and welfare within schools.
Second, the policy does not have the same effect on both schools. The comparison of
figures 3.6 and 3.8 shows that the relationship between the fraction of each racial group and
segregation is not the same. For school 88 the relationship is cubic, while for school 106 is
quadratic. This further complicates the design of a good desegregation program.
Third, the model with only direct utility provides different policy recommendations than
the full specification with mutual utility, indirect utility and popularity effects. This is quite
evident from the graphs on welfare. For school 88, an increase of African American enroll-
ment which does not exceed 50%, does not cause a dramatic change in welfare. The picture
is completely different when looking at Figure 3.7. In addition, the levels of segregation
predicted by the full specification are more extreme than the ones under the simpler speci-
fication.
3.5 Conclusions
This paper develops and estimates a dynamic model of strategic network formation with
heterogeneous agents. The paper contributes to the economic literature on network forma-
tion in two ways. First, while most strategic models have multiple equilibria, I establish the
existence of a unique stationary equilibrium, which characterizes the likelihood of observing
a specific network structure in the data. As a consequence, I can estimate and identify
the structural parameters using only one observation of the network at a single point in
time. Second, I propose a Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm that drastically
reduces the computational burden for estimating the posterior distribution. In this model,
the likelihood function cannot be evaluated or approximated with precision: a state-of-the-
art supercomputer would take several years to evaluate the likelihood once. To overcome
this problem, my algorithm generates samples from the posterior distribution and avoids the
evaluation of the likelihood. Using the properties of the stationary equilibrium, I reduce the
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Figure 3.9: Policy Experiments for School 106 (only direct links)
The policy experiment consists of swapping African American and White students among schools 88 and
106. The result is a change in the fraction of racial groups in the schools. The blue dots are the average
segregation or welfare obtained in the simulations for each policy experiment. The vertical dotted line
indicates the perfect integrated case. The red dotted line displays a cubic polynomial interpolation of the
simulation results. Each simulated result was obtained with a sample of 1000 draws from the posterior
distribution and a 10000 iterations of the network formation model for each posterior draw.
computational burden even further and I am able to study high dimensional models.
The model can be used to infer the effect of different policies on network structure. To
illustrate this point, I explore different desegregation policies in US schools. The model
simulations provide predictions about the expected levels of segregation and welfare implied
by busing programs. Perfect integration among schools could deliver unexpected results in
some contexts: segregation may increase and welfare decrease. In addition, the busing pro-
gram may have different effects in different schools. These results suggest that desegregation
policies must be carefully designed to avoid unexpected outcomes.
The model can be easily extended to incorporate unobserved heterogeneity in individual
quality and preferences. The Bayesian estimation strategy can be adapted to estimate mod-
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els with missing links, using data augmentation techniques. These improvements come with
a substantial increase in the computational burden, but also provide a more realistic model.
Both these extensions are reviewed and explained in Appendix C.
The methodology introduced in this work can be used in different settings. Models of
social interactions with sequential moves as in Nakajima (2007) share the same simple equi-
librium characterization presented in this work. In these models individuals interact in an
exogenous network and their actions are optimally chosen given the action of their neighbors.
The estimation techniques developed here are easily adapted to these settings.41
The methodology can be applied to the class of autologistic models in spatial econo-
metrics.42 The latter are models for spatial binary data that explicitly model the spatial
dependence among variables. The likelihood of these models has the same exponential form
with normalizing constant derived in this paper, but their estimation has relied on approx-
imate methods: Maximum Pseudolikelihood (Besag, 1974) or Markov Chain Monte Carlo
Maximum Likelihood (Geyer and Thompson (1992)). My estimation strategy provides a
valid alternative from a Bayesian perspective.
41In principle, several models that admit a characterization as potential games could be estimated using
the algorithm proposed in this paper.
42Besag (1974) provides a description of these models and a simple approximate estimation strategy.
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CHAPTER 4
SEGREGATION IN SOCIAL NETWORKS: MONTE
CARLO MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION
4.1 Introduction
In this paper, I develop an approximate maximum likelihood inference strategy to estimate
the model of strategic network formation presented in Mele (2010b). The model mixes
ingredients from the strategic and random network formation literature that guarantee con-
vergence to a unique stationary equilibrium and allow structural estimation using a single
observation of the network. Players meet sequentially over time according to a random
matching technology and have the opportunity to revise one of their links. Preferences are
defined over network structures and individual socioeconomic characteristics. Individuals
form the link if and only if it provides positive utility. Agents are myopic, since they do
not consider the effect of their current linking strategy on the evolution of the network in
the future. The model can be characterized as a potential game1 and the unique stationary
equilibrium characterizes the likelihood of observing a specific network structure in the data,
as proportional to an exponential function of the potential.
Maximum Likelihood estimation of this model is challenging, since the evaluation of the
likelihood is computationally infeasible, due to an intractable normalizing constant. The
constant is the sum of exponential functions of the potential, where the sum is computed
over all possible network configurations. To be concrete, with a small network containing
n = 10 players, we have 290 ' 1027 possible networks: a state-of-the-art supercomputer
would take a very long time to evaluate the normalizing constant for a given parameter
1See Monderer and Shapley (1996) for a description of potential games. In a potential game all the
incentives of each players can be summarized by an aggregate function: the potential.
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value.2 The first order conditions and the Hessian of the maximum likelihood problem also
depend on the normalizing constant. As a consequence, standard maximization routines fail
in this setting.3
To solve this problem, I impose an additional assumption on the preferences: I assume
that utilities are linear in a vector of parameters. Under this assumption, the first order con-
ditions of the maximum likelihood problem provide a system of nonlinear moment equations
in parameters, which I solve using the Robbins and Monro (1951) stochastic approximation
algorithm. The latter is a sequential method of estimation, which generates a Markovian
sequence of parameters whose mean converges to the solution of the equation. In this sense,
it can be thought of as a Monte Carlo version of the Newton-Raphson algorithm.
However, the stochastic approximation routine is a local solver, and its practical implemen-
tation presents two challenges. First, the algorithm requires sampling from the stationary
equilibrium of the model, which cannot be done by direct simulation because of the normaliz-
ing constant. Modern Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods allow simulation of samples from
this distribution. However, for this particular model, standard algorithms produce highly
correlated samples and require very long runs to produce reliable estimates.4 Second, the
algorithm convergence is crucially related to the starting value. When the starting value is
far from the true parameter, the local approximation of the likelihood function is very poor.
One possible choice, suggested in the statistical literature (Besag (1974); Geyer and Thomp-
son (1992); Snijders (2002)) is to start the algorithm from the Maximum Pseudo-Likelihood
estimator (MPLE). However, as shown in Caimo and Friel (2010), this choice may provide
approximate likelihood functions that do not have a maximum.
I solve the first problem by developing a Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm that gener-
ates samples from the stationary equilibrium of the model without evaluating the likelihood.
To improve convergence, I use a version of the simulated tempering algorithm (Geyer and
2The dataset used in this paper contains a school with 150 students, for a total of 222350 possible network
configurations.
3Routines that require the computation of derivatives, also require the evaluation of the normalizing
constant. The evaluation of the normalizing constant is also required for routines that evaluate the likelihood
at different parameter values, as in Nelder-Mead or Simulated Annealing.
4Recent work by Diaconis and Chatterjee (2011) and Bhamidi et al. (forthcoming) shows that in similar
models the rate of convergence of standard algorithms makes the simulation infeasible.
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Thompson (1995)), which allows fast exploration of the state space of the model. Further-
more, I apply acceleration techniques that allow me to substantially decrease the length of
simulations needed to reach convergence.
To minimize the problem arising from the choice of starting values for the equation solver,
I start the stochastic approximation algorithm from the posterior mean estimated in Mele
(2010b). This choice should be preferred to the MPLE, since the posterior mean and the
maximum likelihood estimator have similar asymptotic behavior. I show evidence of the
poor performance of the MPLE using an example with artificial data.
I apply the estimation strategy to the study of segregation in school friendship networks.
I use data from a school in Add Health, a representative survey of US high schools con-
taining detailed information on the friendship network of each student. I show that when
the algorithm is started using the MPLE estimator the results have implausible magnitudes,
and the standard errors of the estimates are very high. The explanation is that the MPLE
underestimates the correlation among links, giving much weight to the indirect links. The
estimates produced by starting the stochastic approximation at the posterior mean of Mele
(2010b) have more plausible values and convergence is extremely quick. These results con-
firm previous findings that the MPLE may be an extremely misleading estimator when used
in estimation of small networks and when the dependence among links is strong.5
I find strong evidence of racial homophily in the school friendship network examined. Stu-
dents prefer interactions with individuals of the same racial group, other things being equal.
It should be noticed that these estimates control for the structure of the entire network.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I briefly review the model and the char-
acterization of the stationary equilibrium. Section 3 describes the computational problem
and the estimation strategy. Section 4 shows the empirical results and Section 5 concludes.
Appendix A provides the details of the estimation methodology, the algorithms and the
acceleration techniques.
5See Caimo and Friel (2010), Snijders (2002) for examples.
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4.2 A Model of Network Formation
I briefly present the model developed in Mele (2010b) and the main theoretical results.
Details and proofs can be found in the latter paper.
There is a population of n heterogeneous agents and time is discrete. Each agent i,
i = 1, ...n, is characterized by a vector Xi, containing his socioeconomic attributes: race,
gender, income, etc. The network is represented as a binary n× n matrix G whose generic
element Gij indicates the relationship between i and j. When Gij = 1 then i nominates j
as friend, while Gij = 0 indicates there is no friendship. The network represented by G is
directed : the existence of a link between i and j, i.e. Gij = 1, does not imply the existence
of the link Gji. I will use G to indicate the random matrix and g its realization; analogously,
Gij denotes the random link between i and j and gij its realization.
Preferences are defined over network structures and individual characteristics. The utility
of player i from a network g and population attributes X = (X1, ..., Xn) is given by
Ui (g,X) =
n∑
j=1
gijuij︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct friends
+
n∑
j=1
gijgjimij︸ ︷︷ ︸
mutual friends
+
n∑
j=1
gij
n∑
k=1
k 6=i,j
gjkvik
︸ ︷︷ ︸
friends of friends
+
n∑
j=1
gij
n∑
k=1
k 6=i,j
gkiwkj
︸ ︷︷ ︸
popularity
(4.1)
where uij ≡ u (Xi, Xj), mij ≡ m (Xi, Xj), vij ≡ v (Xi, Xj) and wij ≡ w (Xi, Xj) are
(bounded) real-valued functions of the attributes. The utility of the network is the sum
of the net benefits received from each link. The total benefit from an additional link has
four components.
First, when the agent links another individual, she receives an additional direct net ben-
efit uij. The direct utility includes both costs and benefits and it may possibly be negative:
when only homophily enters payoffs of direct links, the net utility uij is positive if i and j
belong to the same group, while it is negative when they are of different types. In Panel A of
Figure 4.1 a network of 8 agents is used to explain the utility components. Each agent can
belong to either the blue group or the yellow group. The link that agent 4 forms to individual
5 provides different direct utility in the two networks, since the attribute of 5 is different
(yellow vs. blue). In many models the direct component is parameterized as uij = bij − cij,
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Figure 4.1: Components of the utility function
A. Direct friends
B. Mutual friends
C. Friends of friends
D. Popularity
The network contains n = 8 agents, belonging to two groups: blue and yellow. All the panels show a
situation in which 4 is forming a new link to individual 5 (the dashed arrow from 4 to 5). Agent 4 receives
different direct utility when he links a blue (Panel A, left) or a yellow (Panel A, right) individual. Agent
4’s utility for an additional link is different if the link is unilateral (Panel B, left) or reciprocated (Panel B,
right). Furthermore, agent 4’s utility from friends of friends varies with their socioeconomic composition: 3
blue individuals (Panel C, left) provide different utility with respect to 2 blue and 1 yellow (Panel C, right).
Finally, agent 4 values how his new link affects his popularity, since he creates a new indirect friendship for
those who already have a link to him (agents 1,2 and 3). The utility of link to agent 5 (which is yellow)
when agents 1,2 and 3 are all blue (Panel D, left) is different when agent 2 is yellow and 1 and 2 are blue
(Panel D, right).
where bij indicates the (gross) benefit and cij the cost of forming the additional link gij. I
use the notation uij, since it does not require assumptions on the cost function.
Agents receive additional utility mij if the link is reciprocated. An agent may perceive
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another individual as a friend, but that person may not perceive the relationship in the same
way. In Panel B of Figure 4.1, a link from agent 4 to agent 5 has a different value if agent 5
reciprocates (right network).
The players value the composition of friends of friends. When i is deciding whether to
link j, she observes j’s friends and their socioeconomic characteristics. Each of j’s friend
provides additional utility v(Xi, Xk) to i. In other this model, an agent who has the op-
portunity to form an additional link, values a male student with three female friends as a
different good than a male student with two male friends and one female friend.6 This is a
peculiar property of this model: individuals value both exogenous and endogenous hetero-
geneity: the former is determined by the socioeconomic characteristics of the agents, while
the latter arises endogenously with the process of network formation. I assume that players
do not receive utility from more than two-links-away friends. Friends of friends are perfect
substitutes. In Panel C of Figure 4.1, from the perspective of agent 4, agent 5 in the left
network is a different good than agent 5 in the right network, since the composition of his
friends is different.
The fourth component corresponds to a popularity effect. Consider Panel D in Figure 4.1.
When agent 4 forms a link to agent 5, he automatically creates an indirect link for agents
1, 2 and 3; thus generating an externality (positive or negative). If there is homophily in
indirect links, the externality is negative for all three agents (1, 2 and 3) in the left network;
on the other hand in the right network, the externality is negative for 1 and 3, but positive
for 2. Therefore, in the left network the popularity of 4 goes down, while in the right network
the fall in popularity is less pronounced.
The network formation is sequential. Each period a random agent i is drawn from the
population and randomly matched with agent j according to a matching technology. The
probability that in period t there is a match mt = ij, conditioning on the current network
6A similar assumption is used in De Marti and Zenou (2009) where the agents’ cost of linking depend
on the racial composition of friends of friends. Their model is an extension of the connection model of
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), and the links are formed with mutual consent. The corresponding network is
undirected.
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gt−1 and characteristics of all agents X = {X1, ..., Xn} is given by
Pr
(
mt = ij|gt−1, X) = ρ (gt−1, Xi, Xj) (4.2)
The probability that two individuals meet depends on the structure of the current network:
for example, it is reasonable to assume that the probability of a meeting among i and j
is higher if they have a friend in common. The matching probability also depends on the
individual characteristics of i and j: for example, people that are similar tend to meet more
often or with higher probability.
Agents behave strategically: when the realization of the meeting process is mt = ij, player
i chooses to link, gtij = 1, if and only if it is a best response to the current network config-
uration. Furthermore, I assume that the player receives a random shock to his preferences
when updating the link, which is unobserved by the econometrician. The shock ε ∼ F (ε) is
meant to capture unobservable variables that affect the linking decision. For example, if i
is in a bad mood at time t he is probably less willing to form a new link.
An individual i will form a link to j, i.e. gtij = 1, if and only if the link is profitable, i.e.
Ui
(
gtij = 1, g
t−1
−ij , X
)
+ ε1t ≥ Ui
(
gtij = 0, g
t−1
−ij , X
)
+ ε0t (4.3)
A crucial assumption is that when choosing, agents do not consider the effect of their linking
strategy on the future evolution of the network. Players follow a stochastic best response
dynamics as in Blume (1993). As in Mele (2010b), I impose restrictions on preferences,
matching technology and idiosyncratic shocks that guarantee uniqueness of the stationary
equilibrium. These assumptions are relatively weak and also provide identification restric-
tions that I exploit in the estimation strategy.
ASSUMPTION 9 (Preferences) The utility function satisfies the following restrictions
m (Xi, Xj) = m (Xj, Xi) for all i, j ∈ I
w (Xk, Xj) = v (Xk, Xj) for all k, j ∈ I
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therefore the utility function is
Ui (g,X) =
n∑
j=1
gijuij +
n∑
j=1
gijgjimij +
n∑
j=1
gij
n∑
k=1
k 6=i,j
gjkvik +
n∑
j=1
gij
n∑
k=1
k 6=i,j
gkivkj (4.4)
The first part of the assumption imposes symmetry on the utility from mutual links. Two
individuals with exactly the same attributes, i.e. Xi = Xj receive the same utility uij and
mij from the mutual link, but they may still perceive that particular friendship in a different
way, as long as the indirect and popularity components of the utility are different. The
second part of the assumption is provides the condition for the model to be coherent (see
Tamer (2003)). In simple words this assumption guarantees that the network probability
distribution is proper, i.e. it sums to one when integrated over the entire state space.
Assumption 1 is crucial to obtain the closed form solution for the stationary equilibrium.
Assumption 2 and 3 guarantee that any state of the network could be reached with positive
probability. As a result, the Markov chain of networks generated by the network formation
game is ergodic and converges to a unique stationary equilibrium.
ASSUMPTION 10 (Meeting Process) The probability that i is matched with j does
not depend on the existence of a link between them, and any pair of individuals can meet
with positive probability, i.e.,
ρ
(
gt−1, Xi, Xj
)
= ρ
(
gt−1−ij , Xi, Xj
)
> 0. (4.5)
The meeting process allows any pair of players to meet. This assumption, together with
the assumption on the preference shock, allows the network formation process to reach any
possible network structure.
ASSUMPTION 11 (Idiosyncratic Shocks) The preference shock follows a Type I ex-
treme value distribution, i.i.d. among links and across time
This assumption is common in the economics literature on discrete choice models and it
allows the network formation model to escape from absorbing states.
Under Assumption 1, one can show that the network formation game has a potential
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function (see Proposition 1 in Mele (2010b)). The deterministic component of the incentives
of any player in any state of the network are summarized by a potential function, Q :
G × X → R
Q (g,X) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
gijuij +
n∑
i=1
n∑
j>i
gijgjimij +
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
n∑
k=1
k 6=i,j
gijgjkvik, (4.6)
The intuition for the result is simple. Under the restrictions of Assumption 1, for any
player i and any link gij we have
Q (gij, g−ij, X)−Q (1− gij, g−ij, X) = Ui (gij, g−ij, X)− Ui (1− gij, g−ij, X)
Consider two networks, g = (gij, g−ij) and g′ = (1− gij, g−ij), that differ only with respect
to one link, gij, chosen by individual i: the difference in utility that agent i receives from
the two networks, Ui (g,X) − Ui (g′, X), is exactly equal to the difference of the potential
function evaluated at the two networks, Q (g,X) − Q (g′, X). That is, the potential is an
aggregate function that summarizes both the state of the network and the deterministic
incentives of the players in each state.
Characterizing the network formation as a potential game facilitates analysis. To compute
the equilibria of the model, there is no need to keep track of each player’s behavior: the
potential function contains all the relevant information. This property is key for the analysis
of networks with many players: the usual check for existence of profitable deviations from
the Nash equilibrium can be performed using the potential, instead of checking each player’s
possible deviation in sequence (see Proposition 2 in Mele (2010b)).
Under Assumptions 1 to 3, it can be shown that the process of network formation described
above, generates a sequence of networks which is a Markov chain. Furthermore, it can be
shown that the Markov chain is irreducible, i.e. any network structure can be reached with
positive probability, and aperiodic, i.e. the chain does not get trapped in cycles where it
visits only few networks in sequence.
Therefore (see Theorem 1 in Mele (2010b)) there exists a unique stationary equilibrium
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of the network formation game. The Markov chain of networks has a unique stationary
distribution pi(g,X), which can be written in closed form as
pi (g,X) =
exp [Q (g,X)]∑
ω∈G
exp [Q (ω,X)]
, (4.7)
where Q (g,X) is the potential function (4.6).
The stationary distribution characterizes the probability of observing a specific network
structure in the data, assuming the data are drawn from the stationary equilibrium of the
model.
The distribution pi (g,X) depends on a normalizing constant
c (G, X) ≡
∑
ω∈G
exp [Q (ω,X)] (4.8)
where G is the set all the possible network configurations. The stationary equilibrium can
be rewritten as
pi (g,X) =
exp [Q (g,X)]
c (G, X) (4.9)
In next section, I explain how the normalizing constant generates computational problems
in the Maximum Likelihood estimation.
4.3 Empirical Strategy
4.3.1 General Idea and Computational Complexity
I use data from the Wave I of Add Health: the sample available is one network realization
gobs and the individual characteristics X of all students. To estimate the model, I assume
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that the utility functions depend on a vector of parameters θ = (θu, θm, θv):
uij = u (Xi, Xj, θu)
mij = m (Xi, Xj, θm)
vij = v (Xi, Xj, θv)
I operationalize the estimation by assuming that the observed network is drawn from the
stationary equilibrium. This allow me to estimate the model using only this single observa-
tion of the friendship network and to identify the structural preference parameters.
In principle, one could use Maximum Likelihood techniques, using the stationary equi-
librium of the model as likelihood function. However, Maximum likelihood estimation is
practically infeasible, due to the normalizing constant c (G, X, θ) = ∑
ω∈G
exp [Q (ω,X, θ)].
To evaluate the likelihood at a given parameter value, we need to evaluate the constant
c (G, X, θ): this involves computing the potential function for each possible network in G.
To be concrete, suppose that there are only n = 10 agents. This translates in a total of
290 ' 1.2379 × 1027 possible networks configurations.7 The exact computation of the con-
stant would require several years for each parameter value, using a supercomputer that can
evaluate 1 million potential functions in 1 second.
In the remaining of this section, I explain the methodology used to tackle this estimation
problem. I refer the interested reader to Appendix B for more technical details.
In extreme synthesis the strategy is:
1. Assume the utility components u, m and v are linear functions of θ. This implies
that the stationary distribution belongs to the exponential families with normalizing
constants (Lehman (1983)).
2. Solve the system of non-linear equations implied by the first order condition of the
likelihood maximization problem, using the Robbins and Monro (1951) stochastic ap-
proximation algorithm, as presented in Snijders (2002).
7This is the number of all possible 10×10 binary matrices, since by assumption any state of the network
can occur with positive probability. In general a network with n agents has 2n(n−1) possible configurations
(states).
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3. Use Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods to sample from the stationary
distribution. I develop a version of the Simulated Tempering algorithm (Geyer and
Thompson (1995)), which facilitates the exploration of the enormous state space of the
model.
4. Use methods to accelerate the MCMC algorithm and increase the mixing of the chains.
These techniques allow me to significantly reduce the length of simulations needed to
estimate the structural parameters.
4.3.2 Likelihood Function
I assume that the utility functions u, m and v depend linearly on a vector of parameters.
Define θu = (θu1, θu2, ..., θuP )
′, θm = (θm1, θm2, ..., θmL)
′ and θv = (θv1, θv2, ..., θvS)
′. Define
the functions H : RA × RA → R.
ASSUMPTION 12 (Linearity of Utility) The utility functions are linear in parameters
uij = u (Xi, Xj, θu) =
P∑
p=1
θupHup (Xi, Xj) = θ
′
uHu (Xi, Xj)
mij = m (Xi, Xj, θm) =
L∑
l=1
θmlHml (Xi, Xj) = θ
′
mHm (Xi, Xj)
vij = v (Xi, Xj, θv) =
S∑
s=1
θvsHvs (Xi, Xj) = θ
′
vHv (Xi, Xj)
The functions H do not rule out interactions among different characteristics, for example
interactions of race and gender of both individuals. There is no constraint in the specification
of u, m and v but linearity in parameters. Therefore we can consider different specifications
and include different set of variables for the direct, mutual and indirect links.
The assumption delivers a very useful result (see Proposition 4 in Mele (2010b)). The
stationary equilibrium of the model belongs to the exponential family
pi (g,X, θ) =
exp [θ′t (g,X)]∑
ω∈G
exp [θ′t (ω,X)]
(4.10)
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where θ = (θu, θm, θv)
′ is a (column) vector of parameters and t (g,X) is a (column) vector
of canonical statistics.
The vector t (g,X) = (t1 (g,X) , ..., tK (g,X)) is the vector of sufficient statistics for the
network formation model. It can contain the number of links, the number of whites-to-
whites links, the number of male-to-female links and so on. As stated above, interactions
of different variables are possible, e.g. the number of black-males-to-white-females links, or
interactions of individual controls with school-level controls.
4.3.3 Estimation Strategy
The parameters are estimated using Maximum Likelihood methods. The log-likelihood is
denoted by ` (gobs; θ) ≡ log pi (g,X, θ) and the parameters are solution of the maximization
problem
θˆmle = arg max
θ∈Θ
` (gobs; θ) (4.11)
In Appendix B, I show that solving the maximization problem (4.11) is equivalent to
solving the system of nonlinear moment equations
t (gobs, X) = Epi,θ [t (g,X)] , (4.12)
where t (gobs, X) is the vector of canonical sufficient statistics observed in the data, and
Epi,θ [t (g,X)] is the expected value of the sufficient statistics in the stationary equilibrium
at true parameter θ. The system corresponds to the first order conditions of (4.11).
I solve the system of equations (4.12) using the Robbins and Monro (1951) stochastic
approximation algorithm.8 The algorithm generates a Markovian sequence of parameters,
whose average converges to the solution of the equation. In this sense, it is a sequential
estimation method and it can be thought of as a Monte Carlo version of the Newton-Raphson
algorithm.
8Kushner and Yin (2003) provide an extensive review of the literature on stochastic approximation
and applications of the algorithm. Snijders (2002) proposes to use Robins-Monro for the estimation of
Exponential Random Graph Models (ERGM).
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The Robbins-Monro algorithm sequentially updates the parameters using the recursion
θˆ(r+1) = θˆ(r) − aD−10
[
t(g(r), X, θˆ(r))− t(gobs, X)
]
(4.13)
where the gain a is small and positive, t(g(r), X, θˆ(r)) is the vector of sufficient statistics of
a network g(r) sampled from the stationary distribution at the current parameter value θˆ(r),
and
D0 = diag
[
∂E
[
t
(
ω,X, θ(0)
)− t(gobs, X)]
∂θ
]
= diag
[
COV (t(g,X, θ(0)))
]
(4.14)
is a diagonal matrix containing the variances of the sufficient statistics computed at the initial
guess θ(0). In order to perform the updates in (4.13) the research needs to generate samples
from the stationary equilibrium of the model, which is complicated by the normalizing
constant.
It can be shown that the sequence of θˆ(r) is a Markov chain, and by the ergodic theorem
the average θˆ = R−1
∑R
r=1 θˆ
(r) converges almost surely to the true parameter value, i.e. the
solution of (4.12)9
θˆ =
1
R
R∑
r=1
θˆ(r)
a.s−→ θ (4.15)
I use a version of the Simulated Tempering algorithm to generate samples from the stationary
equilibrium of the model, which improves mixing with respect to the traditional Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm. Simulated Tempering involves simulation from different MCMC sam-
plers, each producing a Markov Chain that has a invariant distribution a tempered version of
the target distribution, i.e. the stationary equilibrium of the model scaled by a real number
(the temperature). This produces a long chain that contains variable length runs from each
sampler and switches among samplers. Samplers with higher temperatures have target dis-
tribution that are flatter, and can explore the state space much faster than the sampler with
original target distribution. Only the network generated from the original target distribu-
tion are used as samples for the stochastic approximation. I augment the original Simulated
9See Kushner and Yin (2003) or Snijders (2002) for details
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Tempering algorithm with acceleration techniques suggested in Li et al. (2004), to decrease
the length of the simulations needed to reach convergence and decrease the variance of the
Monte Carlo estimates. The details are contained in Appendix B.
The simulated tempering is an improvement with respect to the Metropolis-Hastings al-
gorithm proposed in Snijders (2002). The intuitive reason lies in the results of Proposition
3 in Mele (2010b), which bounds convergence for the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm for this
model. The simulated tempering algorithm modifies the transition probability of the Markov
chain that generates the samples, allowing the sampler to propose bigger steps and reach
states that would not be possible to reach in one Metropolis-Hastings iteration. This is
reflected in a decrease of the second highest eigenvalue of the transition matrix, which ac-
celerates convergence.10
The stochastic approximation algorithm follows the steps suggested in Snijders (2002)
1. Guess a θ(0)
2. Run the Simulated Tempering algorithm to generate a sample
{
t(g(s), X, θˆ(0))
}S
s=1
3. Estimate D0 in (4.14) as
Dˆ0 = diag
[
1
S
S∑
s=1
t(g(s), X, θˆ(0))t(g(s), X, θˆ(0))T − t¯0t¯T0
]
(4.16)
where t¯0 = S
−1∑S
s=1 t(g
(s), X, θˆ(0)) is the average of the simulated sufficient statistics.
Plug the estimated Dˆ0 in (4.13).
4. At iteration r (r = 1, ...R), run the Simulated Tempering at parameter θˆ(r) to generate
a sample network g(r). Compute t(g(r), X, θˆ(r)).
5. Iterate (4.13) one step ahead
θˆ(r+1) = θˆ(r) − aD−10
[
t(g(r), X, θˆ(r))− t(gobs, X)
]
(4.17)
6. Repeat steps 4-5 until approximate convergence is reached.
10It is very hard to make a quantitative statement about the improvement in computational speed.
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7. Once convergence is achieved, use the estimated θˆ = (1/R)
∑R
r=1 θˆ
(r) to run the Simu-
lated Tempering algorithm and generate a sample
{
t(g(s), X, θˆ)
}S
s=1
8. Estimate the standard errors of the parameters as
̂AsyV (θmle) =
[
1
S
S∑
s=1
t(g(s), X, θˆ)t(g(s), X, θˆ)T − t¯t¯T
]−1
(4.18)
where t¯ = S−1
∑S
s=1 t(g
(s), X, θˆ).
The computational efficiency of this method is crucially related to both the choice of the
initial guess g(0) and the network simulation algorithm. The related literature has proposed
to use the Maximum Pseudo-Likelihood Estimator (MPLE) as starting value in various
contexts Besag (1974); Nakajima (2007); Snijders (2002). The MPLE maximizes the product
of the conditional probabilities (details of the derivation can be found in Appendix)
logPL (g; θ,X) = θ′
∑
i
∑
j
gij∆t (g−ij, X)−
∑
i
∑
j
log [1 + exp (θ′∆t (g−ij, X))]
assuming that each link is independently formed. As a consequence, this estimator severely
underestimates the dependence among links. At the same time the MPLE is extremely sim-
ple and it can be obtained using a simple Newton-Raphson routine.
Unfortunately, recent studies have shown that this initial guess may produce wrong re-
sults.11 The Robbins-Monro algorithm converges rapidly as long as the starting value is close
to the solution. Otherwise it may require infeasible long iterations to converge. In many
models the MPLE is extremely far from the MLE and this produces several problems. First,
the convergence of the algorithm is very slow. Second, the network simulation algorithm
may produce degenerate networks, i.e. networks where everybody is linked to everybody else
or networks where no links are formed. The second problem further slows down convergence.
To circumvent this problem, I use the posterior mean estimated in Mele (2010b) as initial
guess for the algorithm. This is based on the asymptotic behavior of the Maximum Likeli-
11See Snijders (2002) for a discussion of the problem and some practical solutions in the context of
Exponential random graph models. Caimo and Friel (2010) show that the problem of degeneracy may result
in an approximated likelihood that does not have a maximum.
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hood Estimator and the posterior mean, as stated in the Bernstein-Von Mises theorem. The
initial network for all simulations is the observed network.12
4.4 Empirical Results
4.4.1 Artificial Data
I generate artificial network data to show that using the MPLE as starting value for the
Robbins-Monro algorithm could be very misleading. The data are generated using a toy
model with 3 parameters, where the utility function of the players is given by
Ui(g,X) = θ1
n∑
j=1
gij + θ2
n∑
j=1
gijgji + θ3
[
n∑
j=1
gij
n∑
k 6=i,j;k=1
gjk +
n∑
j=1
gij
n∑
k 6=i,j;k=1
gki
]
(4.19)
The data are generated using the vector of parameters
θ = (−2.0, 0.5, 0.01) (4.20)
To generate the network used in estimation I use a Simulated tempering algorithm with 5
temperatures. I start the sampler at a random network with 100 players, which is generated
under the assumption that each link is independent and occurs with probability p = 0.2. I
collect a sample of 1000000 networks from the simulated tempering and use the last iteration
as dataset.
The results are displayed in Table 4.1. The first and second column report the estima-
tion using the Maximum Pseudo-Likelihood Estimator, while third and fourth column show
results obtained using the Robbins-Monro algorithm started at the MPLE. Both estimates
are clearly not close to the true parameters. This conforms to previous evidence on the poor
performance of the MPLE in models with high degrees of dependence among variables.
12A possible motivation for this choice is contained in Mele (2010b), where the result of Lemma 1 makes
this a natural choices. Alternatively one could generate a random network and start each simulation form
that network.
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Table 4.1: Estimation, Artificial Data
MPLE Robbins-Monro Posterior Mean Robbins-Monro
coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.d. coef s.e.
Direct -3.358 0.061 -3.480 0.030 -2.099 0.137 -2.100 0.057
Mutual 0.764 0.141 0.573 0.068 0.583 0.349 0.581 0.131
Indirect/Popularity 0.038 0.003 0.037 0.0004 0.009 0.006 0.010 0.002
Estimation of the toy model (4.19). MPLE is the Maximum Pseudo-Likelihood Estimator, while the Posterior
Mean is obtained using the Bayesian approximate exchange algorithm of Mele (2010b). The Robbins-Monro
stochastic approximation algorithm is started at the MPLE (columns 3-4) and at the posterior mean (columns
7-8).
Columns 5 and 6 report the estimates obtained using the Bayesian approximate exchange
algorithm of Mele (2010b). Columns 7 and 8 are obtained starting the stochastic approxi-
mation routine at the posterior mean in column 5. The results are as expected much more
precise.
4.4.2 Add Health
I use data from the Add Health survey. I estimate the model using School 28, which has
150 enrolled students and a total of 355 friendship nominations, with 58.667% females, and
a racial fragmentation of 0.606. The racial composition is as follows: 42% whites, 45.3%
blacks, 0.667% asians, 10.6% hispanics.
I report the results of estimation in Table 4.2. Column 1 shows the estimates using the
Maximum Pseudo-Likelihood Estimator (MPLE). The estimates suggest homophily in direct
links (excluding gender), while for mutual and indirect there is some heterophily. The esti-
mates of marginal utilities for the indirect links appear implausible in their magnitudes. The
intuition is that the MPLE does not take into account the correlation among links, since
it assumes links are independent, thus overestimating the importance of non-direct links.
The second column contains the standard errors for the MPLE. While the MPLE is known
to be consistent (as n → ∞), there is no general theory about the asymptotic behavior of
standard errors. The interpretation of the results is thus not clear.
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In Column 3 and 4, I show the results for the stochastic approximation estimates, started
Table 4.2: Estimation Results, Add Health School 28
MPLE Rob-Mon Post Mean Rob-Mon
coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e.
Direct utility (uij)
constant -5.812 0.665 -5.812 1.817 -4.5947 0.6502 -4.61025 0.20484
same gender -0.149 0.185 -0.149 0.410 0.2199 0.4942 0.18062 0.12889
same grade 0.101 0.065 0.100 0.200 0.772 0.5558 0.78495 0.14242
white-white 0.928 0.257 0.929 0.522 0.4624 0.8419 0.44721 0.27177
black-black 1.108 0.255 1.110 0.550 0.7132 0.7985 0.6802 0.3228
hisp-hisp 2.476 0.431 2.478 1.398 1.5408 1.1437 2.10964 1.17258
Mutual utility (mij)
constant 2.767 0.466 2.774 0.847 0.9503 1.3547 1.08955 0.56895
same gender -1.327 0.296 -1.330 0.686 1.5864 1.0896 1.70228 0.62455
same grade -0.743 0.256 -0.746 0.707 0.006 1.012 -0.03824 0.75784
white-white -1.056 0.443 -1.055 1.095 0.3804 1.1925 0.42891 0.82876
black-black -0.535 0.43 -0.525 0.896 0.7624 1.1534 0.89191 0.53173
hisp-hisp -2.071 0.992 -2.071 2.909 0.3745 1.7842 0.2113 2.97365
Indirect utility (vij)
constant 5.341 18.258 5.342 37.451 -0.3628 0.1849 -0.36287 0.02761
same gender 10.025 7.325 10.026 8.421 -0.0152 0.1835 -0.01532 0.02387
same grade -3.907 1.76 -3.906 3.922 0.3559 0.1665 0.35717 0.06136
white-white 33.733 8.84 33.742 10.845 0.3354 0.2027 0.33557 0.03558
black-black 27.711 8.336 27.732 10.558 0.2761 0.1767 0.27601 0.03204
hisp-hisp -10.214 35.636 -9.709 76.039 -0.3136 0.9793 -0.23689 0.20591
at the MPLE. The coefficients are very similar to the MPLE, while the standard errors are
much larger. The intuition for this results is simple: for a small sample, the MPLE provides
a very bad approximation of the likelihood. This translates in a very poor approximation
of the first order conditions, solved by the stochastic approximation algorithm. As a conse-
quence, the computation of the covariance matrix performed in the last step of the stochastic
approximation is erratic and has high variability.
On the other hand, when I start the algorithm at the posterior mean estimated in Mele
(2010b) (columns 5 and 6), the estimates are very different and the standard errors are
smaller (column 7 and 8). The magnitudes of indirect links coefficients are now plausible
and show strong homophily effects (excluding hispanic student). The direct link homophily
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for whites is not significant.
4.5 Conclusions
This paper studies an alternative estimation strategy for the model of strategic network
formation presented in Mele (2010b). I propose an approximated maximum likelihood esti-
mation procedure, implemented using stochastic approximation and MCMC simulations.
The main challenge in the estimation of the model is the presence of a normalizing con-
stant in the likelihood, that cannot be computed or approximated with precision. Assuming
that the utility functions are linear in parameters, it is shown that the likelihood belongs to
the exponential family. The first order conditions of the maximum likelihood problem pro-
vide a system of nonlinear equations that can be solved using the stochastic approximation
algorithm developed by Robbins and Monro (1951).
Since the algorithm requires the simulation of networks from the stationary equilibrium
of the model, I propose a Simulated Tempering algorithm that improves on the standard
Metropolis-Hastings. I provide evidence that the Maximum Pseudo-Likelihood Estimator
(MPLE) usually suggested in the literature, performs poorly in this setting. I use artificial
and Add Health data to estimate the model. When the stochastic approximation is started
from the posterior mean estimated in Mele (2010b) the estimates are more precise and have
plausible magnitudes. On the other hand, starting the approximate algorithm at the MPLE
proves a very poor choice.
In addition, the simulated tempering algorithm developed for this model could be easily
extended to other settings where the state space is large and the Metropolis-Hastings sam-
pler has poor mixing properties. Models of social interactions with sequential moves as in
Nakajima (2007) or autologistic models in spatial econometrics (Besag (1974)) are possible
candidates for the use of the algorithm.
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APPENDIX A
TECHNICAL APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
A.1 Background Theory
In this section I briefly review the fundamental concepts and definitions needed to develop
my main theoretical results.1 I provide proofs of some results in Appendix B. The interested
reader can refer to the books listed in the references for more details, while the reader familiar
with spatial Poisson point processes can skip this appendix.
A.1.1 Notation, Basic Properties and Definitions
A spatial point process X is a stochastic mechanism that maps points over a set S ⊆ R2.
Alternatively it can be defined as a random counting measure over bounded sets A ⊆ S. I
denote the random set as X = {x1, ..., xn}, where xi denotes the generic point of the process.
The random variable N (A) indicates the number of points in bounded set A ⊆ S. I denote
the realizations of X as x and the realizations of N as n. I write ξ or η to indicate a generic
point (coordinate) in S and xi for the generic realized point of the process. The area of
region A is |A| and dξ refers to the infinitesimal region containing ξ.
I consider only finite point processes, with realizations x in the set N1f = {x ⊆ S :
n (x ∩ A) < ∞},for any bounded A ⊆ S. A point process is stationary if all the proba-
bility statements about the process in any bounded set A of the plane are invariant under
arbitrary translations. This implies that all the statistics are invariant under translation,
e.g. EN (A) = ENp (A), where Np (A) is the process X translated by the vector p. A point
process is isotropic if the invariance holds under arbitrary rotations. A process that is sta-
1Diggle (2003), Stoyan et al. (1987), Stoyan and Stoyan (1994), Moller and Waagepetersen (2004) are
the basic references.
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tionary and isotropic is called motion-invariant. For convenience I will also assume that the
process is simple (or orderly), i.e that multiple coincident events cannot occur.
In this paper I consider simple nonstationary and anisotropic processes.
A.1.2 First and Second Order Properties
Let X be a spatial point process defined over S ⊆ R2. The intensity function is a locally
integrable function2 λ : S → [0,∞), defined as the limit of the expected number of points
per infinitesimal area
λ (ξ) = lim
|dξ|→0
{
E [N (dξ)]
|dξ|
}
(A.1)
A stationary process has constant intensity λ (ξ) = λ for all ξ. The intensity measure of
a point process X is defined for A ⊆ S as
Λ (A) = EN (A) =
∫
A
λ (ξ) dξ (A.2)
and measures the expected number of points of the process in the set A. I follow the
literature and assume that Λ (A) is locally finite, i.e. Λ (A) < ∞ for all bounded A ⊆ S,
and diffuse, i.e. Λ ({ξ}) = 0, for ξ ∈ S (or alternatively @ξ ∈ S s.t. Λ ({ξ}) > 0). The fact
that Λ (A) is diffuse implies that P [N (dξ) > 1] = o (|dξ|): in words, there are no coincident
points, and the process is simple.3
A.1.3 Poisson Processes and Marked Poisson Processes
The Poisson point process is the simplest point process and is widely used in practical
applications. The definition of the process consists of two conditions, that also provide a
2A function is locally integrable if
∫
A
λ (ξ) dξ <∞ for all bounded A ⊆ S
3The intensity function has also an infinitesimal interpretation, since the fact that P [N (dξ) > 1] = o (|dξ|)
implies that E [N (dξ)] converges to P [N (dξ) = 1] as |dξ| → 0. It follows that the quantity λ (ξ) dξ can
be interpreted as the probability of an event in the infinitesimal region dξ, i.e λ (ξ) dξ ≈ P [N (dξ) = 1].
Analogously notice that E [N (dη)N (dξ)] ≈ P [N (dη) = N (dξ) = 1], for ξ and η close, and we can interpret
the quantity λ2 (ξ, η) dξdη as the probability of observing two events in the infinitesimal regions dξ and dη.
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practical algorithm for simulation.
DEFINITION 4 (Poisson Point Process) A point process X on S is a Poisson Point
Process with intensity λ (ξ) if the following two conditions are satisfied:
1. for any bounded A ⊆ S with Λ (A) <∞
P [N (A) = n] = [Λ (A)]n
exp [−Λ (A)]
n!
, n = 0, 1, 2, .... (A.3)
2. for any n ∈ N and any bounded A ⊆ S with 0 < Λ (A) <∞ , conditional on N (A) = n
the point are i.i.d. over S with density
f (ξ) =
λ (ξ)∫
A
λ (ξ) dξ
(A.4)
We will write X ∼ Poi (S, λ (ξ)).
The first condition requires that for any bounded set the number of points of the process
is a draw from the Poisson distribution with mean Λ (A) =
∫
A
λ (ξ) dξ, implying EN (A) =
Λ (A) for any bounded A ⊆ S. The second condition requires that, conditioning on the
number of points, the locations are i.i.d. draws from a density function proportional to the
intensity function. Therefore the intensity function entirely characterizes the process.
Sometimes condition (A.4) is replaced by the independent scattering property: if X ∼
Poi (S, λ (ξ)), then for disjoint sets A1, A2, A3, ...AK ⊆ A the random variables N (A1) ,
N (A2) , ..., N (AK) are stochastically independent Poisson random variables, i.e.
P [N (A1) = n1, ..., N (AK) = nK ] =
K∏
k=1
[Λ (Ak)]
nk exp [−Λ (Ak)]
nk!
(A.5)
for n = n1 + n2 + ... + nk. In Appendix B, I prove that conditions (A.3) and (A.4) imply
(A.5).
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In this paper I consider only Inhomogeneous Poisson Point Processes (IPP): these processes
are nonstationary and anisotropic, with spatially varying intensity function.4 The IPP is
a very simple and parsimonious model for clustered points. Notice that the clustering of
locations arises only exogenously, being a consequence of the intensity specification: there is
no behavioral interpretation of points clusters.
In Appendix B, I show that a point process X is Poisson if and only if its probability law
is5
P [(X ∩ A) ∈ F ] =
∞∑
n=0
exp [−Λ (A)]
n!
∫
A
· ·
∫
A
1[{x1,...,xn}∈F ]
n∏
i=1
λ (xi) dx1 · ·dxn (A.6)
for all A ⊆ S, with Λ (A) = ∫
A
λ (ξ) dξ < ∞, and for all F ⊆ N1f . By convention for
n = 0, I write 1[∅∈F ]. The probability over S ⊆ R2 is obtained by substituting A with S.
It is possible to enrich the Poisson model, assigning to each point a random variable (or
vector) representing an attribute: this random variable is called mark and the process is
called Marked Poisson Process.
More formally, let X0 be a spatial point process defined over the space S ⊆ R2. If there
is a random mark m (ξ) ∈M attached to each point ξ ∈ X0 then the process
X = {{ξ,m (ξ)}| ξ ∈ X0}
is called Marked Point Process with events in S and marks in M. The mark space M
may be a finite set, i.e. M = {1, 2, ...,M}, in which case X is called a multitype process, or
a more general set M⊆ Rq, q ≥ 1.
DEFINITION 5 (Marked Poisson Process) The process X = {{ξ,m (ξ)}| ξ ∈ X0} is
4A Poisson Point Process is said Homogeneous (or stationary) if λ (ξ) = λ, for all ξ ∈ S and f (ξ) = |A|−1,
for any bounded A ⊆ S. It follows that for an Homogeneous Poisson Process (HPP) EN (A) = λ |A|. The
HPP is considered the ideal of complete spatial randomness in literature. Complete spatial randomness
means that we do not expect the intensity of the process to vary over the region we are considering and that
there are no interactions amongst different events. Indeed, by condition (A.3) and the fact that λ (ξ) = λ,
an HPP shows stationarity and isotropy, cause N (A) ∼ Poisson (λ |A|), and thus the expected number of
events does not vary over the planar region A; by condition (A.4) and f (ξ) = |A|−1, we have no clustering
or inhibition (the presence of a point in ξ does not make more or less likely the occurrence of an event η in
the neighborhood of ξ).
5See also Proposition 3.1 in Moller and Waagepetersen (2004).
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a Marked Poisson Process if
1. X0 is a Poisson Point Process over S with intensity function λ0 (ξ) (with
∫
A
λ0 (ξ) dξ <
∞ for all bounded A ⊆ S)
2. conditional on X0 the marks {m (ξ)| ξ ∈ X0} are mutually independent
The framework developed in the paper is based on the simple processes described above.
A.2 Point Processes Theory
A.2.1 Independent Scattering Property
PROPOSITION If X ∼ Poi (S, λ (ξ)), then for disjoint sets A1, A2, A3, ...Ak ⊆ A the
random variables N (A1) , N (A2) , N (A3) , ... are stochastically independent, i.e.
P [N (A1) = n1, ..., N (Ak) = nk] =
k∏
j=1
[Λ (Aj)]
nj exp [−Λ (Aj)]
nj!
(A.7)
for n = n1 + n2 + ...+ nk.
Proof. Consider the case in which we have only two disjoint sets, i.e. A = A1 ∪ A2.
The extension to k sets is done by induction. Conditional on N (A) = n1 + n2 = n,
P [ξ ∈ (X ∩ A)] = f (ξ) = λ (ξ) /Λ (A). Then given N (A) = n,
P [N (A1) = 1|N (A) = n] =
∫
A1
f (ξ) dξ =
Λ (A1)
Λ (A)
and by condition (1) of the definition of a Poisson process, P [N (A1) = n1|N (A) = n] =[
Λ(A1)
Λ(A)
]n1
and also
P [N (A1) = n1, N (A2) = n2|N (A) = n] =
(
n1 + n2
n1
)[
Λ (A1)
Λ (A)
]n1 [Λ (A2)
Λ (A)
]n2
=
n!
n1! (n− n1)!
[Λ (A1)]
n1 [Λ (A2)]
n−n1
Λ (A)n
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and thus condition (2) of the definition of a Poisson process implies that the unconditional
probability is
P [N (A1) = n1, N (A2) = n2] =
n!
n1! (n− n1)!
[Λ (A1)]
n1 [Λ (A2)]
n−n1
[Λ (A)]n
[Λ (A)]n
exp [−Λ (A)]
n!
= [Λ (A1)]
n1 exp [−Λ (A1)]
n1!
[Λ (A2)]
n−n1 exp [−Λ (A2)]
(n− n1)!
A.2.2 Probability Law of a Poisson Point Process
PROPOSITION A point process X is a Poisson Point Process, i.e X ∼ Poi (S, λ (ξ)) , if
and only if for all A ⊆ S, with Λ (A) = ∫
A
λ (ξ) dξ <∞, and for all F ⊆ N1f
P [(X ∩ A) ∈ F ] =
∞∑
n=0
exp [−Λ (A)]
n!
∫
A
· ·
∫
A
1[{x1,...,xn}∈F ]
n∏
i=1
λ (xi) dx1 · ·dxn (A.8)
where by convention for n = 0 we have 1[∅∈F ]
Proof. Conditioning on N (A) = n, a specific realization {x1, ..., xn} over A has proba-
bility
n∏
i=1
f (xi) =
n∏
i=1
[
λ(xi)∫
A λ(ξ)dξ
]
. Therefore all the possible realizations {x1, ..., xn} ∈ F have
probability
P [ (X ∩ A) ∈ F |N (A) = n] =
∫
A
· ·
∫
A
1[{x1,...,xn}∈F ]
n∏
i=1
[
λ (xi)
Λ (A)
]
dx1 · ·dxn.
In order to get the unconditional probability we just need to multiply by P [N (A) = n] =
exp[−Λ(A)]
n!
Λ (A)n and sum for all n, obtaining (A.8).
For the necessary part of the proof just multiply (A.8) inside the sum by Λ(A)
n
Λ(A)n
and notice
127
you can rewrite the probability as
P [(X ∩ A) ∈ F ] =
∞∑
n=0
exp [−Λ (A)]
n!
Λ (A)n
∫
A
· ·
∫
A
1[{x1,...,xn}∈F ]
n∏
i=1
[
λ (xi)
Λ (A)
]
dx1 · ·dxn
=
∞∑
n=0
P [N (A) = n]× P [ (X ∩ A) ∈ F |N (A) = n]
where P [N (A) = n] is a Poisson distribution and P [ (X ∩ A) ∈ F |N (A) = n] is a binomial
point process.
The probability law of the process over S ⊆ R2 is obtained from (A.8), by substituting A
with S.
A.2.3 The process under A1,A2 and A3 is Poisson
In our framework we use the Marked Poisson Process extensively and we exploit a property
that we prove in the following lemma (see also Proposition 3.9 in Moller and Waagepetersen
(2004), p. 26).
LEMMA 1 If X satisfies Assumptions 1-3 with M⊆ Rq, q ≥ 1 then
X ∼ Poi (S ×M, λ (ξ,m))
Proof. Notice that Assumptions 1 and 2 are simply the definition of a Marked Pois-
son Process. If we add Assumption 2, the probability of a pair (ξ,m) is f (ξ) ρ (ξ,m) =
λ0(ξ)
Λ0(A)
ρ (ξ,m) for any bounded A ⊆ S. Therefore, conditioning on N (A) = n we have
P [ (X ∩ A) ∈ F |N (A) = n]
=
∫
A
· ·
∫
A
∫
M
· ·
∫
M
1[{(x1,m1),...,(xn,mn)}∈F ]
n∏
i=1
[
λ0 (xi)
Λ0 (A)
ρ (xi,mi)
]
dx1 · ·dxndm1 · ·dmn
=
∫
A×M
· ·
∫
A×M
1[{(x1,m1),...,(xn,mn)}∈F ]
n∏
i=1
[
λ (xi,mi)
Λ0 (A)
]
dx1 · ·dxndm1 · ·dmn
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Therefore the unconditional distribution is
P [(X ∩ A) ∈ F ]
=
∞∑
n=0
exp [−Λ0 (A)]
n!
∫
A×M
· ·
∫
A×M
1[{(x1,m1),...,(xn,mn)}∈F ]
n∏
i=1
[λ (xi,mi)] dx1 · ·dxndm1 · ·dmn
Notice that
∫
A×M
λ (ξ,m) dξdm =
∫
A
λ0 (ξ)
[∫
M
ρ (ξ,m) dm
]
dξ =
∫
A
λ0 (ξ) dξ = Λ0 (A) for
any A and define t = (ξ,m) with values in T = S ×M and λ (t) = λ0 (ξ) ρ (ξ,m) to get
P [(X ∩ A) ∈ F ] =
∞∑
n=0
exp
[
− ∫
A×M λ (t) dt
]
n!
∫
A×M
· ·
∫
A×M
1[{t1,...,tn}∈F ]
n∏
i=1
[λ (ti)] dt1 · ·dtn
It follows from (A.8) that X ∼ Poi (T, λ (t)) or X ∼ Poi (S ×M, λ (ξ,m))
A.2.4 The case of Multitype Point Process
If the process is a multitype point process then the previous proposition can be specialized
in the following
LEMMA 2 If a Marked Point Process X with discrete mark space M = {1, 2, ...,M}
satisfies Assumptions 1-3, it is equivalent to a multivariate Poisson Process (X1, X2, ..., XM),
i.e Xm ∼ Poi (S, λm (ξ)) are mutually independent and λm (ξ) = λ0 (ξ) ρm (ξ), m = 1, ...,M .
Proof. Assumptions 1 and 2 together form the definition of a Multitype Poisson Process.
The (IF) part of the proof then just requires to prove that Assumption 3 implies the multivari-
ate poisson process, i.e. that P (m (ξ) = m|X0 = x0) = ρm (ξ) implies Xm ∼ Poi (S, λm (ξ))
and mutually independent.
(IF ) A Poisson Point Process is uniquely determined by its void probabilities (Theorem
3.1 p. 16 in Moller and Waagepetersen (2004))
v (A) = P [N (A) = 0] = P [X ∩ A = ∅] = exp [−Λ (A)]
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Therefore for independent Poisson Processes X1 and X2 with intensity measure Λ1 (·) and
Λ2 (·), their joint distribution is uniquely determined by the joint void probabilities
P [X1 ∩ A = ∅, X2 ∩B = ∅] = exp [−Λ1 (A)− Λ2 (A)]
for any bounded A,B ⊆ S. For simplicity consider a multitype point process with
M = {1, 2} only: the extension to M types can be proven by induction. Let the inten-
sity functions of the univariate processes be λm (ξ) = λ0 (ξ) ρm (ξ) with intensity measures
Λm (A) =
∫
A
λm (ξ) dξ. The univariate process X1 can be thought of as obtained from the
multitype process X0 by including ξ ∈ X in X1 with probability P (m (ξ) = 1|X0 = x0) =
ρ1 (ξ). Such a process is called an independent thinning of X0 with retention probabili-
ties ρ1 (ξ). The events are excluded or included independently of each other. Formally the
process X1 can be thought of as the process
X1 = {ξ ∈ X0 : U (ξ) ≤ ρ1 (ξ)}
where U (ξ) ∼ U [0, 1].
Notice that Λ0 (A) = Λ1 (A) + Λ2 (A) and that conditional on ξ ∈ X0, for ξ ∈ A
P [ξ ∈ X1] =
∫
A
ρ1 (ξ)
λ0 (ξ)
Λ0 (A)
dξ
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The definition of Poisson process then implies that
P [X1 ∩ A = ∅] =
∞∑
n=0
P [N (X0 ∩ A) = n]× P [X1 ∩ A = ∅|N (X0 ∩ A) = n]
=
∞∑
n=0
exp [−Λ0 (A)]
n!
Λ0 (A)
n
∫
A
· ·
∫
A
(
n∏
i=1
[1− ρ1 (xi)] λ0 (xi)
Λ0 (A)
)
dx1 · ·dxn
=
∞∑
n=0
exp [−Λ0 (A)]
n!
[∫
A
[1− ρ1 (ξ)]λ0 (ξ) dξ
]n
= exp [−Λ0 (A)]
∞∑
n=0
[∫
A
λ0 (ξ) dξ −
∫
A
ρ1 (ξ)λ0 (ξ) dξ
]n
n!
= exp [−Λ0 (A)]
∞∑
n=0
[Λ0 (A)− Λ1 (A)]n
n!
= exp [−Λ0 (A)] exp [Λ0 (A)− Λ1 (A)]
= exp [−Λ1 (A)]
Using the same argument we can show that
P [X2 ∩ A = ∅] = P [X0X1 ∩ A = ∅] = exp [−Λ0 (A) + Λ1 (A)]
Therefore we have proven that X1 and X2 are Poisson processes. It remains to be shown
that they are independent. Rewrite the joint probability of X1 and X2 for A,B ⊆ S as
P [X1 ∩ A = ∅, X2 ∩B = ∅] = P [X ∩ (A ∩B) = ∅, X1 ∩ AB = ∅, X2 ∩BA = ∅]
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Using the independent scattering property of the Poisson Process, for A,B ⊆ S
P [X ∩ (A ∩B) = ∅, X1 ∩ AB = ∅, X2 ∩BA = ∅]
= P [X ∩ (A ∩B) = ∅]P [X1 ∩ AB = ∅]P [XX1 ∩BA = ∅]
= exp [−Λ0 (A ∩B)] exp [−Λ1 (AB)] exp [−Λ0 (BA) + Λ1 (BA)]
= exp [−Λ0 (A ∩B)− Λ1 (AB)− Λ0 (BA) + Λ1 (BA) + Λ1 (A ∩B)− Λ1 (A ∩B)]
= exp [−Λ1 (A)− Λ0 (B) + Λ1 (B)]
= exp [−Λ1 (A)] exp [−Λ0 (B) + Λ1 (B)]
= P [X1 ∩ A = ∅]P [X2 ∩B = ∅]
Then X1 and X2 are independent Poisson Processes with intensity λm (ξ) = λ0 (ξ) ρm (ξ),
m = 1, 2. We can extend the argument to m = 1, ..,M by induction.
(ONLY IF ) Remember that the union of independent Poisson Processes is a Poisson
Process with the intensity function equal to the sum of the single processes intensities.
Therefore
(
M⋃
m=1
Xm
)
∼ Poi
(
S,
M∑
m=1
λm (ξ)
)
= Poi (S, λ0 (ξ)) = X0. This means that the
process satisfies Assumption 1. The proof follows from the fact that conditioning on the
sum of M independent Poisson variables we obtain a multinomial distribution
P (m (ξ) = m|X0 = x0) = P
[
ξ ∈ Xm| ξ ∈
M⋃
m=1
Xm
]
= P
[
(ξ ∈ Xm) ∩
(
ξ ∈
M⋃
m=1
Xm
)]
×
(
P
[
ξ ∈
M⋃
m=1
Xm
])−1
=
λm (ξ)
M∑
m=1
λm (ξ)
=
λ0 (ξ) ρm (ξ)
M∑
m=1
λ0 (ξ) ρm (ξ)
= ρm (ξ)
Therefore also Assumption 3 is satisfied and since Assumption 3 implies Assumption 2,
the proof is complete.
When the conditional mark distribution does not depend on location, ρ (ξ,m) = ρ (m) for
all ξ, then we have random labelling.
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A.3 Proofs of the Main Results
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The Poisson assumption allows us to compute the expectation in the following way
E [T (X)] =
∞∑
n=0
E [T (X)|N (S) = n]× P [N (S) = n]
It follows that
E [T (X)] = E
[
1
N (S)
∑
ξ∈X0
φ (ξ)
]
=
∞∑
n=0
E
[
1
n
∑
ξ∈X0
φ (ξ)
∣∣∣∣∣N (S) = n
]
× P [N (S) = n]
=
∞∑
n=0
1
n
∑
ξ∈X0
E [φ (ξ)|N (S) = n]× P [N (S) = n]
=
∞∑
n=0
1
n
[
n
∫
S
φ (ξ)
λ0 (ξ)
Λ0 (S)dξ
]
× P [N (S) = n]
=
∫
S
φ (ξ)
λ0 (ξ)
Λ0 (S)dξ
∞∑
n=0
P [N (S) = n]
=
∫
S
φ (ξ)
λ0 (ξ)
Λ0 (S)dξ
= E [φ (ξ)]
where the fourth equality follows from the fact that the locations of the poisson process
are i.i.d points with density λ0(ξ)
Λ0(S)
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The variance of the index is computed in several steps
V [T (X)] = V
[
1
N (S)
∑
ξ∈X0
φ (ξ)
]
= E
( 1
N (S)
∑
ξ∈X0
φ (ξ)
)2−(E[ 1
N (S)
∑
ξ∈X0
φ (ξ)
])2
= E
[
1
N (S)2
∑
ξ∈X0
φ (ξ)2
]
+ E
 1N (S)2 ∑
ξ∈X0
∑
η∈X0
η 6=ξ
φ (ξ)φ (η)

−
(
E
[
1
N (S)
∑
ξ∈X0
φ (ξ)
])2
The first component of the sum above is
E
[
1
N (S)2
∑
ξ∈X0
φ (ξ)2
]
=
∞∑
n=0
1
n2
[
n
∫
S
φ (ξ)2
λ0 (ξ)
Λ0 (S)dξ
]
× P [N (S) = n]
= E
[
1
N (S)
] ∫
S
φ (ξ)2
λ0 (ξ)
Λ0 (S)dξ
= E
[
1
N (S)
]
E
[
φ (ξ)2
]
The second component of the sum is
E
 1N (S)2 ∑
ξ∈X0
∑
η∈X0
η 6=ξ
φ (ξ)φ (η)
 = ∞∑
n=0
1
n2
[
n (n− 1)
∫
S
∫
S
φ (ξ)φ (η)
λ0 (ξ)λ0 (η)
Λ0 (S)2
dηdξ
]
×P [N (S) = n]
= E
[
n− 1
n
(∫
S
φ (ξ)
λ0 (ξ)
Λ0 (S)dξ
)2]
=
(
1− E
[
1
N (S)
])
E [φ (ξ)]2
where the second equality follows from the i.i.d. condition of the Poisson process, so ξ
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and η are independent points. Therefore the variance is
V [T (X)] = E
[
1
N (S)
]
E
[
φ (ξ)2
]
+
+
(
1− E
[
1
N (S)
])
E [φ (ξ)]2
−E [φ (ξ)]2
= E
[
1
N (S)
] [
E
[
φ (ξ)2
]− E [φ (ξ)]2]
= E
[
1
N (S)
]
V [φ (ξ)]
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Consider the quantity
∑
m∈M |ρm (ξ)− ρm|. Under complete segregation, for all ξ ∈ X0,
∃m∗ ∈ M such that ρm∗ (ξ) = 1 and ρm (ξ) = 0 for any m 6= m∗. The probability of m∗ is
ρm∗ , therefore
∑
m∈M
|ρm (ξ)− ρm| = ρ1 |1− ρ1|+ (1− ρ1) |0− ρ1|+ ...
...+ ρM |1− ρM |+ (1− ρM) |0− ρM |
= 2ρ1 (1− ρ1) + ...+ 2ρM (1− ρM)
= 2
∑
m∈M
ρm (1− ρm)
= 2I
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
This proof follows the same lines of the proof for Proposition 1. Consider the quantity∑
m∈M (ρm (ξ)− ρm)2. Under complete segregation, for all ξ ∈ X0, ∃m∗ ∈ M such that
ρm∗ (ξ) = 1 and ρm (ξ) = 0 for any m 6= m∗. The probability of m∗ is ρm∗ , therefore
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d (ξs) =
∑
m∈M
(ρm (ξ
s)− ρm)2
= ρ1 (1− ρ1)2 + (1− ρ1) (0− ρ1)2 +
...+ ρM (1− ρM)2 + (1− ρM) (0− ρM)2
= ρ1 (1− ρ1) (1− ρ1 + ρ1) + ...+ ρM (1− ρM) (1− ρM + ρM)
=
∑
m∈M
ρm (1− ρm) = I
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Consider the quantity
∫
M |ρ (ξ,m)− ρ (m)| dm. For a given ξ and under complete segre-
gation, ∃m∗ = m∗ (ξ) ∈ M such that ρ (ξ,m) = δ (m−m∗). The density associated with
the realization of m∗ is ρ (m∗). Therefore we get
∫
M
|ρ (ξ,m)− ρ (m)| dm =
∫ ∞
0
ρ (m∗)
[∫ ∞
0
|δ (m−m∗)− ρ (m)| dm
]
dm∗
We can solve the integral inside to get
∫ ∞
0
|δ (m−m∗)− ρ (m)| dm = lim
ε→0
∫ m∗− ε
2
0
ρ (m) dm
+ lim
ε→0
∫ m∗+ ε
2
m∗− ε
2
|δ (m−m∗)− ρ (m)| dm+
+ lim
ε→0
∫ ∞
m∗+ ε
2
ρ (m) dm
= lim
ε→0
∫ m∗− ε
2
0
ρ (m) dm+ lim
ε→0
∫ m∗+ ε
2
m∗− ε
2
δ (m−m∗) dm
− lim
ε→0
∫ m∗+ ε
2
m∗− ε
2
ρ (m) dm+ lim
ε→0
∫ ∞
m∗+ ε
2
ρ (m) dm
By taking the limit for ε → 0, using the fact that limε→0
∫ m∗+ ε
2
m∗− ε
2
δ (m−m∗) dm = 1 and
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limε→0
∫ m∗+ ε
2
m∗− ε
2
ρ (m) dm = 0
∫ ∞
0
|δ (m−m∗)− ρ (m)| dm = 1 +
∫ m∗
0
ρ (m) dm+
∫ ∞
m∗
ρ (m) dm = 2
It follows that ∫
M
|ρ (ξ,m)− ρ (m)| dm =
∫ ∞
0
2ρ (m∗) dm∗ = 2
A.4 Artificial Cities
In Figure A.1, I show six artificial cities: A(symptotia), B(ayesia), C(lassica), D(eMoivria),
E(mpirica) and F(isheria). Each city contains 800 individuals, distributed over the square
[0, 4]× [0, 4]. There are 25% blacks (the black circles) and 75% whites (the red circles). The
grid represents the partition in neighborhoods.
For Cities A, B and C, I simulated an homogeneous Poisson Process with 50 points on
a unit square, one for blacks and a different one for whites; I used the unit squares as
neighborhoods of the cities, assigning 4 of them to be black and 12 of them to be white.
City D was constructed by simulating white locations as an HPP with 600 points over the
square [0, 4] × [0, 4]. Then I simulated blacks locations as an HPP with 200 points in the
circle of radius one, where the center of the circle coincided with the center of the city. City
E was constructed by simulating an HPP with 600 points over the square [0, 4]× [0, 4] for the
whites. Then I simulated two HPP with 100 points each over the circle of radius 1 for the
black population. This creates an irregular black neighborhood in the city, while allowing
whites to be inside the ghetto too. Finally, city F is the result of a simulation of an HPP
with 600 points over the square [0, 4]× [0, 4] for the whites and an HPP with 200 points over
the square [0, 4]× [0, 4] for the blacks. This is the perfect integrated case, according to our
framework.
I report results for the spatial dissimilarity index estimation. In Table A.1 I report the
results of estimation for the artificial cities. The bandwidth is chosen using the Diggle and
Berman (1989) procedure.
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Figure A.1: Artificial Cities
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Figure 7: CITY E
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Figure 7: CITY F
For cities A, B and C the estimated spatial dissimilarity is smaller than the traditional,
since the conditional probabilities surfaces make the estimate smoother. For cities D and E
spatial and traditional index are very close. Of course if we change the neighborhoods defini-
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Table A.1: Traditional vs Spatial Dissimilarity
Bandwidth Spatial Dism Trad. Dism
City A 2.83 0.9225333 1
City B 2.605 0.900698 1
City C 0.37 0.9061751 1
City D 2.445 0.803017 0.7816667
City E 2.85 0.8993939 0.8816667
City F 2.73 0.03108531 0.1216667
tion this does not have to hold.6 For the perfectly integrated city F, the spatial dissimilarity
measures less segregation than the standard measure.
6I computed the dissimilarity index for several different partitions of cities D and E: 4, 16, and 64
neighborhoods respectively.
For city E there is a clear increase of the index as we increase the number of neighborhoods. Surprisingly,
for city D, the value of the index is not necessarily monotonically increasing in the number of neighborhoods:
from 4 neighborhoods to 16 the index increases, while it decreases from 16 neighborhoods to 64.
This suggests another potential problem of the neighborhood-based approach: the relationship between
the scale of the partition and the index is not necessarily monotonic.
These results are available from the author
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APPENDIX B
TECHNICAL APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3
B.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
The potential is a functionQ from the space of actions to the real line such thatQ (gij, g−ij, X)−
Q
(
g′ij, g−ij, X
)
= Ui (gij, g−ij, X)−Ui
(
g′ij, g−ij, X
)
, for any ij.1 A simple computation shows
that, for any ij
Q (gij = 1, g−ij, X)−Q (gij = 0, g−ij, X) = uij + gjimij +
n∑
k=1
k 6=i,j
gjkvik +
n∑
k=1
k 6=i,j
gkivkj
= Ui (gij = 1, g−ij, X)− Ui (gij = 0, g−ij, X)
therefore Q is the potential of the network formation game. The welfare function is computed
as
W (g,X) =
n∑
i=1
Ui (g,X)
=
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
gijuij +
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
gijgjimij +
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
n∑
k=1
k 6=i,j
gijgjkvik +
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
n∑
k=1
k 6=i,j
gijgkivkj
=
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
gijuij + 2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j>i
gijgjimij +
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
n∑
k=1
k 6=i,j
gijgjkvik +
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
n∑
k=1
k 6=i,j
gijgkivkj
= Q (g,X) +
n∑
i=1
n∑
j>i
gijgjimij +
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
n∑
k=1
k 6=i,j
gijgkivkj
1 For more details and definitions see Monderer and Shapley (1996).
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Proof of Proposition 2
1) The existence of Nash equilibria follows directly from the fact that the network formation
game is a potential game with finite strategy space. (see Monderer and Shapley (1996) for
details)
2) The set of Nash equilibria is defined as the set of g∗ such that, for every i and for every
gij 6= g∗ij
Ui
(
g∗ij, g
∗
−ij, X
) ≥ Ui (gij, g∗−ij, X)
Therefore, since Q is a potential function, for every gij 6= g∗ij
Q
(
g∗ij, g
∗
−ij, X
) ≥ Q (gij, g∗−ij, X)
Therefore g∗ is a maximizer of Q. The converse is easily checked by the same reasoning.
3) Suppose gt = g∗. Since this is a Nash equilibrium, no player will be willing to change
her linking decision when her turn to play comes. Therefore, once the chain reaches a Nash
equilibrium, it cannot escape from that state.
4) The probability that the potential will increase from t to t+ 1 is
Pr
[
Q
(
gt+1, X
) ≥ Q (gt, X)] =
=
∑
i
∑
j
Pr
(
mt+1 = ij
)
Pr
[
Ui
(
gt+1ij , g
t
−ij, X
) ≥ Ui (gtij, gt−ij, X)∣∣mt+1 = ij]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1 because agents play Best Response, conditioning on mt+1
=
∑
i
∑
j
ρij = 1.
By part 3) of the proposition, a Nash network is an absorbing state of the chain. Therefore
any probability distribution that puts probability 1 on a Nash network is a stationary distri-
bution. For any initial network, the chain will converge to one of the stationary distributions.
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It follows that in the long run the model will be in a Nash network, i.e. for any g0 ∈ G
lim
t→∞
Pr
[
gt ∈ NE∣∣ g0] = 1.
Proof of Theorem 1
1. The sequence of networks [g0, g1, ...] generated by the network formation game is a markov
chain. Inspection of the transition probability proves that the chain is irreducible and
aperiodic, therefore it is ergodic. The existence of a unique stationary distribution then
follows from the ergodic theorem (see Gelman et al. (1996) for details).
2. A sufficient condition for stationarity is the detailed balance condition. In our case this
requires
Pgg′pig = Pg′gpig′ (B.1)
where
Pgg′ = Pr
(
gt+1 = g′
∣∣ gt = g)
pig = pi
(
gt = g
)
Notice that the transition from g to g′ is possible if these networks differ by only one element
gij. Otherwise the transition probability is zero and the detailed balance condition is satis-
fied. Let’s consider the nonzero probability transitions, with g = (1, g−ij) and g′ = (0, g−ij).
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Define ∆Q ≡ Q (1, g−ij, X)−Q (0, g−ij, X).
Pgg′pig = Pr
(
mt = ij
)
Pr (gij = 0| g−ij) exp [Q (1, g−ij, X)]∑
ω∈G
exp [Q (ω,X)]
= ρ (g−ij, Xi, Xj)× 1
1 + exp [∆Q]
×exp [Q (1, g−ij, X) +Q (0, g−ij, X)−Q (0, g−ij, X)]∑
ω∈G
exp [Q (ω,X)]
= ρ (g−ij, Xi, Xj)× 1
1 + exp [∆Q]
×exp [Q (1, g−ij, X)−Q (0, g−ij, X)] exp [Q (0, g−ij, X)]∑
ω∈G
exp [Q (ω,X)]
= ρ (g−ij, Xi, Xj)
exp [∆Q]
1 + exp [∆Q]
exp [Q (0, g−ij, X)]∑
ω∈G
exp [Q (ω,X)]
= Pr
(
mt = ij
)
Pr (gij = 1| g−ij) exp [Q (0, g−ij, X)]∑
ω∈G
exp [Q (ω,X)]
= Pg′gpig′
So the distribution (4.7) satisfies the detailed balance condition. Therefore it is a stationary
distribution for the network formation model. From part 1) of the proposition, we know
that the process is ergodic and it has a unique stationary distribution. Therefore pi (g,X) is
also the unique stationary distribution.
Proof of Proposition 4
The proof consists of showing that Q (g,X) can be written in the form θ′t (g,X). Consider
143
the first part of the potential
∑
i
∑
j
gijuij =
∑
i
∑
j
gij
P∑
p=1
θupHup (Xi, Xj)
=
P∑
p=1
θup
∑
i
∑
j
gijHup (Xi, Xj)
≡
P∑
p=1
θuptup (g,X)
= θ′utu (g,X)
where tup (g,X) ≡
∑
i
∑
j
gijHup (Xi, Xj), θu = (θu1, ..., θuP )
′ and tu (g,X) = (tu1(g,X), ..., tuP (g,X))′.
Analogously define θm = (θm1, θm2, ..., θmL)
′ and tm(g,X) = (tm1(g,X), tm2(g,X), ..., tmL(g,X))′
and θv = (θv1, θv2, ..., θvS)
′ and tv (g,X) = (tv1 (g,X) , tv2 (g,X) , ..., tvS (g,X))
′. It follows
that
∑
i
∑
j>i
gijgjimij =
∑
i
∑
j>i
gijgji
L∑
l=1
θmlHml (Xi, Xj)
=
L∑
l=1
θml
∑
i
∑
j>i
gijgjiHml (Xi, Xj)
=
L∑
l=1
θmltml (g,X)
= θ′mtm (g,X)
and
∑
i
∑
j
gij
∑
k 6=i,j
gjkvij =
∑
i
∑
j
gij
∑
k 6=i,j
gjk
S∑
s=1
θvsHvs (Xi, Xk)
=
S∑
s=1
θvs
∑
i
∑
j
gij
∑
k 6=i,j
gjkHvs (Xi, Xk)
=
S∑
s=1
θvstvs (g,X)
= θ′vtv (g,X)
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ThereforeQ (g,X) can be written in the form θ′t (g,X), where θ = (θu, θm, θv)
′ and t (g,X) =
[tu (g,X) , tm (g,X) , tv (g,X)]
′
Q (g,X) = θ′utu (g,X) + θ
′
mtm (g,X) + θ
′
vtv (g,X)
= θ′t (g,X)
and the stationary distribution is
pi (g,X) =
exp [θ′t (g,X)]∑
ω∈G
exp [θ′t (ω,X)]
.
B.2 Computational Details
B.2.1 Network Simulation
The algorithm used to simulate the network produces samples from the stationary equilib-
rium of the model. This is the result of Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. 1. The network simulation algorithm satisfies the detailed balance condition for the
stationary distribution 4.7. Indeed for any given θ
Pr (g′|g,X, θ) pi (g,X, θ) = qg (g′|g) min
{
1,
exp [Q (g′, X, θ)]
exp [Q (g,X, θ)]
qg (g|g′)
qg (g′|g)
}
exp [Q (g,X, θ)]
c (G, X, θ)
= min
{
qg (g
′|g) exp [Q (g,X, θ)]
c (G, X, θ) ,
exp [Q (g′, X, θ)]
c (G, X, θ) qg (g|g
′)
}
= qg (g|g′) min
{
qg (g
′|g)
qg (g|g′)
exp [Q (g,X, θ)]
c (G, X, θ) ,
exp [Q (g′, X, θ)]
c (G, X, θ)
}
= qg (g|g′) min
{
qg (g
′|g)
qg (g|g′)
exp [Q (g,X, θ)]
exp [Q (g′, X, θ)]
, 1
}
exp [Q (g′, X, θ)]
c (G, X, θ)
= Pr (g|g′, X, θ) pi (g′, X, θ)
This concludes the proof.
2. The algorithm generates a Markov Chain of network with finite state space. The chain
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is irreducible and aperiodic and therefore it is uniformly ergodic (see Theorem 4.9, page 52
in Levin et al. (2008)).
3. The bound to the convergence rate was derived by Diaconis and Stroock (1991), for
reversible finite chains (see Proposition 3 in their paper).
The algorithm has a very useful property that can be exploited in the posterior sim-
ulation to reduce the computational burden. Adapting the suggestion in Liang (2010),
define P(R)θ′ (g′|g) as the transition probability of a Markov chain that generates g′ with R
Metropolis-Hastings updates of the network simulation algorithm, starting at the observed
network g and using the proposed parameter θ′. Then,
P(R)θ′ (g′|g) = Pθ′(g1|g)Pθ′(g2|g1) · · · Pθ′(g′|gR−1), (B.2)
where Pθ′(gj|gi) = qg(gj|gi)αmh(gi, gj) is the transition probability of the network simulation
algorithm above. Since the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm satisfies the detailed balance
condition, we can prove the following
LEMMA 1 Simulate a network g′ from the stationary distribution pi (·, X, θ′) using a Metropo-
lis Hastings algorithm starting at the network g observed in the data. Then
P(R)θ′ (g|g′)
P(R)θ′ (g′|g)
=
exp [Q(g,X, θ′)]
exp [Q(g′, X, θ′)]
(B.3)
for all R, g, g′ ∈ G and for any θ′ ∈ Θ.
Proof. Let P(R)θ′ (g′|g) be defined as in (B.2). This is the transition probability of the chain
that generates g′ with R Metropolis-Hastings updates, starting at the observed network g
and using the proposed parameter θ′. Notice that the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm satisfies
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the detailed balance for pi (g,X, θ′), therefore we have
P(R)θ′ (g|g′)pi (g′, X, θ′) = Pθ′(gR−1|g′)Pθ′(gR−2|gR−1) · · · Pθ′(g|g1)pi (g′, X, θ′)
= Pθ′(g1|g)Pθ′(g2|g1) · · · Pθ′(g′|gR−1)pi (g,X, θ′)
= P(R)θ′ (g′|g)pi (g,X, θ′)
It follows that
P(R)θ′ (g|g′)
P(R)θ′ (g′|g)
=
pi (g,X, θ′)
pi (g′, X, θ′)
=
exp [Q(g,X, θ′)]
exp [Q(g′, X, θ′)]
c (G, X, θ′)
c (G, X, θ′)
=
exp [Q(g,X, θ′)]
exp [Q(g′, X, θ′)]
.
This concludes the proof.
One should notice that as long as the algorithm is started from the network g observed in
the data (which is assumed to be a draw from the stationary equilibrium of the model), the
equality in (B.3) is satisfied for any R.
The approximate exchange algorithm presented in this paper removes the requirement of
exact sampling by exploiting the property of the stationary equilibrium characterization,
described in Lemma 1.
B.2.2 Posterior Simulation
In this section I provide the technical details for the algorithm proposed in the empirical
part of the paper. The first set of results show that the exchange algorithm generate (ap-
proximate) samples from the posterior distribution (3.16).
The original exchange algorithm developed in Murray et al. (2006) is slightly different
from the one used here. The main modification is in Step 2: the original algorithm requires
an exact sample from the stationary equilibrium of the model.
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ALGORITHM 3 (EXACT EXCHANGE ALGORITHM)
Start at current parameter θt = θ and network data g.
1. Propose a new parameter vector θ′
θ′ ∼ qθ(·|θ) (B.4)
2. Draw an exact sample network g′ from the likelihood
g′ ∼ pi (·|X, θ′) (B.5)
3. Compute the acceptance ratio
αex (θ, θ
′, g′, g) = min
{
1,
exp [Q(g′, X, θ)]
exp [Q(g,X, θ)]
p (θ′)
p (θ)
qθ (θ|θ′)
qθ (θ′|θ)
exp [Q(g,X, θ′)]
exp [Q(g′, X, θ′)]
c(θ)c(θ′)
c(θ)c(θ′)
}
= min
{
1,
exp [Q(g′, X, θ)]
exp [Q(g,X, θ)]
p (θ′)
p (θ)
qθ (θ|θ′)
qθ (θ′|θ)
exp [Q(g,X, θ′)]
exp [Q(g′, X, θ′)]
}
(B.6)
4. Update the parameter according to
θt+1 =
 θ′ with prob. αex (θ, θ′, g′, g)θ with prob. 1− αex (θ, θ′, g′, g) (B.7)
The difference between this algorithm and the approximate one is in step 2. The exact
and approximate algorithms use the same acceptance ratio αex (θ, θ
′, g′, g), a consequence of
LEMMA 1. Indeed the acceptance ratio for the approximate algorithm is
α˜ex (θ, θ
′, g′, g) = min
{
1,
exp [Q(g′, X, θ)]
exp [Q(g,X, θ)]
p (θ′)
p (θ)
qθ (θ|θ′)
qθ (θ′|θ)
P(R)θ′ (g|g′)
P(R)θ′ (g′|g)
}
(B.8)
= min
{
1,
exp [Q(g′, X, θ)]
exp [Q(g,X, θ)]
p (θ′)
p (θ)
qθ (θ|θ′)
qθ (θ′|θ)
exp [Q(g,X, θ′)]
exp [Q(g′, X, θ′)]
}
(B.9)
= αex (θ, θ
′, g′, g) (B.10)
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This result implies that to prove the convergence of the approximate algorithm to the exact
algorithm, there is no need to prove convergence of α˜ex (θ, θ
′, g′, g) to αex (θ, θ′, g′, g). The
convergence of step 2 of the algorithm is sufficient.
Preliminary Lemmas for THEOREM 2
The convergence of the approximate exchange algorithm to the correct posterior distribution
is proven in 4 steps.
1. First we prove that the exact exchange algorithm converges to the correct posterior
(LEMMA 2)
2. Second, we prove that the approximate algorithm has a stationary distribution and it
is ergodic (LEMMA 3, similar to the one in Liang 2010)
3. Third, we prove that the transition kernel of the approximate and exact algorithms
are arbitrarily close for a large enough number of network simulations (LEMMA 4)
4. Fourth, we combine previous results to prove that the approximate algorithm converges
to the correct posterior
A similar proof strategy is contained in Liang et al. (2010) and Andrieu and Roberts (2009).
Let Q (dϑ|θ) = qθ (ϑ|θ) ν (dϑ). The transition kernel of the exact exchange algorithm can be
written as
P (θ, dϑ) =
[∑
g′∈G
pi (g′, ϑ)αex (θ, ϑ, g′, g)
]
Q (θ, dϑ)
+ δθ (dϑ)
{
1−
∫
Θ
[∑
g′∈G
pi (g′, ϑ)αex (θ, ϑ, g′, g)
]
Q (θ, dϑ)
}
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and the transition kernel of the approximate exchange algorithm can be written as
P˜R (θ, dϑ) =
[∑
g′∈G
P(R)ϑ (g′|g)αex (θ, ϑ, g′, g)
]
Q (θ, dϑ)
+ δθ (dϑ)
{
1−
∫
Θ
[∑
g′∈G
P(R)ϑ (g′|g)αex (θ, ϑ, g′, g)
]
Q (θ, dϑ)
}
Let η (θ) be the average rejection probability for the approximate algorithm, i.e.
η (θ) := 1−
∫
Θ
[∑
g′∈G
P(R)ϑ (g′|g)αex (θ, ϑ, g′, g)
]
Q (θ, dϑ) (B.11)
The next lemma proves that the transition kernel satisfies the detailed balance condition for
the posterior distribution. For any pair of parameters (θ, ϑ) ∈ Θ we have
P [θ, ϑ|g,X] p (θ|g,X) = Pr [θ|ϑ, g,X] p (ϑ|g,X) (B.12)
The detailed balance condition is sufficient condition for the Markov chain generated by the
algorithm to have stationary distribution the posterior (3.16) (for details see Robert and
Casella (2005) or Gelman et al. (2003)).
LEMMA 2 The exchange algorithm produces a Markov chain with invariant distribution
(3.16).
Proof. Define Z ≡ ∫
Θ
pi (g|X, θ) p (θ) dθ. In the algorithm the probability Pr [ϑ|θ, g,X]
of transition to θj, given the current parameter θ and the observed data (g,X), can be
computed as
Pr [ϑ|θ, g,X] = qθ (ϑ|θ) exp [Q(g
′, X, ϑ)]
c(G, X, ϑ) αex (θ, ϑ, g
′, g) . (B.13)
This is the probability qθ (ϑ|θ) of proposing ϑ times the probability of generating the new
network g′ from the model’s stationary distribution, exp[Q(g
′,X,ϑ)]
c(G,X,ϑ) and accepting the proposed
150
parameter αex (θ, ϑ, g
′, g). Therefore the left-hand side of (B.12) can be written as
Pr [ϑ|θ, g,X] p (θ|g,X) = qθ (ϑ|θ) exp [Q(g
′, X, ϑ)]
c(G, X, ϑ) αex (θ, ϑ, g
′, g) p (θ|g,X)
= qθ (ϑ|θ) exp [Q(g
′, X, ϑ)]
c(G, X, ϑ) αex (θ, ϑ, g
′, g)
exp[Q(g,X,θ)]
c(G,X,θ) p (θ)
Z
= qθ (ϑ|θ) exp [Q(g
′, X, ϑ)]
c(G, X, ϑ)
× min
{
1,
exp [Q(g′, X, θ)]
exp [Q(g,X, θ)]
p (ϑ)
p (θ)
qθ (θ|ϑ)
qθ (ϑ|θ)
exp [Q(g,X, ϑ)]
exp [Q(g′, X, ϑ)]
}
×
exp[Q(g,X,θ)]
c(G,X,θ) p (θ)
Z
= min{qθ (ϑ|θ) exp [Q(g
′, X, ϑ)]
c(G, X, ϑ)
exp [Q(g,X, θ)]
c(G, X, θ)
p (θ)
Z ,
qθ (θ|ϑ) exp [Q(g
′, X, θ]
c(G, X, θ)
exp [Q(g,X, ϑ)]
c(G, X, ϑ)
p (ϑ)
Z }
= qθ (θ|ϑ) exp [Q(g
′, X, θ)]
c(G, X, θ)
exp [Q(g,X, ϑ)]
c(G, X, ϑ)
p (ϑ)
Z ×
× min
{
1,
exp [Q(g′, X, ϑ)]
exp [Q(g,X, ϑ)]
p (θ)
p (ϑ)
qθ (ϑ|θ)
qθ (θ|ϑ)
exp [Q(g,X, θ)]
exp [Q(g′, X, θ)]
}
= qθ (θ|ϑ) exp [Q(g
′, X, θ)]
c(G, X, θ) α(ϑ, θ, g
′, g)
exp [Q(g,X, ϑ)]
c(G, X, ϑ)
p (ϑ)
Z
= qθ (θ|ϑ) exp [Q(g
′, X, θ)]
c(G, X, θ) α(ϑ, θ, g
′, g)p (ϑ|g,X)
= Pr [θ|ϑ, g,X] p (ϑ|g,X)
The latter step proves the detailed balance for a generic network g′. Since the condition is
satisfied for any network g′, detailed balance follows from summing over all possible networks.
LEMMA 3 (The approximate algorithm is ergodic)
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Assume the exact exchange algorithm is ergodic and that for any ϑ ∈ Θ
P(R)ϑ (g′|g)
pi (g′, ϑ)
> 0 for any g′ ∈ G (B.14)
Then for any R ∈ N such that for any θ ∈ Θ , ρ(θ) > 0, the transition kernel of the
approximate algorithm P˜R is also irreducible and aperiodic, and there exists a stationary
distribution p˜ (θ) such that
lim
s→∞
∥∥∥P˜ (s)R (θ0, ·)− p˜ (θ)∥∥∥
TV
= 0 (B.15)
Proof. The exact algorithm with transition kernel P is an irreducible and aperiodic Markov
chain. To prove that the approximate algorithm with transition kernel P˜R defines an ergodic
Markov chain, it is sufficient to prove that the set of accessible states of P are also included
in those of P˜R. The proof proceeds by induction.
Formally, we need to show that for any s ∈ N, θ ∈ Θ and A ∈ B (Θ) such that P (s) (θ, A) > 0,
implies P˜
(s)
R (θ, A) > 0.
Notice that for any θ ∈ Θ and A ∈ B (Θ),
P˜R (θ, A) =
∫
A
[∑
g′∈G
P(R)ϑ (g′|g)αex (θ, ϑ, g′, g)
]
qθ (ϑ|θ) dϑ+ I (θ ∈ A) η (θ)
≥
∫
A
[∑
g′∈G
min
{
1,
P(R)ϑ (g′|g)
pi (g′, ϑ)
}
pi (g′, ϑ)αex (θ, ϑ, g′, g)
]
qθ (ϑ|θ) dϑ
+I (θ ∈ A) η (θ) > 0
where the last inequality comes from
P(R)ϑ (g′|g)
pi(g′,ϑ) > 0 for any g
′ ∈ G and ϑ ∈ Θ.
This proves that the statement is true when s = 1. By induction we assume that it is true
up to s = n ≥ 1 and for some θ ∈ Θ chose A ∈ B (Θ) such that P (n+1) (θ, A) > 0 and assume
that ∫
Θ
P˜
(n)
R (θ, dϑ) P˜R (ϑ,A) = 0
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This implies that P˜R (ϑ,A) = 0, P˜
(n)
R (θ, ·)-a.s.; by the induction assumption at s = 1 it
follows that P (ϑ,A) = 0, P˜
(n)
R (θ, ·)-a.s.
From this and the induction assumption at s = n, P (ϑ,A) = 0, P (n) (θ, ·)-a.s. (assume not,
then P (ϑ,A) > 0, P (n) (θ, ·)-a.s. which by induction would imply P˜R (ϑ,A) > 0, which is a
contradiction). The latter step contradicts P (n+1) (θ, A) > 0 and the result follows.
The next step consists of proving that the transition kernel of the approximate algorithm
P˜R (θ, ϑ) and the exact algorithm P (θ, ϑ) are arbitrarily close for a large enough number
of network simulations R. Formally we prove a statement which is equivalent to proving
convergence in total variation norm.2
LEMMA 4 (Convergence of the exact and approximate transition kernels)
Let  ∈ (0, 1]. There exists a number of simulations R0 ∈ N such that for any function
φ : Θ→ [−1, 1] and any R > R0 ,
∣∣∣P˜Rφ(θ)− Pφ(θ)∣∣∣ < 2 (B.16)
Proof. The transition of the exchange algorithm is
P (φ(θ), φ(ϑ)) =
∫
Θ
φ(ϑ)
[∑
g′∈G
pi (g′, ϑ)αex (θ, ϑ, g′, g)
]
qθ (ϑ|θ) dϑ
+ φ(θ)
[
1−
∫
Θ
[∑
g′∈G
pi (g′, ϑ)αex (θ, ϑ, g′, g)
]
qθ (ϑ|θ) dϑ
]
while the transition kernel for the approximate algorithm is
P˜R (φ(θ), φ(ϑ)) =
∫
Θ
φ(ϑ)
[∑
g′∈G
P(R)ϑ (g′|g)αex (θ, ϑ, g′, g)
]
qθ (ϑ|θ) dϑ
+ φ(θ)
[
1−
∫
Θ
[∑
g′∈G
P(R)ϑ (g′|g)αex (θ, ϑ, g′, g)
]
qθ (ϑ|θ) dϑ
]
2See Levin et al. (2008), proposition 4.5, page 49.
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and therefore the difference is
S = P (φ(θ), φ(ϑ))− P˜R (φ(θ), φ(ϑ))
=
∫
Θ
φ(ϑ)
[∑
g′∈G
[
pi (g′, ϑ)− P(R)ϑ (g′|g)
]
αex (θ, ϑ, g
′, g)
]
qθ (ϑ|θ) dϑ
− φ(θ)
∫
Θ
[∑
g′∈G
[
pi (g′, ϑ)− P(R)ϑ (g′|g)
]
αex (θ, ϑ, g
′, g)
]
qθ (ϑ|θ) dϑ
Consider the quantity
S0 =
∫
Θ
[∑
g′∈G
[
pi (g′, ϑ)− P(R)ϑ (g′|g)
]
αex (θ, ϑ, g
′, g)
]
qθ (ϑ|θ) dϑ
≤
∫
Θ
[∑
g′∈G
∣∣∣pi (g′, ϑ)− P(R)ϑ (g′|g)∣∣∣αex (θ, ϑ, g′, g)
]
qθ (ϑ|θ) dϑ
and since αex (θ, ϑ, g
′, g) ≤ 1 for any (θ, ϑ) ∈ Θ×Θ and (g′, g) ∈ G × G, we have
S0 ≤
∫
Θ
[∑
g′∈G
∣∣∣pi (g′, ϑ)− P(R)ϑ (g′|g)∣∣∣
]
qθ (ϑ|θ) dϑ
=
∫
Θ
[
2 sup
g′∈G
∣∣∣pi (g′, ϑ)− P(R)ϑ (g′|g)∣∣∣] qθ (ϑ|θ) dϑ
The convergence of the network simulation algorithm implies that for any ε > 0, there exists
an R0 (ϑ, ε) ∈ N such that for any R > R0 (ϑ, ε) and for any g ∈ G
2 sup
g′∈G
∣∣∣pi (g′, ϑ)− P(R)ϑ (g′|g)∣∣∣ ≤ ε
Pick R0 (ε) = maxϑ∈Θ {R0 (ϑ, ε)}. Then for any  ∈ (0, 1], there is an R0 () ∈ N such that
for any R > R0 () and for any g ∈ G
S0 ≤
∫
Θ
qθ (ϑ|θ) dϑ = 
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This implies that
|S| ≤ |2S0| = 2
(B.17)
The next theorem is the main result for the convergence. It states that the approximate ex-
change algorithm converges to the correct posterior distribution, provided that the number
of network simulations and parameter samples are big enough.
Proof of THEOREM 2
. Proof. The main idea is to decompose the total variation in two components
∥∥∥P˜ (s)R (θ0, ·)− p (·|g,X)∥∥∥
TV
=
∥∥∥P˜ (s)R (θ0, ·)− P (s) (θ0, ·) + P (s) (θ0, ·)− p (·|g,X)∥∥∥
TV
≤
∥∥∥P˜ (s)R (θ0, ·)− P (s) (θ0, ·)∥∥∥
TV
+
∥∥P (s) (θ0, ·)− p (·|g,X)∥∥TV
and prove that each component converges. We will use the same idea, but rewrite the total
variation in a more convenient form.3 For any function φ : Θ→ [−1, 1] we have
∣∣∣P˜ (s)R φ (θ0)− p (φ)∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣P˜ (s)R φ (θ0)− P (s)φ (θ0) + P (s)φ (θ0)− p (φ)∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣P˜ (s)R φ (θ0)− P (s)φ (θ0)∣∣∣+ ∣∣P (s)φ (θ0)− p (φ)∣∣
The second component converges because the exact exchange algorithm is ergodic, as stated
in Lemma. For any ε > 0 there is number of simulation steps s(θ0, ε), such that for any
s ≥ s(θ0, ε) ∣∣P (s)φ (θ0)− p (φ)∣∣ ≤ ε (B.18)
3See Levin et al. (2008), proposition 4.5, page 49.
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For the remaining of the proof, I will set s0 := s(θ0, ε). I use the telescoping sum decompo-
sition in Andrieu and Roberts (2009) (page 15, adapted from last formula)
∣∣∣P˜ (s0)R φ (θ0)− P (s0)φ (θ0)∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
s0−1∑
l=0
[
P (l)P˜
(s0−l)
R φ (θ0)− P (l+1)P˜ (s0−(l+1))R φ (θ0)
]∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
s0−1∑
l=0
P (l)
(
P˜R − P
)
P˜
(s0−(l+1))
R φ (θ0)
∣∣∣∣∣
Now we can apply s0 times the result of LEMMA 4 (as in Liang et al. (2010) and Andrieu and
Roberts (2009)) to prove that there exists an R0 (θ0, ε) ∈ N such that for any R > R0 (θ0, ε)
∣∣∣P˜ (s0)R φ (θ0)− P (s0)φ (θ0)∣∣∣ ≤ 2s0ε (B.19)
this implies ∣∣∣P˜ (s)R φ (θ0)− p (φ)∣∣∣ ≤ (2s0 + 1) ε (B.20)
We conclude the proof by choosing ε = / (2s0 + 1).
This proves that the approximate exchange algorithm is ergodic, therefore the law of large
number holds, and the second part of the theorem is proven.
B.2.3 Convergence Experiments
In this section, I provide an overview of the convergence properties of the algorithm using
examples with artificial data. Assume a toy model with three parameters, with an utility
function of the following form
Ui(g,X) =
n∑
j=1
gijθ1 +
n∑
j=1
gijgjiθ2 +
n∑
j=1
gij
n∑
k 6=i,j;k=1
gjkθ3 +
n∑
j=1
gij
n∑
k 6=i,j;k=1
gkiθ3 (B.21)
The artificial data are generated using the vector of parameters
θ = (−2.0, 0.5, 0.01) (B.22)
156
Figure B.1: Convergence to the high density posterior region
Each graph shows convergence to the high density region of the posterior distribution. The curves with
different colors represent chains started at overdispersed initial values. The solid black line represent the
parameter that generated the data. Convergence is very fast and we can use the initial 2000 iterations as
burn-in. In this example the network has n = 50 agents and the number of network simulations per proposal
is R = 3000.
To obtain the network dataset for the estimation, the network simulation algorithm is started
at a random network and then ran for 1 million iterations. The initial random network is
generated by assuming each link is independent and the probability of a link is p = .2. The
last iteration of this long simulation is used as dataset in all the estimation exercises below.
I report results for networks with n = 50 and n = 100 agents.
To check if the exchange algorithm converges to the correct region of the parameter
space, the parameter simulations are started from 5 over-dispersed starting values
θ1 = (−2.0, 0.5, 0.01)
θ2 = (−10.0, 5.0, 1.0)
θ3 = (10.0,−5.0,−1.0)
θ4 = (−3.0,−0.05, 0.3)
θ5 = (−20.0, 15.0,−0.3)
In Figure B.1, I display the convergence of the simulations to the high density region of the
posterior. In this example the number of network simulations for each parameter proposal
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Figure B.2: Convergence, autocorrelation functions
Each graph is the autocorrelation function of the chains generated by the exchange algorithm.
is R = 3000.4 The solid horizontal black line represents the parameter that generated the
data. Each color represents a simulation started at one of the initial values above. After 2000
iterations all the chains have reached approximate convergence to the region of the posterior
that contains the data generating parameters. In Figure B.2, I show the autocorrelation
functions for the same example. In this example the autocorrelation disappears after 200
lags. This is mainly due to the small amount of parameters in this toy model. High-
dimensional models show more persistent autocorrelation of the chains. As a consequence,
the length of the simulations for the empirical application is much longer. In Figure B.3
I show the same convergence properties of Figure B.1 by plotting two parameters in each
graph. I show 3 snapshots of the simulations: at 500, 1000 and 2000 iterations. The dashed
lines intersect at the parameter values that generated the data. After 500 iterations (Panel
A) almost all chains have converged to the high density region. The purple chain converges
after 2000 iterations: this is because this chain corresponds to the 5th starting value, which
is the quite far from the parameter that generated the network. Table B.1 reports the result
4Similar results hold for different R values.
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Figure B.3: Convergence of the simulations
Panel A. 500 iterations
Panel B. 1000 iterations
Panel C. 2000 iterations
Three snapshots of the simulations at 500, 1000 and 2000 iterations of the fast exchange algorithm. The
true parameter value is indicated by the intersection of the dashed lines. After 500 iterations only few chains
have converged close to the true parameters. After 1000 the remaining chains have almost reached the high
density region of the posterior. At 2000 iterations the algorithm has reached approximate convergence for
all the chains.
of estimations using different network simulation lengths, with a network of n = 50 players.
The table suggests that R = 1000 is maybe too small, while there is not much difference
among the remaining estimation results. In Table B.2, I show similar results for a network
with n = 100 players and starting the simulations at a parameter vector (-20.0,15.0,-0.3).5
For this network size, R = 3000 would sufficient. This is the amount of simulation used in
the empirical application.
In summary, convergence in this toy model is quite fast. For high-dimensional models
5Similar results hold for alternative starting values.
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Table B.1: Convergence Experiments, n = 50
Starting value: (-2.00,0.50,0.01)
true R=1000 R=2000 R=3000 R=5000
θ1 -2.000 mean -2.0165 -2.0643 -2.077 -2.0838
s.d. 0.2629 0.2018 0.1845 0.1635
mc s.e. 0.0125 0.0069 0.0063 0.0051
θ2 0.500 mean 0.5387 0.6083 0.6207 0.6158
s.d. 0.5519 0.4435 0.4144 0.4076
mc s.e. 0.0338 0.0294 0.0189 0.0279
θ3 0.010 mean 0.0043 0.0121 0.0147 0.0175
s.d. 0.0262 0.0201 0.0187 0.0165
mc s.e. 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Starting value: (-10.0,5.0,1.0)
true R=1000 R=2000 R=3000 R=5000
θ1 -2.000 mean -2.0131 -2.0651 -2.0688 -2.0673
s.d. 0.2643 0.2013 0.1814 0.1655
mc s.e. 0.0137 0.0067 0.0057 0.0046
θ2 0.500 mean 0.5542 0.6181 0.6149 0.6571
s.d. 0.5506 0.4425 0.4228 0.4046
mc s.e. 0.0363 0.0279 0.029 0.022
θ3 0.010 mean 0.0041 0.0119 0.0143 0.0157
s.d. 0.0267 0.0201 0.0185 0.0167
mc s.e. 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Starting value: (10.0,-5.0,-1.0)
true R=1000 R=2000 R=3000 R=5000
θ1 -2.000 mean -2.0287 -2.0583 -2.0656 -2.0686
s.d. 0.2548 0.2072 0.1883 0.164
mc s.e. 0.0099 0.0081 0.0085 0.0043
θ2 0.500 mean 0.5723 0.6028 0.6275 0.6593
s.d. 0.5418 0.4473 0.4084 0.3844
mc s.e. 0.034 0.0224 0.0283 0.0207
θ3 0.010 mean 0.0058 0.0113 0.0128 0.016
s.d. 0.0255 0.0211 0.0203 0.0167
mc s.e. 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Starting value: (-3.0,-0.05,0.3)
true R=1000 R=2000 R=3000 R=5000
θ1 -2.000 mean -2.016 -2.0727 -2.0884 -2.0724
s.d. 0.2574 0.2033 0.1842 0.1625
mc s.e. 0.01 0.0064 0.007 0.0051
θ2 0.500 mean 0.5612 0.5993 0.6354 0.6576
s.d. 0.5436 0.4442 0.4163 0.4044
mc s.e. 0.0346 0.027 0.0252 0.0256
θ3 0.010 mean 0.0047 0.0128 0.0158 0.0162
s.d. 0.0254 0.0205 0.0181 0.0165
mc s.e. 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Convergence experiments using artificial data. The network contains n = 50 players and the data are
generated by 1 million iterations of the simulation algorithm using the true parameters. The posterior is
estimated using different lengths R of the network simulation algorithm. The table reports the estimated
posterior mean, standard deviation and Monte Carlo standard error for the posterior mean.
convergence is slower, but reasonable, in the order of 50 or 100 thousands iterations. One
possible strategy is to use a small R for the initial simulations: when the chain reaches
approximate convergence we can increase the number of network simulations and estimate
the posterior with higher precision.
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Table B.2: Convergence Experiments, n = 100
Starting value: (-20.0,15.0,-0.3)
true R=1000 R=3000 R=5000 R=10000 R=30000 R=50000 R=100000
θ1 -2.000 mean -2.0783 -2.0989 -2.0892 -2.0789 -2.0938 -2.0874 -2.1055
s.d. 0.2613 0.1375 0.1101 0.091 0.0632 0.0703 0.0823
mcse 0.0111 0.0015 0.0031 0.0025 0.0018 0.0016 0.0026
θ2 0.500 mean 0.341 0.5835 0.5627 0.5909 0.6475 0.6396 0.6201
s.d. 0.7119 0.3499 0.343 0.2751 0.2284 0.2612 0.3127
mcse 0.081 0.0176 0.0335 0.028 0.0253 0.0436 0.0364
θ3 0.010 mean 0.006 0.0096 0.0105 0.0111 0.0113 0.0124 0.0119
s.d. 0.0114 0.0065 0.0051 0.0042 0.0032 0.0031 0.0031
mcse 0.000020 0.000005 0.000005 0.000007 0.000003 0.000005 0.000005
Convergence experiments using artificial data. The network contains n = 100 players and the data are
generated by 1 million iterations of the simulation algorithm using the true parameters. The posterior is
estimated using different lengths R of the network simulation algorithm. The table reports the estimated
posterior mean, standard deviation and Monte Carlo standard error for the posterior mean.
B.2.4 Parallel estimation with multiple networks
When data from multiple independent networks are available the estimation routines are
easily adapted. Assume the researcher has data from C networks: let gc and Xc denote the
network matrix and the individual controls for network c, c = 1, ..., C. The aggregate data
are denoted as g = {g1, ..., gc} and X = {X1, ..., Xc}.
Assuming each network is drawn from the stationary equilibrium of the model, each net-
work has distribution
pi (gc, Xc, θ) =
exp [Q (gc, Xc, θ)]∑
ω∈Gc
exp [Q (ωc, Xc, θ)]
(B.23)
Since each network is independent, the likelihood of the data (g,X) can be written as
pi (g,X, θ) =
C∏
c=1
pi (gc, Xc, θ) =
C∏
c=1
{
exp [Q (gc, Xc, θ)]
c (Gc, Xc, θ)
}
=
exp
[∑C
c=1Q (gc, Xc, θ)
]
∏C
c=1 c (Gc, Xc, θ)
=
exp
[∑C
c=1Q (gc, Xc, θ)
]
C (G, X, θ)
where G = ⋃Cc=1 Gc and X = {X1, ..., XC}. The likelihood for multiple independent networks
is of the same form as the likelihood for one network observation. The structure of this like-
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lihood makes parallelization extremely easy: each network can be simulated independently
using the network simulation algorithm; at the end of the simulation we collect the last
network and compute the potential; then we compute the sum of potentials and use it to
compute the probability of update.
Therefore, the algorithm is modified as follows
ALGORITHM 4 (Parallel FAST EXCHANGE ALGORITHM)
Fix the number of simulations R. Store each network data (gc, Xc) in a different proces-
sor/core. At each iteration t, with current parameter θt = θ and network data g
1. Propose a new parameter θ′ from a distribution qθ(·|θ)
θ′ ∼ qθ(·|θ) (B.24)
2. For each processor c, start ALGORITHM 1 at the observed network gc, iterating
for R steps using parameter θ′ and collect the last simulated network g′c
g′c ∼ P(R)θ′ (g′c|gc) (B.25)
3. Update the parameter according to
θt+1 =
 θ′ with prob. αpex (θ, θ′)θ with prob. 1− αpex (θ, θ′)
where
αpex(θ, θ
′) = min
1, exp
[∑C
c=1Q(g
′
c, Xc, θ)
]
exp
[∑C
c=1Q(gc, Xc, θ)
] p (θ′)
p (θ)
qθ (θ|θ′)
qθ (θ′|θ)
exp
[∑C
c=1Q(gc, Xc, θ
′)
]
exp
[∑C
c=1Q(g
′
c, Xc, θ
′)
]

The speed of the algorithm depends on the largest network in the data. Since each parameter
update requires the result of each processor simulation there is some idle time, since small
networks are simulated much faster.
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B.2.5 Freeman Segregation Index
The Freeman segregation index measures the degree of segregation in a population with
two groups (Freeman, 1972). Assume there are two groups, A and B. Let nAB be the total
number of links that individuals of group A form to individuals of group B. Let nBA, nBB
and nAA be analogously defined. The original index developed by Freeman (1972) is defined
as
FSI =
E [nAB] + E [nBA]− (nAB + nBA)
E [nAB] + E [nBA]
(B.26)
When the link formation does not depend on the identity of individuals, then the links
should be randomly distributed with respect to identity. Therefore, the index measures the
difference between the expected and actual number of links among individuals of different
groups, as a fraction of the expected links. An index of 0 means that the actual network
closely resembles one in which links are formed at random. Higher values indicate more
segregation. In this paper segregation is measured using the index6
SEG = max {0, FSI} (B.27)
The index varies between 0 and 1, where the maximum corresponds to a network in which
there are no cross-group links.
To complete the derivation of the index, the expected number of cross-group links is
computed as
E [nAB] =
(nAA + nAB) (nAB + nBB)
nAA + nAB + nBA + nBB
E [nBA] =
(nBA + nBB) (nAA + nBA)
nAA + nAB + nBA + nBB
6The index (B.26) varies between -1 and 1. However, the interpretation of the index when it assumes
negative values is not clear. Therefore Freeman (1972) suggests to use only when it is nonnegative, to
measure the presence of segregation
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B.3 Extensions
It is possible to incorporate unobserved heterogeneity or random coefficients in the model.
However this would significantly increase the computational cost of estimation. The sim-
plest way to introduce unobserved heterogeneity is to model the preference shock εij as
incorporating individual random effects. In our application of school friendship networks
the unobserved quality of the student could be interpreted as ”coolness” or personality or
attractiveness. The decision of the player to form a link is modified as follows
Ui (gij = 1, g−ij, X) + ηi + ηj + νij1 ≥ Ui (gij = 0, g−ij, X) + ηi + νij0 (B.28)
where νij is an i.i.d. shock with logistic distribution and the vector η = {η1, ..., ηn} is drawn
at time 0 from a known distribution W (η). In this formulation I assume that the players
observe the random effect η but the econometrician does not. Notice that the random effect
of player i cancels out, while the choice of linking j is conditional on the random effect of
player j (which is present only when the link is formed).
Conditioning on the realization of the vector η ∈ Υ, the potential function is modified as
follows
Q (g,X, θ; η) = Q (g,X, θ) +
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
gijηj (B.29)
To compute the unconditional likelihood we need to integrate out the unobserved vector η
to obtain
pi (g,X, θ) =
∫
Υ
exp [Q (g,X, θ; η)]∑
ω∈G exp [Q (ω,X, θ; η)]
dW (η) (B.30)
The integral above can be computed using Monte Carlo techniques, as it is standard in the
IO literature or labor economics. However, the model does not allow standard Monte Carlo,
because of the normalizing constant.
A more feasible strategy is to use data augmentation and Markov Chain Monte Carlo
methods as in the discrete choice literature (Rossi et al. (1996), Athey and Imbens (2007)).
Conditioning on the realization of the unobserved component η, we can use the exchange
algorithm to sample from the posterior distribution of θ. Conditioning on the proposed θ
164
we can use a metropolis hastings step to sample the unobserved component η.
Given an initial (θ, η) at simulation s, we propose a new θ′ and use the exchange algorithm
to accept or reject the proposal. Given the new value of θs+1, we propose a new vector of
unobserved components η′ and accept using a Metropolis Hastings step. The probability of
η, conditioning on (θ, g,X) is
Pr (η|g,X, θ) = W (η) pi (g,X, θ; η)
pi (g,X, θ)
(B.31)
The Metropolis-Hastings step proceeds by proposing a new η′ from a distribution qη (η′|η),
which is accepted with probability
αη (η, η
′, g, θs) =
{
1,
W (η′) pi (g,X, θ; η′) qη (η|η′)
W (η) pi (g,X, θ; η) qη (η′|η)
}
(B.32)
Similar ideas apply to random coefficients. One possibility is to estimate a specification
with random coefficient at the network level.
θp = θp0 +
C∑
c=1
θpcZc + ξc (B.33)
where Zc is a network-level variable for network c, and ξc ∼ N (0, σξ).
The estimation method is flexible enough to allow for estimation when there are missing
links. The Add Health dataset could raise some concern about missing links, since the
original questionnaire asks students to report up to 5 male and 5 female friends. If a student
has more than 5 male friends, those are missing from the dataset.
Using the Bayesian algorithm provided in this paper one could easily deal with the missing
links. The algorithm cab be modified to include an additional simulation step that generates
the missing links gmis, given the observed network data gobs and the current parameter vector.
Then the algorithm proceeds with the exchange algorithm as before using the augmented
data g = {gmis, gobs}.
The main cost of these extensions is the increased computational burden, which may be
substantial.
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APPENDIX C
TECHNICAL APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 4
C.1 Derivation of the Pseudo-Likelihood
In order to perform the estimation procedure I need to initialize the vector of parameters
θ. A popular choice in the literature is the Maximum Pseudo-Likelihood estimator (MPLE)
as suggested in Geyer and Thompson (1992), Snijders (2002), Besag (1974) and Nakajima
(2007). In this section, I derive the Pseudo-Likelihood for my model.
PL (g; θ,X) =
∏
ij
Pr (Gij = gij|G−ij = g−ij, X)
=
∏
ij
exp
[
gij
(
uij + gjimij +
∑
k 6=i,j
gjkvik +
∑
k 6=i,j
gkivkj
)]
1 + exp
[
uij + gjimij +
∑
k 6=i,j
gjkvik +
∑
k 6=i,j
gkivkj
]
=
∏
ij
exp [θ′gij∆t (g−ij, X)]
1 + exp (θ′∆t (g−ij, X))
(C.1)
Taking logs we get
logPL (g; θ,X) =
∑
i
∑
j
gij
(
uij + gjimij +
∑
k 6=i,j
gjkvik +
∑
k 6=i,j
gkivkj
)
−
∑
i
∑
j
log
[
1 + exp
(
uij + gjimij +
∑
k 6=i,j
gjkvik +
∑
k 6=i,j
gkivkj
)]
= θ′
∑
i
∑
j
gij∆t (g−ij, X)−
∑
i
∑
j
log [1 + exp (θ′∆t (g−ij, X))]
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Let’s rewrite the equation as
`(θ) = logPL (g; θ,X)
=
∑
i
∑
j
gij
K∑
k=1
θk∆tk (g−ij, X)−
∑
i
∑
j
log
[
1 + exp
(
K∑
k=1
θk∆tk (g−ij, X)
)]
Therefore the First order conditions are
∂`(θ)
∂θk
=
∑
i
∑
j
gij∆tk (g−ij, X)−
∑
i
∑
j
∆tk (g−ij, X)
exp
(∑K
k=1 θk∆tk (g−ij, X)
)
1 + exp
(∑K
k=1 θk∆tk (g−ij, X)
)
=
∑
i
∑
j
∆tk (g−ij, X) [gij − pij]
where I defined
pij ≡
exp
(∑K
k=1 θk∆tk (g−ij, X)
)
1 + exp
(∑K
k=1 θk∆tk (g−ij, X)
)
The Hessian is therefore
∂2`(θ)
∂θk∂θs
= −{
∑
i
∑
j
∆tk (g−ij , X) [∆ts (g−ij , X)
exp
(∑K
k=1 θk∆tk (g−ij , X)
)
[
1 + exp
(∑K
k=1 θk∆tk (g−ij , X)
)]2
×
[
1 + exp
(
K∑
k=1
θk∆tk (g−ij , X)
)]
−
exp
(∑K
k=1 θk∆tk (g−ij , X)
)
[
1 + exp
(∑K
k=1 θk∆tk (g−ij , X)
)]2 ∆ts (g−ij , X)
[
exp
(
K∑
k=1
θk∆tk (g−ij , X)
)]
]}
= −
∑
i
∑
j
∆tk∆ts
exp
(∑K
k=1 θk∆tk
)
[
1 + exp
(∑K
k=1 θk∆tk
)]2
[
1 + exp
(
K∑
k=1
θk∆tk
)]
−
∑
i
∑
j
∆tk
exp
(∑K
k=1 θk∆tk
)
[
1 + exp
(∑K
k=1 θk∆tk
)]2 ∆ts
[
exp
(
K∑
k=1
θk∆tk
)]
= −
∑
i
∑
j
∆tk∆tspij [1− pij ]
The maximizer can be found with a standard Newton-Raphson algorithm
θ(n+1) = θ(n) −
[
∂2
∂θ∂θ′
`(θ(n))
]−1
∂
∂θ
`(θ(n)) (C.2)
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C.2 Maximum Likelihood estimation problem
The parameters are estimated using Maximum Likelihood methods. The log-likelihood is
denoted by ` (gobs; θ), where gobs is the observed network, and the parameters are solution of
the maximization problem
θˆmle = arg max
θ∈Θ
` (gobs; θ) (C.3)
I exploit a property of the exponential family to obtain an estimation method that avoids
the use of exponentials. The solution of the maximization problem (C.3) is equivalent to the
solution of the system of nonlinear equations
t (gobs, X) = Epi,θ [t (ω,X)] (C.4)
where t (gobs, X) is the vector of observed sufficient statistics, and Epi,θ [t (ω,X)] is the vector
of expected sufficient statistics in the stationary equilibrium of the model at parameter θ.
The system (C.4) corresponds to the first order conditions of (C.3). The derivation is simple,
starting from the likelihood function computed at the observed network gobs
pi (gobs, X; θ) =
exp [
∑
k θktk (gobs, X)]∑
ω∈G
exp [
∑
k θktk (ω,X)]
Therefore the first order conditions with respect to parameter θk are
tk (gobs, X)
∑
ω∈G
exp
[∑
k
θktk (ω,X)
]
=
∑
ω∈G
tk (ω,X) exp
[∑
k
θktk (ω,X)
]
tk (gobs, X) =
∑
ω∈G
tk (ω,X)
exp [
∑
k θktk (ω,X)]∑
ω∈G
exp [
∑
k θktk (ω,X)]
tk (gobs, X) = E [tk (ω,X; θ)]
The formulation of the problem as in (C.4) suggests a simple Monte Carlo technique for
estimation. Given a specific value of θ we can draw sample networks from the stationary
distribution and compute the sample mean of the sufficient statistics. The problem is to find
the θˆ that equates the sample mean to the observed sufficient statistics.
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This simple strategy is computationally inefficient since for each iteration at a given pa-
rameter value one has to draw a new sample, simulating from the stationary distribution.
Even assuming that the simulation is very fast (which is not the case here) one ends up
discarding a lot of generated samples.1
I solve the system of equations using the Robins-Monro stochastic approximation algo-
rithm (Robins and Monro, 1951).2 The idea behind this method is to generate a Markovian
sequence of parameters whose mean converges to the solution of the equation. In this sense
it is a sequential estimation method and it can be thought of as a Monte Carlo version of
the Newton-Raphson algorithm.
I use several properties of the exponential family of distributions in developing the algo-
rithm (see Lehman (1983)). The Hessian of the maximum likelihood problem is equivalent
to the variance-covariance matrix of the sufficient statistics, i.e.
COV(tk(g,X, θ), tl(g,X, θ)) =
∂2pi
∂θk∂θl
(C.5)
for all k, l. The asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of the maximum likelihood estimates
AsyV (θmle) is the inverse of (C.5).
AsyV (θmle) = [COV(t(g,X, θ))]−1 (C.6)
Since none of these quantities can be computed analytically, I estimate them using Markov
Chain Monte Carlo methods.
The original Robins-Monro algorithm sequentially updates the parameters using the re-
cursion
θˆ(r+1) = θˆ(r) − arD−1r
[
t(g(r), X, θ)− t(gobs, X)
]
(C.7)
1In this sense the MCMC-MLE method is the most computationally efficient, since it requires to draw a
single sample to perform the maximization.
2Kushner and Yin (2003) provide an extensive review of the literature on stochastic approximation
and applications of the algorithm. Snijders (2002) proposes to use Robins-Monro for the estimation of
Exponential Random Graph Models (ERGM).
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where the gain ar is a sequence of positive numbers that converges to zero as r goes to
infinity (usually 1/r) and
Dr =
∂E
[
t
(
ω,X, θ(r)
)− t(gobs, X)]
∂θ
= COV(t(g,X, θ)) (C.8)
The second equality follows from the properties of the exponential family. It can be shown
that the sequence θˆ(r) is Markov and it is asymptotically normal (see Snijders (2002) and
Kusher and Yin (2003)).
θˆ(r) → N
(
θ,
1
n
COV(t(g,X, θ))−1
)
(C.9)
Since for each iteration the matrix Dr must be re-estimated through simulation from the
current parameter θˆ(r), this procedure is computationally inefficient and it can be improved.
It can be shown that if Dr is positive definite then a constant matrix D0 can be used as long
as the average of the sequence θˆ(r) is used as estimate for θ and the gain sequence is slightly
modified. This is the case here since Dr is the variance-covariance matrix of the sufficient
statistics.
Therefore the algorithm follows the steps suggested in Snijders (2002)
1. Guess a θ(0)
2. Run the Simulated Tempering algorithm to generate a sample
{
t(g(s), X, θˆ(0))
}S
s=1
3. Estimate D0 in (4.14) as
Dˆ0 = diag
[
1
S
S∑
s=1
t(g(s), X, θˆ(0))t(g(s), X, θˆ(0))T − t¯0t¯T0
]
(C.10)
where t¯0 = S
−1∑S
s=1 t(g
(s), X, θˆ(0)) is the average of the simulated sufficient statistics.
Plug the estimated Dˆ0 in (4.13).
4. At iteration r (r = 1, ...R), run the Simulated Tempering at parameter θˆ(r) to generate
a sample network g(r). Compute t(g(r), X, θˆ(r)).
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5. Iterate (4.13) one step ahead
θˆ(r+1) = θˆ(r) − aD−10
[
t(g(r), X, θˆ(r))− t(gobs, X)
]
(C.11)
6. Repeat steps 4-5 until approximate convergence is reached.
7. Once convergence is achieved, use the estimated θˆ = (1/R)
∑R
r=1 θˆ
(r) to run the Simu-
lated Tempering algorithm and generate a sample
{
t(g(s), X, θˆ)
}S
s=1
8. Estimate the standard errors of the parameters as
̂AsyV (θmle) =
[
1
S
S∑
s=1
t(g(s), X, θˆ)t(g(s), X, θˆ)T − t¯t¯T
]−1
(C.12)
where t¯ = S−1
∑S
s=1 t(g
(s), X, θˆ).
C.3 Simulation Methods
C.3.1 The Main Building Blocks
The dynamic of model replicates the Gibbs Sampler dynamics, as noted above. Therefore the
simulation through Gibbs Sampling appears the natural candidate in this setting. However,
any MCMC algorithm that converges to the stationary distribution of interest is of practical
interest. If a sampler satisfies the detailed balance condition is suitable for the simulation of
the network model3
Pr [g′|g] pi (g) = Pr [g|g′] pi (g′) (C.13)
In particular I use the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm in order to sample networks from
the stationary distribution for estimation. For each iteration one element gij of the matrix
is randomly selected and it is proposed to swap its value to 1− gij.
3 I have proven that the Gibbs sampler satisfies this condition in the proof of Theorem 1 in Mele (2010b),
when the meeting process is symmetric. The proof for the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is contained in
Proposition 3 of Mele (2010b).
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ALGORITHM 5 Metropolis-Hastings Algorithm Start at some g0. One simple choice
is the observed network gobs.
1. At the current state g select an element gij of the matrix with probability q = 1/(n(n−
1))
2. Update the network from g to g′ = (1− gij, g−ij) with probability
r (g, g′) = min {1, exp [Q(g′, X, θ)−Q(g,X, θ)]} (C.14)
This is a variant of ALGORITHM 1 in Mele (2010b). There are both a theoretical and a
practical reason for using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm instead of the Gibbs sampler.
First, it is known that in the context of exponential family the Gibbs sampler produces a lot
more rejections of the proposed states than the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.4 Therefore
the Gibbs sampler remains in the same state for long times and the mixing is slow (see more
detail below). Second, most of the techniques I use to accelerate the mixing and the speed
of computations are easier to apply in the Metropolis-Hasting context.
C.3.2 Slow Mixing
In theory any MCMC scheme satisfying the detailed balance is succesful in producing sam-
ples from the stationary distribution of the model, provided that the researcher is willing to
run the chain for a long enough amount of time (Geyer (1991)). However in models with
large state spaces or when the distribution is multimodal, the MCMC may require unfeasible
long runs to reach a reasonable mixing rate. In this context the problem is serious enough
to require drastic changes in the MCMC scheme to speed up convergence. Proposition 3 in
Mele (2010b) provides bounds to the convergence of the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. The
4See Snijders (2002) for a discussion
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result suggests that to improve convergence it is necessary to modify the transition prob-
ability of the sampler, to decrease the second highest eigenvalue. This can be achieved by
modifying the proposal q and by accelerating the exploration of the state space with larger
steps.
I tackle this problem using several improvements of the basic Metropolis-Hasting scheme,
with three main goals: 1) increase mixing; 2) decrease the sample size needed for simulations;
3) decrease the variance of the estimates.
C.3.3 Large Steps
In many application it is convenient to propose larger steps.5 Geyer (1991) suggests a swap
step, where it is proposed to update the current state of the chain with his complement.
Snijders (2001 and 2002) suggests a similar step in the context of the exponential random
graphs models: the proposal is to swap the current network g to the complement 1− g, i.e.
the network matrix is inverted so that all the entries with 1 become 0, and viceversa.
Snijders (2002) argues that this step is extremely useful when the stationary distribution
is bimodal, since it allows the chain to jump from one mode to the other more easily.6
I use the swap step in my simulation. In each iteration of the sampler with probability
pinv a swap is proposed and it is accepted with probability
pswap (1− g, g) = min {1, exp [Q(1− g,X, θ)−Q(g,X, θ)]} (C.15)
which satisfies the detailed balance condition.
However, ideally one is looking for a scheme that allows to explore the entire state space
without knowing too much about the shape of the distribution. Therefore I combine this
5Most MCMC algorithms suggest small steps: a typical Gibbs sampler cycles through each ele-
ment/variable of the state in a systematic order, updating only a single element per iteration.
As noted in Geyer (1991) there is no reason to restrict the practice of MCMC to only Gibbs or Metropolis-
Hasting alone algorithms. As long as the chain generated by the algorithm has the right stationary distribu-
tion, the ergodic theorem insures convergence of the estimated averages.
6 The example provided by Geyer (1991) is the Ising model, which has a bimodal stationary distribution
for some parameter values. The stationary distribution of the Ising Model is a two-parameter exponential
family with normalizing constant, similar to the model used here
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Figure C.1: A. Bimodal Distribution
technique with other MCMC schemes.
C.3.4 Tempering
Simulated Tempering (Marinari and Parisi(1992), Geyer and Thompson (1995)) is an MCMC
scheme that involves simulation from different MCMC samplers. This produces a long chain
that contains variable length runs from each sampler and switches among samplers.
The intuition of the procedure is simple and resembles closely the simulated annealing
algorithm used in optimization. Assume that the stationary distribution of the network
model is the black distribution of Figure C.1. The distribution is bimodal and the modes
are separated by a very steep valley. Starting from a network g0 a proposed network g1 will
be accepted by the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. But in order to reach the alternative
mode, the algorithm should accept a sequence of downhill moves until it reaches g2. This
sequence has very low probability to occur. Therefore the sampler remains trapped in one
mode for a very long period: it eventually reaches the alternative mode, but it may take
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Figure C.2: B. Simulated Tempering Intuition
unfeasible long runs of the chain to do so.
Consider instead the blue and red distributions in Figure C.2. These are obtained from
the black distribution pi(g) by tempering, i.e. the blue has stationary distribution pi(g)1/τ1
and the red pi(g)1/τ2 , with 1 < τ1 < τ2. A Metropolis-Hastings algorithm that has the blue
or red distribution as stationary distribution is much more likely to switch among modes,
since the hills are much flatter than the original distribution.
The simulated tempering algorithm samples from the different chains in sequence, switch-
ing from the original target distribution (black) to the next tempered distribution (blue),
from the latter (blue) to the third tempered distribution (red) and viceversa. Only the sam-
ples obtained from the original target distribution are used to estimate the average sufficient
statistics: the tempered distributions are used only for fast exploration of the state space
and to avoid that the sampler remains trapped in one of the modes.
More formally, the state of the chain is described by the pair (τ (r), g(r)), where τ (r) is
the indicator of the current sampler (the temperature) and g(r) is the state of the chain at
iteration r. Let h (g) ≡ exp [Q (g,X, θ)] be the unnormalized density associated with the
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stationary distribution pi(g,X, θ).
There are m unnormalized densities hτ (g), where τ = τ1, .., τm, defined over the same state
space G. The stationary distribution of the chain obtained from simulated tempering is
hst(g, τ) ∝ hτ (g)Kτ (C.16)
where the constants Kτ , called pseudopriors, are chosen by the researcher so that the chain
spends roughly the same time in each temperature. Geyer and Thompson (1995) show that
the optimal value for the constants is Kτ = 1/
∑
ω∈G hτ (ω). The probabilities of switching
among temperatures are governed by a random walk with transition probabilities qτ,τ ′ , such
that q1,2 = qm,m−1 = 1 and qτ,τ+1 = qτ,τ−1 = 1/2.
ALGORITHM 6 (Simulated Tempering) Start the iteration at current state (τ (r), g(r))
1. Update g(r+1) with a Metropolis-Hastings step using hτ (r)(g) (propose the swap step with
probability pinv and the one-link update with probability 1− pinv)
2. Pick τ ′ = τ ± 1 according to probabilities qτ,τ ′
3. Accept the transition from temperature τ (r) = τ to τ (r+1) = τ ′ with probability
αST = min
{
1,
hτ ′(g
(r))Kτ ′qτ ′,τ
hτ (g(r))Kτqτ,τ ′
}
(C.17)
Only the samples from the cold distribution hτ1(g) are used to compute the average sufficient
statistics. The Simulated Tempering sampler mixes better than the original Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm, since the heated temperatures allow the chain to visit all states.
In order to compute and update the pseudopriors, I use the stochastic approximation
algorithm proposed in Geyer and Thompson (1995).
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C.3.5 Accelerating the Simulated Tempering Algorithm
The most unappealing feature of the simulated tempering is that it is computationally inef-
ficient, since it discards all the samples generated by the hot temperatures. I borrow some
suggestions from Li, Protopopescu and Gorin (2004), to speed up the simulated tempering
algorithm.
The first improvement consists of switching among temperatures using asymmetric proba-
bilities qi,i+1 < qi,i−1, such that lower temperatures are visited more often.7 I use qi,i+1 = 1/3
and qi,i−1 = 2/3 in the empirical implementation.
The second improvement consists of using larger steps for higher temperatures than for
the lower ones. Since the only relevant samples are the ones from the cold distribution, there
is no need to sample at great detail at higher temperatures. Therefore, I use larger steps
for higher temperatures, modifying the probability of a swap update of the network. The
probability is now pinv(τ) and I set pinv(1) = .1 and pinv(τ + 1) = pinv(τ) + .02.
The previous improvements modify the algorithm directly, but an increase in the speed of
simulation can be achieved by modifying the storage of the data. I use the sparsity of the
network to speed up the computations of the sufficient statistics and the Metropolis-Hastings
updates. I store the network matrix in Compressed Sparse Row (CSR) form and use sparse
matrix algebra routines to compute the network statistics.8 I adapt various codes from the
package SPARSEKIT, available online at
http://www-users.cs.umn.edu/ saad/software/SPARSKIT/sparskit.html.
7This is the same random walk across temperatures, but it is asymmetric.
8A description of the different storage modes is contained in the vignette pdf for the package SparseM,
an R package designed to implement sparse matrix algebra in the R software environment. The vignette is
available at http://www.econ.uiuc.edu/ roger/research/sparse/SparseM.pdf.
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